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Abstract
The Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry was created on September 6, 1861. Men
throughout the southern counties of Ohio flocked to Jackson, Ohio to join the new regiment.
Poor leadership, supply issues, and inexperience immediately plagued the Fifty-Third Ohio. The
Ohioans first experienced enemy fire on the morning of April 6, 1862 at the Battle of Shiloh.
Throughout the war, the Fifty-Third Ohio fought at many battles including Vicksburg,
Chattanooga, and Atlanta. More than any other conflict, the regiment’s first combat experience
remained linked to its reputation and honor. During the opening fight at Shiloh, the regiment was
ordered to retreat by its commanding officer, Colonel J.J. Appler. However, two companies
remained on the line and order was restored to the majority of the regiment through the efforts of
Ephraim C. Dawes, James Percy, Wells S. Jones, and others. Even though the regiment remained
heavily engaged in the fight, and continued to engage the enemy the following day, it was
publicly berated for cowardice by its division commander, General William Tecumseh Sherman.
Union leadership’s desire to clear themselves from the accusation of surprise at Shiloh created
scapegoats out of regiments like the Fifty-Third Ohio. Due in large part to the concepts of honor
and manhood during the Civil War Era, the men of the regiment sought to clear their individual
honor and collective reputation from the perceived stain of Shiloh. Newspapers and Union
leadership initially derided the regiment for Shiloh. Even after the blame for the early withdraw
was attached directly to Appler, the Fifty-Third Ohio was not entirely free from the accusations
and innuendos of Shiloh. The regiment’s successful service later in the war was unjustly tainted
by the lingering perceptions of its first combat experience at Shiloh. Unfortunately, the
reputation of the Fifty-Third Ohio remained frozen in negativity due to the lack of major
scholarly interpretations on Shiloh during the first half of the Twentieth Century.
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Chapter 1
Historiography and Methodology

The Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry first encountered hostile fire on the morning of
April 6, 1862 at the Battle of Shiloh. The regiment arrived on the banks of the Tennessee River
as a part of the Union preparation to strike the heart of the western Confederacy at Corinth,
Mississippi. Although attached to the command of General William Tecumseh Sherman, the
regiment was under the direct leadership of the untested Colonel Jesse Appler. Union leadership
ordered the Fifty-Third Ohio to construct camp near the Shiloh Church in a dangerously exposed
position.1 An order not to construct defensive entrenchments soon followed. When the Rebel
forces attacked, the Fifty-Third Ohio was among the first Union regiments to meet the challenge.
The regiment fired a few devastating rounds before abandoning its position for safety upon the
order of its colonel.
Following the Battle of Shiloh, the Fifty-Third Ohio suddenly found itself in the role of
scapegoat for commanders searching to cover their own shortcomings and failures. First,
Sherman unjustly rebuked the regiment. This was followed by a series of unfortunate and
negative newspaper articles criticizing the Ohioans. Later, the newspapers turned their attention
to retreat of Colonel Appler without totally freeing the rest of the regiment from the stain of
Shiloh. Due to the volume of negativity, and its often-prestigious authors, the Fifty-Third Ohio
was stuck in a negative historiographical interpretation. However, these portrayals were
inaccurate and unjust. The Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry was wrongfully criticized for its
perceived failure at Shiloh, and became the subject of unjustly critical historiography that failed

E. C. Dawes, “My First Day under Fire at Shiloh,” in Sketches of War History, 1861-1865: Papers
Prepared for the Commandery of the State of Ohio, Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, 18901896, Volume IV, ed. W.H. Chamberlin (Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Company, 1896), 2.
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to take into account poor leadership, inadequate training, supply-chain issues, and General
Sherman’s scapegoating of the regiment.
In reality, the Fifty-Third Ohio’s contribution to Shiloh’s first day did not end with
Appler’s order to retreat. Several men from the regiment either ignored the order, or joined other
regiments to continue the fight. Companies A and F of the Fifty-Third Ohio held their ground in
spite of Appler’s order and the fierce Rebel fire. They eventually joined the Seventeenth Illinois
in defense of the Union’s left flank.2 Among the men who stayed on the frontlines was Wells S.
Jones. In contrast to Appler, Jones won the admiration of the regiment for his heroism at Shiloh
and was rewarded with command of the regiment.3 Jones acted as the Fifty-Third’s commander
for the majority of the war, earned the respect of his men through his heroism, and spearheaded
many of the regiment’s postwar reunions.4
The difference in the actions of Jones and Appler not only represented how the men of
the Fifty-Third Ohio responded to their first combat experience, but reflected the overall
inexperience of the soldiers at Shiloh. Shiloh horrified the civilian and military populations on
both sides after the number of dead and wounded were calculated.5 The stories that emerged
from Shiloh were a mixture of heroic tales and embarrassing cowardice. Like Wells S. Jones, the
Fifty-Third Ohio’s Regimental Adjunct Ephraim C. Dawes assisted in repulsing Confederate
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Robert N. Scott, ed., War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies, Series I: Volume X, Part I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1884), 265.
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John K. Duke, History of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry during the War of the Rebellion, 18611865 (Portsmouth: The Blade Printing Company, 1900), 23.
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Ulysses S. Grant, My Dearest Julia: The Wartime Letters of Ulysses S. Grant to His Wife (New York:
Library of America, 2018), 108.
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advances on the Union left flank after Appler’s retreat.6 However, other eyewitnesses claimed to
see the majority of the Fifty-Third flee without firing a shot.7 The battlefield was filled with
untested men who learned the nature of their personal courage on the morning of April 6, 1862.8
In the years following the Battle of Shiloh, the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry
received criticism for its performance during the battle’s opening round. For generations, the
historiography of the regiment’s performance during the Battle of Shiloh is almost unanimous in
its condemnation. In the immediate aftermath of the battle, General Sherman openly rebuked the
regiment for breaking in the face of the enemy.9 Fellow Union commander Don Carlos Buell
supported Sherman’s criticism by claiming the Fifty-Third Ohio “disappeared” from the field.10
However, Sherman was responsible for a major portion of the regiment’s failure. Overall, the
regiment repulsed the Confederate forces before falling victim to the order against constructing
fortifications and repeatedly alerted Union commanders to the presence of Rebel forces
advancing toward the Union line.11 Even though Colonel Jesse Appler ordered an unnecessary
and hasty retreat, members of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry continued the fight and
the regiment was the recipient of unwarranted criticism.

Dawes, “My First Day under Fire at Shiloh” in Sketches of War History, Volume IV, ed., W.H.
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Finding the truth about the Fifty-Third Ohio’s Shiloh story lies in a series of questions
split between examining the events of the battle and the post-war debate over who really failed
on Shiloh’s first day. First, how did the Fifty-Third’s leader, Colonel Jesse Appler, contribute to
the regiment’s collapse on April 6, 1862? Furthermore, in what ways were General Sherman and
the Union leadership responsible for the Fifty-Third failing to hold its line? After examining
these initial questions, combined with the regiment’s actions, it is possible to determine the true
cause of the regiment’s collapse.
Additionally, why did Sherman single out the Fifty-Third Ohio for harsh criticism?
Sherman never hesitated to rebuke the performance of the regiment. The general saved his most
critical remarks for the actions of Colonel Appler. While it is true that Appler ordered a retreat
after the regiment fired only two collective rounds, it is important to ask how the larger context
of the battle and the politics that followed impacted Sherman’s vicious rebukes of the regiment.
How did the criticism affect the men of the Fifty-Third O.V.I.? Moreover, it is important to ask
how the men of the Fifty-Third viewed the claims of their critics. How did the importance of
regimental reputation motive the men to answer their critics? Furthermore, understanding how
the stain of Shiloh motivated the men to clear their regiment’s name from the slander of Shiloh
during the remainder of the war provides interesting insight into era’s concept of honor.
Next, the question of how the Fifty-Third Ohio Infantry responded collectively and
individually to the accusation of fleeing in the face of the enemy is an important aspect of the
overall story. During the era of the Civil War, honor was an important part of a person’s
identity.12 This was especially true when it came to the perception of a soldier’s performance on

12
The concepts of honor, duty, courage, and manhood will be a reoccurring subject in the following
chapters. Among others, Peter S. Carmichael’s The War for the Common Soldier: How Men Thought, Fought, and
Survived in Civil War Armies, Lorien Foote’s The Gentlemen and the Roughs: Violence, Honor, and Manhood in the
Union Army, and James M. McPherson’s For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War provide the

5

the battlefield. The debate over whether the regiment underperformed, or was the victim of
Sherman leaving himself open to a surprise attack, filled the newspapers of southern Ohio and
the pages of National Tribune following the war. According to Sherman, the Battle of Shiloh
resulted in reports and accusations that were damaging to the personal character of the battle’s
veterans.13 However, this did not hinder Sherman from painting the Fifty-Third Ohio as a failed
regiment at Shiloh. The stain of breaking at Shiloh and the weight of Sherman’s rebuke emerged
as a major part of the regiment’s story.
Despite the debate over Shiloh, the Fifty-Third Ohio regained the trust and respect of
General Sherman by the war’s conclusion. Examining how the regiment changed Sherman’s
perception is a question that concludes the story of the regiment at the Battle of Shiloh. Wells S.
Jones, the Fifty-Third’s commanding officer following the removal of Jesse Appler, wrote a
glowing newspaper article praising Sherman following the general’s death. Jones even led a
memorial service for his old commander.14 In addition, Sherman praised the regiment’s
performance for the remainder of the war and wrote about the courage of the Fifty-Third Ohio at
other key conflicts. The events behind this reconciliation deserve an investigation. Even though
Sherman reversed his opinion of the regiment, his rebuke of its performance at Shiloh persisted.

context for these concepts in the following chapters. Specifically, chapter two explains how honor motivated the
men of the Fifty-Third Ohio to enlist while chapters five and six explain the role of honor and manhood in the
context of the regiment’s efforts to clear its name from the accusations of cowardice at Shiloh. In this regard,
McPherson approaches honor through the definitions of the Civil War Era and the influence of Victorian principles.
Foote argues that honor was an important factor in a soldier’s acquisition of the title of “man” during the antebellum
and Civil War periods. In addition, Carmichael explains that duty and codes of conducts influenced the creation of
armies and societies relying on the citizen-soldier. Overall, the concepts of honor, duty, courage, and manhood were
inescapably linked to service in Civil War armies.
13

William T. Sherman, Memoirs (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 2005), 229.
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Overall, the early Union war effort was plagued by supply issues and the failure to
properly prepare troops for combat. In this regard, the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry
arrived on the fields near the Shiloh Meeting House ill-prepared for its first Civil War battle. A
history of the Fifty-Third Ohio should examine how the regiment reflected the general problems
of the Union Army. The Civil War was the largest logistical challenge the United States had
addressed to that point in its history. Inevitably, there were major gaps in supplying weapons,
clothing, and food to U.S. soldiers. The problems facing the ill-trained and underequipped FiftyThird Ohio were not unique, but reflective of the Union war effort as a whole.15
The Fifty-Third Ohio is not a well-known regiment in Civil War history, but its story is
an important piece in constructing a complete history of the conflict. The regiment travelled with
Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman and fought in some of the Western Theater’s
most famous battles. Unfortunately, little work on the regiment exists outside of a memoir and
regimental history from John K. Duke of Company F in 1900.16 In addition, the men of the
regiment left extensive newspaper writings behind as a part of its debate over who was to blame
for the Union failure on Shiloh’s first day. While the regiment’s story is unique to the men who
served under its flag, it is also reflective of the larger Union war effort.
The Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry’s Civil War story began near the banks of the
Tennessee River in the Spring of 1862. Regrettably for the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio, their
initial encounter with combat was derided as a failure. The regiment’s actions at the Battle of

15

Earl J. Hess, Civil War Logistics: A Study of Civil War Transportation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 2017), 17-19; Specifically, Hess argues that the Civil War was the greatest logistical undertaking
in American history to that point. The size and scope of raising, training, supplying, and transporting armies on the
scale of the Civil War was beyond anything previously attempted. Inevitably, supply-chain issues plagued the
United States government.
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Shiloh represents an under-researched portion of Civil War history. The proper telling of their
story falls under the category of military history. However, this does not mean that the story is
strictly based on military maneuvers and battlefield tactics.17 The full story of the Fifty-Third
Ohio is a story of political, social, and cultural history.
To adequately tell the complete story of any Civil War regiment, a comprehensive
examination of the men who served, their communities, and the regiment’s place in the larger
context of the conflict is essential.18 The men of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry were
the product of the time and place they lived. Their opinions, worldviews, and political
persuasions were molded by their era and the people around them. Unlike a traditional military
history, the story of the Fifty-Third Ohio at the Battle of Shiloh must go beyond the battlefield.
The story of the regiment at Shiloh does not begin with the first shot of the battle. In the same
regard, the story does not end the moment the Union victory is secured.
Employing the approach to military history that emphasizes a regiment’s backstory as
much as its battlefield action further entrenches the story of the Fifty-Third Ohio into the broader
context of the Civil War.19 The men of the Fifty-Third Ohio were farmers, lumber workers, shop
keepers, merchants, and pastors before their lives were interrupted by the major political debate
of the time. More importantly, they were sons, husbands, brothers, uncles, friends, and members
of religious congregations. The story of the Fifty-Third Ohio at the Battle of Shiloh is not just

John A. Lynn, “Breaching the Walls of Academe: The Purpose, Problems, and Prospects of Military
History, “ Academic Questions 21, no. 1 (2018): 23-26.
17
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Robert M. Citino, “Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction,” The American Historical Review
112, no. 4 (October 2007): 1070-1090.
19
Earl J. Hess, “Revitalizing Traditional Military History in the Current Age of Civil War Studies,” in
Upon Fields of Battle: Essays on the Military History of America’s Civil War, ed. Andrew S. Bledsoe and Andrew
F. Lang (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2018), 28.
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about the men who faced ferocious enemy fire for the first time on April 6, 1862. The story is
also about the community, relatives, and friends who were left behind following the firing on
Fort Sumter. In this respect, the story of the regiment is not a traditional military history, but a
new style of military history that strives to tell the whole story of a military unit and its
background.20
Any attempt to accurately construct the history of the Fifty-Third Ohio at Shiloh should
be rooted in the words of the regiment’s soldiers and their Union comrades. Arguably, John K.
Duke’s regimental memoir provides the foundation for the Fifty-Third Ohio’s Shiloh story. Also,
Ephraim C. Dawes wrote extensively about the regiment until his death in 1895. His essays
about the regiment’s service during the Battle of Shiloh were printed for the Ohio Commadery of
the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States and in the Grand Army of the
Republic War Papers. Several members of the regiment left extensive accounts of the battle, and
provided detailed defenses of the unit’s actions at Shiloh, in the newspapers of southern Ohio. It
was in the Ohio newspapers, the National Tribune, and articles for Century Magazine that the
debate over who really failed during the opening moments of Shiloh emerged.
Along with the direct writings of the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio, the memoirs of
Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman provide valuable insight into Shiloh’s tactics and
maneuvers. Sherman’s memoir, along with an edited collection of his wartime letters, provide an
understanding of the general’s opinion of the Fifty-Third Ohio in relation to April 6, 1862.
Letters housed in various historical societies and libraries assist in accurately reconstructing the
overall history. Chicago’s Newberry Library, The State Historical Society of Missouri, the Ohio

Andrew S. Bledsoe and Andrew F. Lang, “Military History and the American Civil War,” in Upon the
Fields of Battle: Essays on the Military History of America’s Civil War, ed. Andrew S. Bledsoe and Andrew F. Lang
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2018), 5-9.
20
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History Connection, and the Ohio University Library house essential letters and writings that
form the basis of the following chapters’ conclusions.
This history of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry at Shiloh experienced a few slight
shifts in interpretation during the past 100 years. The regiment’s portrayal ranged from being a
detriment to Sherman’s attempts to hold his line near the Shiloh Meetinghouse, to being the unit
that properly alerted Union commanders to an eminent Rebel assault before wilting under enemy
fire. Even as the more complex interpretations arose, historians viewed the Fifty-Third Ohio’s
actions in a negative light. Inevitably, as Sherman’s value among historians rose, the Fifty-Third
Ohio’s reputation suffered in relation to the Battle of Shiloh.
No full historical work with exclusive focus on the Fifty-Third Ohio at Shiloh exists.
However, books about Sherman, Grant, and the whole Battle of Shiloh feature chapters and
small selections on the regiment. This placed the Fifty-Third Ohio’s Shiloh story at the mercy of
the battle’s military historians and Sherman biographers. A 1903 publication by the Ohio Shiloh
Battlefield Commission stated the Fifty-Third Ohio was unprepared for the battle and led by a
“coward.”21 The regiment’s story remained frozen in negative portrayals due to a dearth of
rehabilitation opportunities. As Civil War historian Timothy B. Smith noted in his collection of
essays Rethinking Shiloh: Myth and Memory, the Battle of Shiloh, and therefore the Fifty-Third
Ohio’s role, remained a neglected area of Civil War history until the second half of the
Twentieth Century.22
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T.J. Lindsey, Ohio at Shiloh; Report of the Commission (Cincinnati: C. J. Krehbiel & Co., 1903), 23-24.
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Timothy B. Smith, Rethinking Shiloh: Myth and Memory (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press,
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Examining the Fifty-Third Ohio’s Shiloh story provides an opportunity to not only better
understand the opening moments of the Battle of Shiloh, but to revisit the charges of cowardice
directed at the regiment. The Fifty-Third Ohio’s status as a failed regiment on April 6, 1861 does
not withstand an in-depth academic examination. Researching the regiment’s background, and
the personalities in its ranks, places the Fifty-Third Ohio into the larger context of the war. In
addition, after examining the overall debate between General Sherman’s popular version of
events and the accounts of the soldiers under his command, evidence arises that exonerates the
Fifty-Third Ohio. The chapters that follow will present the regiment in a new light. The FiftyThird Ohio is presented as a small piece of the larger problems facing the Union war effort in the
Western Theater in 1862. Poor supply lines, inadequate training, the failures of the Union high
command, and the need for a scapegoat in the aftermath of Shiloh were the real causes behind
the regiment’s perceived failure on the battle’s first day.
Shiloh, and the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry, were originally interpreted by the
biographers of William Tecumseh Sherman. Overall, early Civil War history was dominated by
the words and opinions of the conflict’s greatest, and most popular, leaders. General Sherman
emerged from the Civil War as one of the most popular figures above the Mason-Dixon Line.
His revolutionary tactics that broke the Rebel resistance in the deep South transformed Sherman
into a Union hero. However, Sherman’s popularity in the war’s immediate aftermath hindered
the Fifty-Third Ohio’s chance of rehabilitating the perception of its performance at Shiloh. This
is evident in the work of the early Sherman biographer, W. Fletcher Johnson. He firmly blamed
the “panic-stricken” soldiers serving under Sherman for the Union’s initial failure on April 6,
1862 in the book, Life of Wm. Tecumseh Sherman: Late Retired General, U.S.A. (1891).23
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W. Fletcher Johnson, Life of Wm. Tecumseh Sherman: Late Retired General, U.S.A. (Philadelphia:
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Specifically, Johnson called out the Fifty-Third Ohio for prematurely exiting the fight in a
chapter devoted to reprinting Sherman’s official report on the Battle of Shiloh.24
In 1932, Lloyd Lewis published his Sherman biography, Sherman: Fighting Prophet.
Lewis wrote several books on the key figures of the Civil War during the first part of the
Twentieth Century. Similarly to Johnson, Lewis features the Fifty-Third Ohio in his chapter on
the Battle of Shiloh. Unlike Johnson’s book, Sherman: Fighting Prophet heavily relies on the
Fifty-Third Ohio to explain the opening round of the battle. While Lewis does portray the overall
effort of the regiment in a negative manner, his interpretation argued that several members of the
regiment continued fighting following Appler’s call to retreat.25 Appler is again defined as
uneasy and failing to properly prepare his men for combat.26 While Lewis does argue that a few
members of the Fifty-Third showed bravery at Shiloh, the collective regiment is again portrayed
as failing to hold its position, and at least partly responsible for ineffectiveness of Sherman’s left
flank.27
John F. Marszalek’s 1993 biography of Sherman focuses on the actions of Appler as the
source of the Fifty-Third Ohio’s failures. While acknowledging that Sherman ignored the
warnings about the approaching Rebels, Marszalek justifies the general’s response by insinuating
that Appler was an unreliable source.28 Specifically, he writes that “Sherman ignored the

24

Ibid., 130.
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Lloyd Lewis, Sherman: Fighting Prophet (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), 119-221.
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Ibid., 220.
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Ibid., 199-221.

John F. Marazalek, Sherman: A Soldier’s Passion for Order (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
Press, 2007), 177.
28
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warning, considering the source.”29 However, Marszalek connects the actions of the Fifty-Third
Ohio to its colonel without giving the regiment proper context. No mention of the soldiers from
the Fifty-Third who refused to followed Appler’s retreat, or the fact that the regiment remained
in the fight for the duration of the battle, is found in the book. Marszalek simply states that
“within the hour, many men in Appler’s regiment, led by the colonel himself, had broken ranks
and were rushing to the rear.”30
As stated earlier, the Battle of Shiloh remained a surprisingly overlooked aspect of Civil
War history for several decades. The majority of the battle’s early histories were firsthand
accounts of soldiers and regiments that were engaged in the battle.31 However, these sources
influenced the works of later historians and were mostly categorized as memoirs rather than
historical interpretations. Works related to the Battle of Shiloh and its main participants were
published in the first half of the Twentieth Century but were small in number. Writings that
exclusively focused on the battle were in short supply in the late 1800s and early 1900s, but the
Battle of Shiloh increased in popularity following World War II.

29

Ibid.

30

Ibid.
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See Leander Stillwell, The Story of a Common Soldier (Kansas City: Franklin Hudson Publishing Co.,
1920); Lucius Barber, Army Memoirs (Chicago: The J.M.W. Jones Stationery and Printing Co., 1894); Charles B.
Kimbell, History of Battery “A,” First Light Artillery Volunteers (Chicago: Cushing Printing Company, 1899); John
A. Bering and Thomas Montgomery, History of the Forty-Eighth Ohio Vet. Vol. Inf: From its Organization at Camp
Dennison, O., in October, 1861, to the Close of the War, and its Final Muster-out, May 10, 1866 (Hillsboro: The
Highland News Office, 1880); John A. Cockerill, “A Boy at Shiloh,” in Sketches of War History, 1861-1865:
Papers Prepared for the Commandery of the State of Ohio, Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States,
1903-1908, Volume IV, ed. Theodore F. Allen, Edward S. McKee, and J. Gordon Taylor (Cincinnati: Monfort &
Company, 1908); William Preston Johnston, The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston: Embracing His Services in
the Armies of the United States, the Republic of Texas, and the Confederate States (New York: D. Appleton and
Company, 1878); Basil W. Duke, History of Morgan’s Cavalry (Cincinnati: Miami Printing and Publishing
Company, 1867); W.H. Chamberlain, History of the 81st Regiment Ohio Infantry Volunteers during the War of the
Rebellion (Cincinnati: Gazette Steam Printing House, 1865); E. C. Dawes, “My First Day under Fire at Shiloh,” in
Sketches of War History, 1861-1865: Papers Prepared for the Commandery of the State of Ohio, Military Order of
the Loyal Legion of the United States, 1890-1896, Volume IV, ed. W.H. Chamberlin (Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke
Company, 1896).
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Bruce Catton’s This Hallowed Ground, a one-volume history of the Civil War, was
originally published in 1955. Catton was a journalist and historian who molded the public’s
understanding of the Civil War during the 1950s and 1960s. He briefly mentioned the FiftyThird Ohio in his Shiloh section without any background information on the regiment. His
concise portrayal of the regiment mostly presented the Ohioans in a negative manner. Similar to
later historians, Catton presented Colonel Jesse Appler as a failed commander overcome by
fear.32 Catton argued that most of Appler’s men followed him off the battlefield as the regiment
willingly removed itself from the fighting.33
Two major works on the Battle of Shiloh were printed at roughly the same time breaking
the historical drought on works dedicated specifically to the battle. Wiley Sword’s Shiloh:
Bloody April and James Lee McDonough’s Shiloh: In Hell before Night were originally
published in 1974 and 1977 respectively. Sword, a Civil War historian and collector, painted a
negative picture of the Fifty-Third Ohio. Shiloh: Bloody April argued that the regiment was a
“source of trouble” for General Sherman.34 In addition, Sword portrayed the regiment’s leader,
Colonel Jesse Appler, as unfit for command of the Fifty-Third due to his status as an amateur
soldier.35 The book set the tone for how future generations viewed the regiment. No gallantry, or
even the benefit of a doubt, was extended to the Fifty-Third Ohio. Instead, Sword claimed it was
a regiment in “turmoil” led by a “bewildered” Colonel Appler who was the rightful recipient of
Sherman’s harassment.36

32

Bruce Catton, This Hallowed Ground (New York: Vintage Civil War Library, 2012), 114.
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Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April (Dayton: Press of Morningside Bookshop, 1988), 127.
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James Lee McDonough’s 1977 Shiloh: In Hell before Midnight echoed several of the
Sword’s claims. During his long career as a professor and a writer, historian James Lee
McDonough focused on the Civil War’s Western Theater. McDonough’s Shiloh presented the
Fifty-Third Ohio in mostly a negative manner. Similar to Sword, McDonough placed blame on
the regiment for failing to hold the Union line near the Shiloh Church. He also interpreted the
Fifty-Third as the victim of poor regimental leadership. McDonough argued that Appler,
“possessed no knowledge of drill or regulations and would flee from the front lines soon after the
battle began.”37
McDonough’s 1977 work was not the last time he presented the Fifty-Third Ohio in an
undesirable manner. In his biography of General Sherman, William Tecumseh Sherman: In the
Service of My Country, A Life (2016), he claimed that Sherman’s Shiloh Church line collapsed
due to the failure of the Fifty-Third Ohio.38 In the works of McDonough and Sword, the FiftyThird Ohio’s actions on April 6, 1862 are viewed as a disaster. Both historians argued that the
regiment’s leader was responsible for the collapse of Sherman’s left flank. In part, Colonel
Appler’s lack of training and status as an amateur soldier contributed to the regiment’s lack of
success. However, neither historian placed any significant blame on the commanders above
Appler and the Fifty-Third for their men being ill-prepared to face enemy fire.
Larry J. Daniel assisted in introducing the next step in the historiography of the FiftyThird Ohio at the Battle of Shiloh. As a historian, Daniel is a leading voice of the war’s Western
Theater. He has authored several books about the Union and Confederate soldiers fighting in the
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Mississippi region. His approach to the Fifty-Third Ohio at Shiloh differed from McDonough
and Sword. Whereas the initial portrayal of the regiment was one of complete failure as a unit
only viewed through its actions on April 6, 1862, Daniel presented a more complete picture of
the Fifty-Third. In his book Shiloh: The Battle That Changed the Civil War (1997), the first
major background information of Colonel Appler and the regiment appeared.39
In the works of McDonough and Sword, Colonel Jesse Appler and the Fifty-Third’s Civil
War story begins with the Battle of Shiloh. Very little background on the regiment is present
until Daniel’s 1997 work. Arguably, Daniel’s greatest contribution to the historiography of the
regiment was his argument that Appler and the regiment had previously won the praise of
Sherman following their first face-to-face meeting.40 In addition, Daniel argued that Appler’s
role in the pre-war Ohio Militia was one of the main recruiting draws of the regiment.41 Daniel
attacked the previous historiography that stated Sherman’s anger toward Appler’s intelligence
reports stemmed from Sherman’s distrust of Appler’s amateur status. Furthermore, Daniel’s
work on the battle was among the first to acknowledge that Sherman’s ignoring of Appler’s
intelligence reports resulted in Sherman being painted in a negative manner in Civil War
newspapers.42 Even though the portrayal of the Fifty-Third as a regiment who failed to hold its
position against the enemy remained, Larry J. Daniel’s 1997 work presented a more complete
picture of Colonel Appler, the Fifty-Third Ohio, and General Sherman.
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In 2007, James Bissland advanced Daniel’s approach in his book, Blood, Tears, and
Glory: How Ohioans Won the Civil War. At the time of the book’s publication, Dr. Bissland
focused his writings on the history of Ohio among other projects. Bissland’s portrayal of the
regiment’s role at Shiloh reflected the work of Daniel. Bissland furthered the argument that
Appler was viewed as a solid and capable leader before Shiloh.43 Similar to Daniel, Bissland
portrayed the actions of the Fifty-Third as honorable and appropriate in the buildup to battle.
While his history of the Fifty-Third at Shiloh only occupied three pages, Bissland clearly placed
blame on Sherman for the Union’s failure on the battle’s first day. Bissland described Sherman
as, “brushing off warning signs” about the pending Confederate attack.44 Like Daniel, Bissland
blamed Appler for the regiment’s failures under fire, but argued that the failure to prepare for the
enemy’s attack was rests firmly on General Sherman.
Arguably, no historians have written more about the battle of Shiloh and the overall war
in the Western Theater than Steven E. Woodworth and Timothy B. Smith. As historians of the
Battle of Shiloh, both continued to move the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry toward a wellrounded interpretation. Neither historian has written a full book or scholarly article exclusively
on the regiment, but both have produced multiple works that feature the Fifty-Third Ohio during
Shiloh’s first day. The works of these historians placed the Ohio regiment into the greater
context of the battle and the war’s earliest days. In this regard, their works resembled the
interpretations of Larry J. Daniel and James Bissland more than James L. McDonough and Wiley
Sword.
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Steven E. Woodworth not only published several works on the battle of Shiloh, but he
also wrote on the military career of General William Tecumseh Sherman. As a historian and a
professor at Texas Christian University, Woodworth published Nothing but Victory: The Army of
the Tennessee, 1861-1865 in 2005. The book chronicled the entirety of the Army of the
Tennessee’s Civil War service. His assessment of the Fifty-Third Ohio’s performance at Shiloh
presented a more balanced history than Sherman biographers, such as McDonough, and early
historians of the battle. Woodworth argued that the Fifty-Third Ohio repeatedly tried to bring the
enemy presence to Sherman’s attention before the first official shots of the battle were fired.45
While the attempts to alert Sherman to an enemy presence is consistently found in all scholarly
works on Shiloh, the idea that Sherman shared a major portion of the blame for the battle’s first
day emerged during the late 1900s and early 2000s.
Woodworth’s interpretation of the buildup to the Battle of Shiloh placed the Fifty-Third
Ohio into the larger context of the fight and the debates that followed. In Nothing but Victory,
Woodworth portrayed Colonel Appler as a competent, although nervous, commander in the
buildup to battle in a manner reminiscent of Bissland and Daniel.46 The book furthered the
argument that Sherman was taken by surprise by the presence of Rebel soldiers on the morning
of April 6th. Woodworth removed the entirety of the blame for the Union’s early failures from
the Fifty-Third Ohio and implicated Sherman by writing, “for the past few days he had played
the fool,” in reference to Sherman’s unwillingness to believe Appler’s reports.47 However,
Woodworth somewhat exonerates Sherman and the Union leadership in 2009’s The Shiloh
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Campaign by stating that no defensive entrenchments were employed by either side in the war’s
earliest days.48 Overall, Woodworth’s works presented a more balanced interpretation to the
argument between the Fifty-Third Ohio and General Sherman over who failed during the battle’s
opening moment.
In 2006’s Shiloh: A Battlefield Guide published by the Southern Illinois Press,
Woodworth continued the rehabilitation of the Fifty-Third Ohio with another balanced approach.
Cowriting with Mark Grimsley of Ohio State University, the book stated that the regiment
initially sent devastating fire into the line of the Sixth Mississippi.49 Woodworth and Grimsley
reiterated the claim that Appler’s original actions were appropriate before his nerves
overwhelmed his judgement. In addition, the book continued the trend of placing more blame on
Sherman for the April 6th failures.50 Woodworth and Grimsley stated that Sherman’s ability to
process the intelligence reports was clouded by his preconceived idea that the Confederates were
too demoralized to launch a major attack after Fort Donelson and Fort Henry.51 Shiloh: A
Battlefield Guide listed this failure as the, “lowest ebb of Sherman’s career.”52
Timothy B. Smith somewhat returned to the negative portrayal of the regiment and
Colonel Appler in Shiloh: Conquer or Perish (2014). Again, Appler’s nervousness and lack of
professional military training was brought to the foreground.53 However, Smith continued the
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historiographical shift toward the complete picture approach. Smith was among the first
historians to connect, although briefly, Sherman to the Fifty-Third Ohio in the debate over who
was to blame for the Union’s early collapse.54 Similar accounts appear in Smith’s other works on
the battle of Shiloh. The Untold Story of Shiloh: The Battle and the Battlefield and Rethinking
Shiloh: Myth and Memory interpret the battle, Sherman, and the Fifty-Third in the same manner.
Arguably, no one brought the Fifty-Third Ohio closer to a full rehabilitation through a
major historiographical shift than historian Ed Bearss. Working in the capacity as Historian
Emeritus of the U.S. National Park Service at the time In Fields of Honor: Pivotal Battles of the
Civil War (2006) was published, Bearss placed the regiment into a more complete interpretation
between the roles of Sherman and the regiment at Shiloh. He stated that the regiment was more
successful in its duties than most historians have noticed.55 Specifically, Bearss stated, “the 53rd
Ohio puts up a good fight-not as feeble as many writers report.”56 In addition, Bearrs advanced
the idea that Sherman bore the majority of the blame for the battle’s poor start by writing that
Sherman was unalarmed and unconcerned about the reports of approaching Rebels.57
Winston Groom’s 2013 book Shiloh, 1862 again presented the complete picture of the
Fifty-Third Ohio, Sherman, and Shiloh’s opening round. Arguably, no historian has dedicated as
many pages to the regiment as Groom. As a historian and writer, Groom previously wrote about
the Army of the Tennessee in Vicksburg, 1863. Although written more for a popular than
academic audience, his portrayal of the regiment was consistent with historiographical trend of
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his contemporaries. Groom argued that Appler sent the intelligence reports to a dismissive
Sherman who failed to appreciate their seriousness.58 Again, Appler and the Fifty-Third are
presented as a mixture of courageous and disastrous. However, like the other works on Shiloh,
Grooms does not attempt to fully answer who was to blame for the Union’s failures on April 6,
1862.
In 2019’s Attack at Daylight and Whip Them: The Battle of Shiloh, April 6-7, 1862 by
Gregory A Mertz, the trend of presenting the Fifty-Third as the focal point of a complex story
continued. Mertz, a historian and preservationist who worked for the National Parks Service,
argued that the regiment and Colonel Appler acted appropriately in their response to the enemy
presence.59 While the book does place Appler and the regiment’s failures at the forefront of its
chapter on the Fifty-Third Ohio, Mertz stops short of a complete condemnation. He follows the
historiographical shift of Daniel, Bissland, Woodworth, and Smith by arguing that the regiment
was placed in an unwinnable situation by its commanders.60 Even though Mertz does not
implicate Sherman as much as other historians, his book does reflect the growing trend of
showing a complete picture of the events of April 6, 1862.
While the story of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry at Shiloh exists in the pages of
books on the Battle of Shiloh and biographies of William Tecumseh Sherman, the most obvious
gap in the historiography is the fact that no full-length book has been published on the topic. The
regiment’s story is only told as a part of the larger story. However, these works still do not
adequately place the regiment into the larger context of the war. The Fifty-Third Ohio usually
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appears to explain the start of the battle and then disappears following the initial collapse of
Sherman’s line. In this regard, a thorough history of the regiment’s birth through the debate over
who was to blame for the Union initial failures is needed. To date, the only book that exclusively
focuses on the regiment is the regimental memoir History of the Fifty-Third Regiment Ohio
Volunteer Infantry during the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865 by John K. Duke (1900).61
The lack of works placing the regiment into the larger context of the battle and the debate
that followed is evident in where its story does not appear. Even though the regiment is featured
prominently in the biographies of General Sherman, the Fifty-Third Ohio is absent in the recent
biographies of General Grant. Ron Chernow, H.W. Brands, and Ronald C. White do not mention
the regiment as a part of the buildup to the Battle of Shiloh, or as a factor in the battle’s earliest
clash. The Fifty-Third Ohio as a reflection of the larger war is a valuable and needed addition to
the historiography of the regiment and the war.
Furthermore, the lack of works focused on the debate between the regiment and General
Sherman on who failed to secure his left flank represent a monument gap in the topic’s
historiography. The men of the Fifty-Third wrote numerous newspaper articles in an attempt to
clear the regiment’s name from the charge of cowardice. In addition, Sherman was haunted by
the accusation of being caught off guard and surprised by the Rebel attack. Sherman often used
the regiments under him, especially the Fifty-Third Ohio, as a scapegoat. Exploring how the men
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felt about this issue, as well as the reasons behind why they chose to respond, is a glaring
omission in the historiography of the Fifty-Third Ohio and the Battle of Shiloh.
To address the gaps in the regiment’s historiography at the Battle of Shiloh, the following
chapters are based on a series of research questions. The second chapter’s goal is to place the
Fifty-Third Ohio into the context of the time and place. Coming from a state considered to be a
part of the “west,” the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio were molded by their experiences on the
edges of American civilization. The regiment’s home counties were politically complex. The
southern portion of Ohio did not overwhelmingly support Abraham Lincoln during the 1860
president election, but a sizable portion of the region’s male population joined the Union army
without hesitation. Chapter two examines these complexities during the early stages of the Civil
War in Ohio.
Chapter two is built on asking three key questions. First, the chapter intends to answer
how the overall population of Ohio responded to the outbreak of war and Lincoln’s call for
volunteers. In addition, why did Ohioans vote the way they did in the 1860s election is a key
question in the chapter. Finally, the chapter asks how Ohioans viewed slavery and the debate that
surrounded it. Even though the Federal goals in the early days of the Civil War were only to find
ways to preserve the Union, Ohio had been on the front lines of the fugitive slave debate. The
state, especially the southern portion where the Fifty-Third Ohio originated, bordered a slave
state and became a central piece of the Underground Railroad. How did the issue of slavery
impact the politics of Ohio and its citizens’ view of the rebellion? Overall, how did the political
and social conditions in Ohio create regiments like the Fifty-Third Ohio?
Chapter two also focuses on the origins of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry.
Another of the chapter’s key questions focuses on why the men of southern Ohio joined the
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regiment. How did the regiment’s leadership convince men to leave their farms, shops, mills,
friends, and families to join a war that would take them away from their homes? Chapter two
also asks how the conditions of the regiment’s training camp in Jackson, Ohio impacted the
men’s opinion of the war. Finally, the chapter examines if the men were adequately prepared for
the war they would be joining at the Battle of Shiloh. The carnage of the Civil War appeared to
surprise everyone involved including the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio.
Chapter three examines the regiment’s journey from Jackson, Ohio to Paducah, Kentucky
before ending with the Ohioans setting up camp in Rea Field near the Shiloh Meetinghouse. The
chapter explores the initial meeting between General William Tecumseh Sherman and the FiftyThird Ohio. Then, the chapter asks why the regiment came to Pittsburg Landing and what events
placed them in the direct path of the Battle of Shiloh. Furthermore, chapter three examines the
preparedness of the regiment for Civil War combat and how Union command viewed the
growing threat of a possible Confederate attack. The factors that led to the regiment being
undermanned and ill-prepared for the clash are also examined. Finally, the chapter concludes by
asking why the Fifty-Third Ohio, a regiment without prior combat experience, was placed so far
from the Tennessee River base without any defensive fortifications.
The events of the Shiloh battlefield are the subject of the fourth chapter. This chapter
attempts to examine the events of the Battle of Shiloh as well as the proceedings that led to the
clash. The most important question is how the actions of the Fifty-Third Ohio during the buildup
to the battle effected the Union army on April 6, 1862. Asking how the Fifty-Third Ohio
performed in its reconnaissance duties and battle preparations sets the stage for this chapter and
those that follow. Asking why General Sherman refused to believe the reports of Colonel Appler
before the Confederate assault places the Fifty-Third into the larger context of the battle and
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historiographical debates. Why did Union leadership wait until the Confederates attacked to
recognize the seriousness of the pickets’ reports? Furthermore, how did the Fifty-Third Ohio’s
decision to place its camp closer to fresh water impact the early rounds of the battle?
The next chapter heavily builds on the previous chapter by investigating the debate that
followed the battle of Shiloh. As previously stated, General Sherman criticized the Fifty-Third
Ohio Volunteer Infantry for failing to hold its line on the morning of April 6, 1862. However, the
Fifty-Third was not the only regiment that failed to confront the Confederate attack. In this
chapter, the question of why Sherman strongly condemned the regiment and Colonel Jesse
Appler is addressed. How did the political and military rivalries of the time impact the debate
over who was to blame for the Union’s initial failures at Shiloh assists in placing the Fifty-Third
Ohio, General Sherman, and the Battle of Shiloh into the larger context of the 1862 America and
the Civil War.
In response to Sherman’s words, chapter five continues by asking how did the men of the
Fifty-Third Ohio addressed the accusation of cowardice? The Fifty-Third was not the only focus
of criticism following the Battle of Shiloh. Americans were shocked by the slaughter of the battle
and a search for who was to blame ensued.62 General Sherman was also the target for newspaper
criticism following the battle. He, along with General Ulysses S. Grant, was accused of being
taken by surprise and failing to prepare the Union forces. Chapter five also examines how
Sherman’s critics pushed him to create a scapegoat for his own failings.
By the end of the war, the Fifty-Third Ohio had regained the trust of General Sherman.
Sherman still blamed the regiment for the Union debacle on the first day of the Battle of Shiloh,
but he praised the Fifty-Third’s subsequent war record. The conclusion of chapter six is centered
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on how the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry regained the trust of General Sherman. How did
the replacing of Colonel Appler as the regiment’s leader impact the way Sherman viewed the
unit? Chapter six also explores why Sherman and the Fifty-Third reconciled in spite of being at
odds over the interpretation of the Battle of Shiloh.
The Battle of Shiloh, like most monumental Civil War events, is shrouded in legend and
mythology. Albert Sidney Johnston’s proclamation that his army’s horses would be watered in
the Tennessee River on the evening of April 6, 1862, as well as Grant’s determination to “lick”
the Confederates forces the next morning, have seemingly never left the collective historical
conscience of the American public. On the other hand, the stories of individual regiments appear
to be overlooked by history. These are the records that reconstruct the ground-level of the Shiloh
story. The role of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry is one of those accounts. It is a tale
clouded by politics and overshadowed by larger-than-life military heroes. For these reasons, and
many others, the Fifty-Third Ohio deserves to be reexamined.
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Chapter 2
The Formation of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry

Introduction
The unity and sectional compromise that created the United States were in peril at the
midway point of the nineteenth century. Slavery, and the sectional problems associated with the
institution, threatened to destroy the world’s largest and most recent attempt at self-government.
While the northern half of the nation moved toward an industrialized economy based on free
labor, the south strengthened its resolve to protect slave labor. Both sides were economically tied
to the institution, but white southerners lived in a world of social hierarchy based on race. As the
southern population perceived increased attacks on their social and economic structure, the
drums of war grew louder.1
Efforts to prevent a civil war only delayed the violence. The Fugitive Slave Act, Dred
Scott Decision, the birth of the Republican Party, the publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and
other factors clearly signaled the threat that slavery posed to the sectionally unified republic.
When the republican candidate Abraham Lincoln won the election of 1860 without any real
support below the Ohio River, many white southerners believed the nation reached a breaking
point. Several southern states moved toward secession as Lincoln’s inauguration approached.
The crisis grew even more perilous as South Carolina officially left the Union approximately one
month after the election.2 The experiment known as the United States of America was
unraveling.
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Abraham Lincoln addressed the fractured nation for the first time as president on March
4, 1861. Doing his best to relieve southern fears, Lincoln directly declared slavery the cause of
the sectional crisis stating, “One section of our country believes slavery is right and ought to be
extended, while the other believes it is wrong and ought not to be extended.”3 Speaking from the
shadow of the heavily guarded Capitol, Lincoln urged the nation to pursue a peaceful solution to
the pending violence.4 Unfortunately, the newly inaugurated president’s poetic words were not
enough to keep Americans from waging war on their fellow countrymen. The United States was
on the brink of civil war.
The sectional crisis reached its climax with the firing on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861.
Confederate cannonballs smashed into the U.S. stronghold off the coast of South Carolina before
sunrise. This violent act of rebellion finally ignited the divided nation’s long-simmering political
contentions into the horrors of combat.5 In Washington, President Lincoln promptly responded
by requesting that the states still loyal to the Union muster the necessary men into military
service to squash the rebellion. For many in the Union, the president’s April 15th call for 75,000
men brought the previously distant crisis into their cabins, shops, farms, and homesteads.6 The
men who would serve in the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and citizens throughout the
Union, suddenly found their personal lives upended by the call for national service.
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The state of Ohio quickly answered Lincoln’s call for military manpower. On April 23,
1861, Ohio’s General Assembly passed “An Act to Provide for the Rapid Organization of the
Militia of Ohio” to expedite the surge of expected volunteers.7 The call to arms was well
received by Unionists and met with enthusiasm from the Ohio River to Lake Erie.8 Men
throughout Ohio eagerly joined the war effort in such numbers that the state easily surpassed
Lincoln’s request for soldiers.9 As was the case throughout the Midwestern states, a significant
number of Ohioans were fully dedicated to the restoration of Union.
However, the Fifty-Third Ohio was not immediately formed following the president’s
call for volunteers. The Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry was not officially formed until an
order from Governor William Dennison, Jr. created the regiment on September 6, 1861.10
Broadsides and posters alerting men of the creation of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry
littered the walls of barns, postal offices, and stores throughout Pike, Jackson, Scioto, Lawrence,
and other southern Ohio counties. Patriotic and adventurous men were encouraged to descend on
Jackson, Ohio to start their service in the Union Army.11 A combination of national loyalty and
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naivety of the true nature of the conflict kept the recruiting officers busy with a steady flow of
recruits.
To understand why the Fifty-Third Ohio was created, and how men were convinced to
join the regiment, it is important to examine what motivated Ohioans to join the Union war
effort. Specifically, why were men willing to leave their careers, family, and friends behind to
risk their lives to subdue the rebellion? The conditions and effectiveness of the regiment’s
training are also important factors in understanding the origins of the Fifty-Third Ohio. Even
though the men of the regiment readily enlisted to fight due to many motivating factors, the lack
of training and poor leadership practices placed the Fifty-Third Ohio at a disadvantage at the
battle of Shiloh and impacted its legacy into the 1900s.

Origins of the Fifty-Third Ohio
The Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry began its war service at Camp Diamond in
Jackson, Ohio under the leadership of Colonel J.J. (Jesse) Appler.12 As a citizen and an
entrepreneur, Appler was well respected in his local community and the surrounding area.13 He
previously served in the Ohio militia and brought minor military experience to the Fifty-Third
Ohio.14 Despite his later failures on the battlefield at Shiloh, many of his men and members of
the larger community perceived Appler to be an able commander.15 On paper, and in the minds
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of many of his fellow-citizens, J.J. Appler possessed the necessary qualities for battlefield
success.
Appler came to Camp Diamond with long and successful career as a public servant and
office holder. He gained minor notoriety by serving as probate judge in Scioto County before the
war.16 Appler even continued to serve the Portsmouth, Ohio area following the Civil War as a
commissioner in various offices in local government.17 However, he was not without his
detractors. Ephraim C. Dawes who served as Appler’s adjunct during the Battle of Shiloh wrote
that some parents in southern Ohio were unwilling to allow their sons to enlist in Appler’s
regiment due to his reputation for “desperate courage.”18 Appler gained a modest reputation for
unsteady leadership that could potentially place his men in harm’s way during his brief military
career before the creation of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry.19
However, Dawes’ criticism of Appler’s qualifications should be viewed in the proper
context. His words were written approximately three decades after the war when Appler’s
battlefield reputation was thoroughly destroyed following the Battle of Shiloh. In addition,
Dawes offered no further explanation on his charge of Appler demonstrating “desperate
courage.” By the time Dawes presented this assessment of Appler, the former colonel of the
Fifty-Third Ohio was widely derided as a poor military commander. It is possible that Dawes’
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assessment of Appler was entirely based on later events and not an accurate reflection of his
reputation in 1861.
Despite the debate over Appler’s merits as a commander, men from southern Ohio
readily joined the regiment and cheerfully reported for military service at Camp Diamond.
Originally marketed as a mounted regiment, the Fifty-Third Ohio was transformed into a
traditional infantry regiment during its stay in Jackson. Newspapers reported the arrival of
soldiers to Camp Diamond to keep a curious public informed about the activities of their local
heroes. Like many papers, The Pomeroy Weekly Telegraph informed its readers that a “company
of about fifty” from the local community safely entered camp on October 17, 1861.20 Often, the
boys received joyous sendoffs from their local communities as they embarked on a military life
in the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry.21 Bands, banners, and parades illustrated the pride
local communities felt for their citizens leaving to answer their country’s call at Camp Diamond.
No one foresaw the trial by fire, and the magnitude of the carnage, that awaited the men of the
regiment on the battlefield at Shiloh.
Camp Diamond occupied an old Diamond Furnace slightly to the north of the town of
Jackson, Ohio. Known for its contributions to the iron industry, the old manufacturing site was
perfect for a hastily assembled military camp. The necessary buildings and infrastructure for a
nineteenth century military post were already in place as the Fifty-Third Ohio started its
residency. Several small buildings throughout the grounds provided housing for the soldiers
while officers made use of the former Furnace Company’s store and warehouse building. The
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quartermaster set up shop in another large building on the grounds. The old Diamond Furnace
site quickly became a suitable habitation for the regiment.22
The first group of soldiers to arrive at Camp Diamond were from Athens County, Ohio.
Although not a full and completely assembled company, the men from Athens walked into the
Fifty-Third Ohio’s camp on September 16, 1861.23 The first full company arrived on the heels of
the Athens men after making the journey to Jackson from Pike County, Ohio. The Pike
Countians entered neighboring Jackson County under the leadership of Wells S. Jones whose
military accolades would soon surpass almost every man in the regiment. Mostly due to their role
as the first unit to meet its quota to officially qualify as a company, Jones’ Pike County boys
were labeled as Company A for the duration of the war.24 Jones later commanded the regiment,
but he entered Camp Diamond as raw as any of the other recruits in the Fifty-Third Ohio. Like
many men in the regiment, Jones’ response to the first day’s fighting at Shiloh would play a
major factor in his rising rank.
Along with Company A, Company F played a key role in the regiment’s Shiloh story.
Company F consisted of men from Pike, Ross, and Jackson Counties. These men entered the
Union army under the company leadership of Captain James R. Percy.25 Among the most
educated men in the regiment, Percy was teaching in Piketon, Ohio when he enlisted in the FiftyThird Ohio.26 Percy was remembered by his comrades as a colorful character who, among his
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other idiosyncrasies and bizarre exploits, once waded a river completely nude under Rebel fire to
find a suitable crossing for the Fifty-Third Ohio. The stunned Confederates held their fire to
better observe his shocking adventure.27 Even with his peculiarities, Percy was later well
respected and loved by his men due to his abilities as a captain and his courage under fire during
the Battle of Shiloh.
By all accounts, the soldiers were treated with kindness by the Jackson, Ohio local
population and provided with all the necessary equipment for a comfortable entrance into
military life.28 But what motived the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio to leave their homes, families,
farms, and occupations to join a hastily assembled army in what would become the deadliest war
in American history? Accurately discerning the motives of an entire regiment filled with men of
differing backgrounds is an impossible task for any historian. Each man carried his own concerns
and sense of duty into his personal military service. Historian Peter S. Carmichael summarized
the complex reasons behind the motivation to enlist by writing, “Virtually all historians agree
that Civil War soldiers were not apolitical defenders of home and hearth, but complicated beings
who were deeply ideological, articulate, and driven to fight and die for high ideals.”29
Most of the personal reasons for enlistment are lost to history due to a lack of written
evidence or the destruction of letters during the postbellum decades. However, insights into why
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the men joined the regiment remain in the surviving letters and the official memoir/history of the
unit written by Fifty-Third Ohio veteran, John K. Duke. After examining the enduring literature
of the regiment and other documents of the Civil War Era, it is clear that the men of the FiftyThird Ohio Volunteer Infantry were products of their time and motived by the values and politics
of the era to serve in the bloodiest war in American history. Patriotic duty, Victorian-Era honor,
economic stability, passionate political beliefs, and religion factored into the men’s motivation to
enlist.30

Unionism
While it is difficult to collectively explain the motives of soldiers who enlisted in the
Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry, patriotism and the preservation of the Union ranked high as
motivating factors for many soldiers. Even though the Civil War was ignited over a political
struggle related to the institution of slavery and eventually became a war to end human bondage,
many of the war’s early enlistees simply wanted to preserve the Union.31 From its creation
through the Battle of Shiloh in 1862, the Fifty-Third Ohio mostly exhibited this view of the war.
The regiment came into existence a year before the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation and
well before President Lincoln officially attached his name to the document that transformed the
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war into a righteous cause for liberation. Therefore, the men who arrived at Camp Diamond to
fight under the leadership of Colonel Appler were outraged by the rebellion and the firmly
dedicated to the initial goal of preserving the Union.
The Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry’s dedication to Union was visible during
multiple encounters with the symbols of the Confederate States of America during the war. Two
specific events illustrated this view of the rebellion. While entering the town of Lafayette,
Tennessee on June 23, 1862, the Fifty-Third Ohio was enraged by the sight of a Confederate flag
prominently flying over the town. Given the description in the regimental memoir, this flag was
likely the Confederate political flag known as “The Stars and Bars.” The Ohioans quickly
destroyed the symbol of the rebellion and flew the flag of the United States over the town. After
grabbing an ax and chopping down the flagpole, the members of the Fifty-Third tore the
Confederate’s flag into pieces and sent the remains back to Ohio as souvenirs to be proudly
displayed in their homes.32
A similar event occurred when the regiment entered Jackson, Mississippi following the
siege of Vicksburg in 1863. The Ohioans saw the rebel battle flag raised above the town and
quickly discussed the best approach to ensure its destruction. According to John K. Duke’s
memoir, “This hated flag was soon displaced and ‘Old Glory’ flung to the breeze by the 53rd
O.V.I.”33 While most of the regiment would eventually embrace the changing the objectives of
the Union cause, and show a surprising acceptance of African-American soldiers into the Union
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Army, it is clear that Unionism motivated the majority of the men to initially enlist in the FiftyThird Ohio Volunteer Infantry.

Slavery
However, this is not meant to indicate that the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio were
untouched and unmotivated by the issue of slavery. The men of the Fifty-Third were uniquely
positioned to understand the debate arguably better than most of their Union comrades due to the
geographical location of the regiment’s origin. The men of the regiment came from the southern
Ohio counties that neighbored the boundary between free and slave states. The men of the FiftyThird Ohio came from the counties of Pike, Athens, Scioto, Lawrence, Jackson, Ross, Meigs,
Washington, Gallia, Prebel, and Hamilton.34 While not all of the counties were directly situated
on the banks of the Ohio River, all the counties were at most a day’s ride from the river. Scioto,
Meigs, Washington, Lawrence, Athens, Gallia, and Hamilton counties bordered either Kentucky
or Virginia from the north bank of the Ohio River.
Growing up near a geographical line with the monumental political implications of the
Ohio River could have factored into the men’s mindset. This was no ordinary dividing line, but a
location that simmered with the constant possibility of slavery-related hostilities.35 As Alexis de
Tocqueville observed in his journeys through antebellum America, slavery caused obvious
social, economic, and political differences between Ohio and Kentucky.36 Tocqueville famously
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wrote, “On the left bank of the Ohio work is blended with the idea of slavery; on the right
bank…there it is degraded.”37 The men of the regiment came of age on the geographical front
line of the hottest political debate of their era.
While it is impossible to know if any of the Fifty-Third Ohio encountered runaway
slaves, or if they were even aware of the Underground Railroad, they lived on the direct route
self-liberated slaves travelled in their journey to freedom. In addition, at least one free AfricanAmericans served the regiment as a cook at Camp Diamond.38 How this impacted the individual
and collective mindset of the regiment is also impossible to estimate. However, the official
regimental history indicates an acceptance and compassion for African-Americans among the
soldiers of the Fifty-Third Ohio following the first test of African-Americans in combat.39
According to Duke’s official history of the regiment, the initial reaction to emancipation and the
use of African-American soldiers was mixed. Like the many in the Union ranks, the Fifty-Third
Ohio Volunteer Infantry understood emancipation to be a necessary tactic for hastening the end
of the war. The men of the regiment, like the population of Ohio, held complex views on
African-Americans and equality, but understood slavery to be at the heart of the Civil War.40
Often, Union soldiers who had not encountered slavery became its most fervent
opponents once their regiments came into direct contact with the institution. As Union armies
moved into the agricultural plantation society of the deep south, contact with enslaved men and
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women was inevitable.41 The soldiers in blue were seen as a liberating force even before
President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation. The wartime service of the Fifty-Third
Ohio Volunteer Infantry immediately placed the regiment on a collision course with slavery.
Following the Ohioans first combat experience at Shiloh, the regiment marched deeper into the
south during the campaigns to take Corinth and Vicksburg. The regiment participated in the
march through the slave-dependent state of Georgia with General William T. Sherman during the
war’s final years.
The complex views of slavery are visible through an examination of the division the
Fifty-Third Ohio joined at the outset of its service. The regiment was under the command of
General William Tecumseh Sherman. Like the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio, Sherman was a
product of the southern Ohio. The abolition of slavery was not the war’s primary objective for
Sherman. Never an abolitionist, the general only came to accept the end of slavery as a wartime
measure necessary to crushing the rebellion.42 Sherman clearly defined his opinion on slavery’s
connection to the rebellion in an 1864 letter: “too much stress has been laid on the Negro. It is
used as a touch Stone, a test. It should not be, but treated as any other minor question. The Negro
question will solve itself. The Government of the United States is the Issue. Shall it stand or
fall?”43
Sherman’s view of slavery, African-Americans, equality, and the origins of the Civil War
were not unique. Many Westerners shared his opinion. The belief that the war was fought to
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simply save the Union was prevalent in Ohio. However, many soldiers, including members of
the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry, grew into stronger opponents of the institution of
slavery for moral and logistical reasons. Opinions throughout the state of Ohio were complex
and ever-evolving during the war, but rooted in a dedication to preserving the Union. As
historian Kristopher Teters argued about the Sherman and the men under his command:
“Ironically, the general who probably least interested in assuming the mantle of liberator led an
army that freed thousands.”44
On the other hand, the men of the regiment came of age in the same region that molded
their commander-in-chief, Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln’s opposition to slavery grew from personal
experiences working on and near the Ohio River. Lincoln biographer David S. Reynolds wrote of
the sixteenth president’s impactful 1841 encounter with slavery: “the sight of chained
blacks…seen on the Ohio River steamboat fourteen years earlier haunted him.”45 As a man of the
West, Lincoln’s life straddled the dividing line between the free and slave states. The firsthand
experience with the institution in the Ohio River region assisted in morphing Lincoln into a
champion for slavery’s isolation and eventual demise. Twenty years after the sixteenth
president’s life-changing encounter with slavery, the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry was
formed by men who lived and traveled the same river. Coming into contact with slavery
impacted individual men in uniquely personal ways.
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Politics
In addition, Ohio experienced massive political change during the decade that preceded
the Civil War. The state became a microcosm of the larger United States through its shifting
political structure in response to its approach to slavery. The Republican Party found almost
immediate success throughout Ohio. During the election of 1856, the first election to feature a
candidate for president from the new party, many Ohioans gathered for rallies to show their
support for the Republican ticket. In a somewhat shocking outcome, the Republican candidate
John C. Fremont beat James Buchannan to secure Ohio electoral votes four years before
Abraham Lincoln emerged as the new party’s first successful presidential candidate.46 However,
while the rallies in support of Fremont proved the existence of strong Republican support in part
of the state, the southern portion of Ohio mostly supported the Democratic ticket.47
The southern counties along the Ohio that eventually filled the ranks of the Fifty-Third
Ohio were politically diverse. Unlike other parts of Ohio, the southern counties were heavily
populated by citizens from the slave states of Virginia and Kentucky. The proximity of these
states created an environment that harbored feelings of uneasiness toward radical abolitionists
while still understanding the importance of prohibiting slavery in newly acquired territories. It
was in this climate that southern Ohio proved slightly more receptive to the 1860 Republican
candidacy of Abraham Lincoln. While still not as strongly Republican as other portions of the
state, southern Ohio did place more counties into Lincoln’s column in 1860 than Fremont’s 1856
campaign.48
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Historian Timothy B. Smith summarized the political culture of this region. Smith
claimed that the southern counties in Ohio, “were tied more to the Ohio River and Kentucky
slavery than to the free labor industries farther north, there was some fear that those counties
might side with the South early in the war…”49 The political division that characterized the
pivotal state of Kentucky also found its way north of the Ohio River and into the land of the
Fifty-Third Ohio. As was common with the northern states known as the “west” during the Civil
War Era, the southern counties of Ohio were less enthusiastic about supporting perceived
abolitionist candidates than other northern states.50
However, the 1857 Dred Scott decision provided a boost to Republican membership as
many Ohioans feared the Supreme Court might soon declare slavery legal in their state.
Furthermore, Ohio Republicans believed the entire American judicial system was now in the
possession of the slave interest. The possibility that slave-owners could be granted property
rights on Northern soil suddenly appeared a reality to Ohio Republicans.51 According to historian
Eric Foner: “Many Republicans believed that slavery would be established in the North, not by a
direct Supreme Court decision but by a ruling on the right of slaveholders to bring slaves into
and out of free states without forfeiting their property rights.”52 Regardless of their stance on
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emancipation and equality, the tradition of Ohio’s status as free was not something most Ohioans
were willing to lose.
The Dred Scott Decision had a unifying impact on Ohio’s population. From Lake Eire to
the Ohio River, Ohio citizenship suddenly carried more importance. Even Ohioans who
supported slavery in the South and viewed African-Americans as inferior were often swept up in
political fervor caused by the decision. For this reason, the issue of slavery dominated Ohio
politics during the late antebellum period. Citizens of the state were identifying themselves with
the political group that was best equipped to defend Ohio’s status as a free state. By the outbreak
of the Civil War, the majority of the state had adopted some aspect of the Republican Party’s
platform.53 Even though many of the Fifty-Third Ohio’s soldiers did not embrace the language
and ideology of abolition, they were likely impacted by the growing solidarity and dedication to
Ohio freedom.
The Fifty-Third Ohio’s post-war regimental memoir emphasized a few members’
affiliation with the Republican Party. Connections to the party of Lincoln were mentioned in the
memoir’s section containing biographical sketches of former soldiers, John K. Duke and Wells
S. Jones.54 It is not clear if these men were Republican Party members before the war, or if the
inclusion of their party affiliation was added for reasons related to the publication date of 1900.
Duke authored the regimental memoir, but he was not a member of the regiment when it was
founded which may decrease the importance of political affiliation as stated in the memoir.55
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Furthermore, Colonel J.J. Appler was an active Democrat at the time of the regiment’s formation
and remained involved in the party for the remainder of his life.56 The Fifty-Third Ohio consisted
of republicans and democrats with a variety of opinions on the future of the United States.

Economics
In addition to political concerns, economic considerations were a factor for the men of
the regiment. Undoubtedly, the allure of money drew soldiers to enlist. Many men enlisted into
the Fifty-Third Ohio for security of steady pay. The majority of the regiment came from
economic backgrounds that did not provide consistent paychecks. The men of the Fifty-Third
Ohio Volunteer Infantry came from farms, shops, classrooms, and family-owned mills. As stated
on the posters calling for volunteers, each soldier was promised $100 and 160 acres of land for
their service.57 In addition, the posters assured continuous pay from the day of enlistment,
equipment, and well-made clothing.58 The enticement of salary not only appeared as the focal
point of the official recruitment poster, but was highlighted in newspaper articles in the
regiment’s recruitment area.59 In addition to the one-hundred dollar bounty upon enlistment, the
Fifty-Third Ohio’s recruiting lieutenants promised a monthly salary of thirteen dollars.60
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Throughout the war, the men of the regiment wrote to their families in Ohio about their
salaries and indicated the positive impact of the income on their family finances.61 Personal
finances were important for the men of the Ohio regiment. Since many of the soldiers in the
regiment worked on family farms or other forms of self-employed labor, having the man of the
family leave to serve an extended period in military service could be economically devastating.
Often, the men were left without wages as the U.S. government struggled to keep up with the
massive undertaking of waging a modern war.62 As stated in a letter from William McDonald to
his wife, the government frequently fell behind in compensating the Fifty-Third Ohio placing a
strain on the finances of the soldiers and their families.63

Religion
In addition to the inescapable realities of economics and politics, religion was an everpresent part of life during the Civil War Era. The Civil War occurred in the midst of arguably the
most religious period in American history. Historian Timothy L. Wesley defined the Civil War
as being “fought by a distinctly pious people in a distinctly pious age.”64 Like most antebellum
Americans, the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry were products of post-Second
Great Awakening America. The religious movement of the early 1800s still had a profound
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impact on the American view of religion in the 1860s. Religion influenced almost every aspect
of American life, and provided believers with potential answers to complex political and social
questions, during an era that historian George C. Rable labeled a “largely pre-Darwinian
world.”65
On the eve of the Civil War, American churches were filled with an estimated twentythree million free citizens attending services on a regular basis.66 Protestant denominations
especially benefitted from travelling evangelists spreading their message throughout the North
and South and adding new members to American churches.67 Morality in spiritual, political, and
patriotic terms on the eve of the Civil War were defined by the teachings of the Second Great
Awakening.68 How the influence of religion motivated each man to enlist and face enemy fire is
purely speculation, but religion based on the Protestant Bible clearly impacted the Fifty-Third
Ohio Volunteer Infantry, as it did soldiers on both sides of the conflict.69
Not only was the influence of the Second Great Awakening easily observed in American
culture on the eve of the Civil War, but the state that produced the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer
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Infantry was home to a series of war-time religious revivals.70 The spiritual fervor in Ohio spread
throughout the countryside and filled the pages of letters from the home front to soldiers on the
battlefields.71 Few institutions influenced American society during the Civil War than the
Church.72
The Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry’s ranks contained men whose pre-war
occupation were in church leadership positions. At least two Methodist ministers served as
officers in the regiment and others filled the role of chaplains. This religious influence trickled
down to the enlisted men. Card playing and drinking, common vices among the era’s male
population, were strictly prohibited in the Fifty-Third Ohio. Religious services and prayer
gatherings were almost nightly occurrences during the regiment’s stay at Camp Diamond and
even after the regiment entered the field.73 According to one officer, “the spirituality and
Christianity of the regiment, certainly could not be surpassed.”74
The author of the Fifty-Third Ohio’s regimental history frequently relied on the spiritual
terminology of the era when describing the regiment’s wartime service. The men of the FiftyThird Ohio were not unique in their frequent references to religion, God, and spiritual matters.
The armies of the Civil War were some of the most religious in the history of Western
Civilization. The regimental history frequently mentioned the Fifty-Third Ohio’s observance of
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the Sabbath and its author voiced his concern that the Union Army’s schedule hindered the FiftyThird Ohio from properly observe the holy day asking: “Will the God of Nations bless a cause
which so flagrantly violates his holy day by deliberately planning for a campaign to commence
upon the Sabbath?”75 Furthermore, the author described the regiment’s homeland just north of
the Ohio River as “God’s Country.”76

Honor, Duty, and Manhood
Similar to religion, the era’s emphasis on honor and duty drove the members of the FiftyThird Ohio to enlist. These virtues were of great importance in all of antebellum society, but they
were unavoidable merits for the American male population. As historian James McPherson
argued, the sense of duty during the Civil War Era was a part of everyday life.77 Men were
expected to maintain high levels of honesty and never shy from protecting their family, home, or
way of life. As McPherson wrote, “The consciousness of duty was pervasive in Victorian
America.”78 Even though the concepts of honor and duty are often associated with Civil War Era
southern culture, they were realities for northern men as well.
The official reports of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry throughout the war
illustrated the importance of honor. Often, the reports featured specific praise for men who
exhibited these virtues on the battlefield. In his official report, the Fifty-Third Ohio’s brigade
commander, Jesse Hildebrand, specifically mentioned members of the Fifty-Third Ohio as
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properly fulfilling their duty at Shiloh.79 In the same report, members of the Fifty-Third Ohio
that did not exhibit honor and courage were called out. In 1860s America, a man’s courage on
the battlefield, and his overall dedication to fulfilling his military duty, were tied to his character
and honor.80 Soldiers on both sides of the conflict were often urged by their families to face the
enemy and to perform honorably on the battlefield.81 Performing well under fire usually resulted
in an official promotion and earning the respect of comrades. As the war continued, several
members of the Fifty-Third used this avenue to move up the ranks. Ephraim C. Dawes, Robert
Fulton, Wells S. Jones, and other members of the regiment’s promotions were reflected by
glowing accounts of their bravery and courage in the Fifty-Third Ohio’s official reports.82
Honor during the Civil War was also directly tied to the era’s definition of manhood. The
title of a “man” was not guaranteed to a person born as a biological male.83 Earning the
distinction of a Civil War Era “man” required men to perform activities and present themselves
with the characteristics associated with the title. For many men, Civil War combat provided the
ideal opportunity to prove not only his honor, but his worthiness as a “man.” Historian Lorien
Foote defined nineteenth century manhood as: “an achievement rather than an innate nature.”84
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For the soldiers of the Fifty-Third Ohio, the war placed them on a collision course with the era’s
definitions of masculine character.

Camp Diamond
Regardless of their motivations for enlisting, this was the collection of men that reported
for duty at Camp Diamond in 1861. Little did the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio know that they
were prepping for the bloodiest battle in American history to that time. Furthermore, the Union
Army was filled with countless commanders who were given their position due to their standing
in civilian and political circles more than military merits. Even men with military backgrounds
were lacking in their understanding of Civil War-era combat. The training that the Fifty-Third
received was severely inadequate. Since the regiment’s leader was the mostly inexperienced
Jesse Appler, the Fifty-Third Ohio received little drilling that prepared them for the coming fight
at Shiloh. Ephraim C. Dawes wrote of Appler, “He had little education, but much general
intelligence; good ideas of discipline, but no knowledge of drill nor of army regulation.”85 Dawes
had a similar impression of the regiment’s collective leadership and doubted the Fifty-Third
Ohio’s ability to properly prepare for combat.86
Major H.S. Cox was tasked with the job of drilling the Fifty-Third Ohio while in camp in
Jackson, Ohio. Cox served under Lew Wallace before the war and came into the regiment with
combat experience from the Battle of Bull Run. However, Cox suffered a common fate for Civil
War soldiers and fell ill during the regiment’s stay at Camp Diamond. Due to the illness, Cox
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was unable to adequately fulfill his duties and never led the men in a single military drill. Both
Union and Confederacy were still struggling to understand the full scope of the conflict in the
war’s early years and frequently placed men in harm’s way without the proper combat training.
In this regard, the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry was no exception. The regiment
completed basic regimental parade drills at Camp Diamond, but the men did not participate in a
single battalion drill when they departed Jackson for the field.87
During the regiment’s stay at Camp Diamond, the men were sometimes distracted by the
attractions of the community. This often led to the administering of military punishment.
According to Captain Wells S. Jones of Company A: “the guard house at Camp Diamond was
well patronized.”88 However, the offenses were usually related to minor infractions of camp
rules. Soldiers overstaying their approved leave in Jackson appear to be the regiment’s most
widespread crime. In 1885, Jones recalled the regiment’s biggest scandal involving two soldiers
“eating pie” in January of 1862.89 Whether the pie was stolen or eaten against orders, Jones’
recollection indicates a raw, but well-mannered, regiment.
Before the regiment left Camp Diamond, an outbreak of measles struck the camp with
devastating results. The outbreak was attributed to the lack of clean straw in the camp.
According to the regimental memoir, the men often slept on straw during the regiment’s
residence at Camp Diamond. Over time, the straw decayed and was not properly replaced. This
was believed to cause a bacterial outbreak among the men.90 Whether this explanation could
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withstand modern medical scrutiny or not, the account highlights the Civil War Era’s struggle to
properly understand medicine and disease.
Once again, Jackson’s local population came to the aid of the regiment. Women from the
local community arrived to nurse the sick men back to health.91 Unfortunately, their best efforts
were not enough to save two popular and respected soldiers from the measles epidemic. Austin
Crowell and David Anmiller succumbed to the effects of the illness near the end of 1861. Both
men were ceremoniously buried in Jackson, Ohio.92 As was common among Civil War
regiments, the Fifty-Third Ohio lost men to illness before it ever faced the enemy on a
battlefield. Illness proved to be a constant companion to the Fifty-Third Ohio during the war.
During its first military campaign in Tennessee, limited access to clean water devastated the men
with digestive discomfort and severe illness.93

Anxious to “See the Elephant”
The organization of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry was completed in January of
1862.94 Rumors spread through the Camp Diamond that the regiment would soon depart Jackson,
Ohio to join a concentration of Union forces in Paducah, Kentucky.95 By the time the regiment
left Jackson on February 16, 1862, many of the men were tired of the monotony of military camp
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life.96 Even Ephraim C. Dawes’ early enthusiasm for the Union war effort was replaced with the
boredom often associated with Civil War camps. Writing to his sister, Dawes confirmed his
desire to leave Camp Diamond and to participate in meaningful action.97 However, in spite of the
gloomy and muddy Ohio winter, the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry numbered 821 men fit
for duty by mid-January of 1862.98
The Fifty-Third Ohio’s creation at Camp Diamond in 1861 occurred in the war’s infancy.
The men who filled its ranks entered the war as the products of 1861 Northern culture. Soon, the
regiment would unexpectedly find itself at the middle of the one of the largest battles of the Civil
War. Regardless of their individual reason for enlisting, the soldiers of the Fifty-Third Ohio were
about to collectively learn the lessons of combat. The clash that awaited Appler’s men on the
banks of the Tennessee River altered their shared perception of the war. The Fifty-Third Ohio’s
lack of training, unqualified leadership, occupation of an exposed position, and the overall failure
of the Union command to appreciate the seriousness of the Confederate threat resulted in a day
that unrightfully stained the reputation of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry. However, the
regiment’s Shiloh experience quickly transformed the Fifty-Third Ohio from a collection of
green soldiers into hardened veterans of the war’s Western Theater.
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Chapter 3
From Jackson, Ohio to Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee

On February 16, 1862, the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry departed Jackson, Ohio
for Paducah, Kentucky with approximately 950 men in eight companies and two detachments.1
Leaving its sick behind for proper medical attention, the regiment travelled a short distance by
train to Portsmouth, Ohio.2 Portsmouth was not only an important river town situated on the
northern bank of the Ohio River, it was also the hometown of the regiment’s commander,
Colonel J.J. Appler. After spending one night in Portsmouth, the Fifty-Third Ohio boarded a
steamboat and bid farewell to Ohio.3 For many of the men, this was their first journey outside the
buckeye state and their first extended period away from family and friends.
Unfortunately, the regiment’s journey toward its first combat experience at Shiloh would
be marred by supply issues, illness, the chaos of a fluctuating Union command, Sherman’s
search for redemption, and the inability of Grant and Sherman to recognize the warning signs of
a pending attack. The Fifty-Third Ohio arrived at the Union camp around the Shiloh
Meetinghouse unprepared for the coming fight. In order to understand the regiment’s level of
unpreparedness, it is important to investigate why the Ohioans were placed in such a vulnerable
position when they were among the most inexperienced soldiers at the Pittsburg Landing camp.
First, how and why the regiment was present at Shiloh is important to contemplate. Next, why
was the regiment ill-equipped and poorly prepared for the true nature of Civil War combat?
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Finally, it is necessary to investigate the relationship between the Fifty-Third Ohio and General
William Tecumseh Sherman in the buildup to the Battle of Shiloh with emphasis on the location
of the regiment’s camp, the lack of fortifications, and the refusal of Union command to grasp the
growing Rebel threat.

Paducah and General Sherman
The Fifty-Third Ohio arrived at an unusually damp Paducah, Kentucky on February 23,
1862.4 Every inch of Paducah appeared to be drenched with river water adding misery to the
regiment’s residency.5 The recently restored William Tecumseh Sherman commanded the
Kentucky camp after serving a brief stint in Missouri.6 General Sherman had only been in charge
for a week when the Fifty-Third Ohio arrived.7 General Henry Halleck, the commander of the
Department of the Missouri, entrusted Sherman with command while Halleck worked to
orchestrate a strike at the heart of the western Confederacy.8 The Western command believed
Confederate resistance in the Mississippi River region was teetering on the verge of defeat and
expected to crush the Rebels with an assault on the deep South.
Upon arrival, the Fifty-Third Ohio immediately reported to General Sherman. Captain
Wells S. Jones recalled that Sherman introduced himself to the regiment by asking a member of
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the Fifty-Third Ohio, “How long do you expect to remain in the service?”9 Likely caught off
guard by the question, and not wanting to embarrass himself in the general’s presence, the
soldier answered for himself and his comrades, “The Regiment has enlisted for three years and
expects to serve its time.”10 The answer pleased General Sherman who was already growing
wary of politically ambitious soldiers. Sherman responded approvingly: “Most of you fellows
come down here intending to go home and go to Congress in about three weeks.”11 The
Kentucky camp was the regiment’s first encounter with William Tecumseh Sherman, but the two
would remain connected for the duration of the war.
Not only was Paducah the beginning of the Fifty-Third Ohio’s service outside its home
state, it was an opportunity for General Sherman to rebuild his reputation after suffering public
embarrassment the previous year. Overseeing the camp provided Sherman with the perfect
opening to rehabilitate his public persona from allegations of insanity that wrecked his
command. He had been placed on leave, and his mental health questioned, after Northern
newspapers attacked his assessment of military affairs in Kentucky.12 The story of Sherman’s
“insanity” appeared in the Cincinnati Commercial and quickly spread through Northern
newspapers.13 The Cincinnati Commercial article declared: “General W.T. Sherman, the
commander of the Department of the Cumberland, is insane. We learn that he at one time
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telegraphed to the War Department three times in one day for permission to evacuate Kentucky,
and retreat into Indiana.”14 Although the charges against Sherman’s sanity were certainly
overstated, the accusation tainted his reputation and caused him to consider taking his own life.15
According to biographer Lloyd Lewis, Sherman “let thoughts of suicide dart back and forth
through his mind,” as he awaited his return to the army.16 Sherman entered his role at Paducah a
broken man in search of redemption.
Fortunately for Sherman, he was politically well-connected and benefitted from his wellknown family. His stepfather was a powerful Ohio politician named Thomas Ewing who
orchestrated Sherman’s 1836 acceptance into West Point.17 Furthermore, his brother, John
Sherman, was a sitting United State Senator at the time of the general’s fall from grace.18
Sherman’s connections not only undoubtedly assisted in his effort to return to active command,
they also ensured his version of later events received a large audience. This proved unfortunate
for the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry during the public debate over who truly failed in the
initial moments of the Battle of Shiloh. But in the spring of 1862, the untested Fifty-Third Ohio
was on the verge of its first combat experience with a division commander seeking redemption.
As men were sent to bolster Grant’s army fighting along the Tennessee River region, the
number of Union soldiers at Paducah fluctuated. Action in the Western Theater drastically
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outpaced the Eastern Theater during the war’s early years. General Ulysses S. Grant required
manpower to continue his assault on the Confederate army and relied on Sherman’s camp to fill
this need. At one point, the Paducah camp contained approximately 40,000 men, but as more
men left to partake in the fighting on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, only about 15,000
soldiers remained under Sherman’s command. Along with the Fifty-Third Ohio, at least six more
Ohio regiments were housed at the Kentucky camp making Ohio the camp’s most represented
state.19 Located near the confluence of the Ohio and Tennessee Rivers, Paducah not only
provided easy access to drive deeper into Confederate territory, its location protected the
southern portions of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio from the threat of Rebel political ideology and
military invasion.20
Colonel Appler’s men came to Paducah as a part of Union operations in the Western
Theater. The Union army was making visible progress in the West due to General Ulysses S.
Grant’s capture of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson in the early months of 1862. Later, Grant added
Paducah to the Union cause by outpacing a Confederate force under the command of Gideon
Pillow to the town.21 Now, the Confederates faced the impossible task of defending an area of
least six states in the Western Theater with rivers that provided ideal avenues of invasion.22
Arguably, no waterway provided better access to the heart of the Western Confederacy, and the
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railroad hub of Corinth, Mississippi, than the Tennessee River. Historian Craig L. Symonds
called the Tennessee, “a liquid highway for Federal flotilla”23 The Union planned to use the river
to launch an attack on Rebel forces at railroad town of Corinth, Mississippi that would leave the
deep south open to invasion and expedite the end of the war.24 By the time the Fifty-Third left
Paducah, the Union clearly possessed the momentum in the West.

Union Supply Chain and Command Issues
During its stay in Kentucky, the Fifty-Third Ohio finally received the weapons it would
carry into battle. The army issued Austrian rifles to the regiment due to a shortage of better rifles
in the government arsenal.25 Throughout the majority of the war, Union soldiers mostly carried
.58 caliber Springfield rifles, but the U.S. government was still trying to learn how to equip its
massive armies in the late winter/early spring of 1862.26 Supply issues were not unique to the
Fifty-Third Ohio. The other regiments in its brigade, the Seventy-Seventh Ohio and FiftySeventh Ohio, also mostly received the Austrian rifle.27 According to Robert Flemming of the
Seventy-Seventh Ohio: “They were not considered a desirable arm, and there was bitter
disappointment among the men in not getting the Enfield rifle, which was then considered a very
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superior gun…They were a very heavy, awkward gun.”28 Around the same time, the Fifty-Third
Ohio and the rest of its untested brigade, now known as the Third Brigade, was assigned to
Sherman’s Fifth Division.29
The lack of standardized weapons plagued the early Union war effort in the West. The
Union Army carried a wide variety of weapons. Armaments were sometimes uniformed within a
brigade, but the inconsistent calibers wreaked havoc at the Battle of Shiloh. According to Civil
War historian James Lee McDonough, Sherman’s division entered combat with rifles of “six
different calibers” spread through the four brigades.30 The Fifty-Third Ohio blamed the supply
issues on former President James Buchannan’s Secretary of War who allegedly stole rifles for
the Confederate cause and sabotaged of the federal arsenal as the secession crisis deepened.31
The Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry was not the only regiment frustrated with the
government’s inability to supply its troops. The Forty-Eighth Ohio entered Paducah without
weapons and were forced to rotate outdated muskets among soldiers on picket duty. In spite of
the rumor of a pending Rebel assault, the Forty-Eighth Ohio spent approximately two weeks at
Paducah without arms. This regiment eventually received the Austrian Rifle and were greatly
displeased by the gun’s inability to handle the stress of rapid fire.32 In about a month, the FortyEighth Ohio and the Fifty-Third Ohio would stand together to face the Confederate onslaught at
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the Battle of Shiloh. Both regiments would be forced to rely on undesirable weapons during their
first test under fire.
The Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry remained in Paducah for only a short time.
During that period, the Union command in the West was in fluctuation. Ulysses S. Grant was
rewarded for his victories over Fort Henry and Fort Donelson by losing his command. The old
accusation of Grant’s alcoholism, combined with charges of insubordination, led Halleck to
advocate for Grant’s removal. Most historians agree that Grant’s removal was partially
motivated by Halleck’s jealousy over the praise his subordinate received in the Union press, but
now the hero of the early war in West was without a command.33 Even though Grant was
restored after short period of turning command over to C.F. Smith, the Fifty-Third Ohio entered
an army suffering from a revolving door of command and professional jealousy.34

From Paducah to Pittsburg Landing
The Fifty-Third Ohio finally left Paducah on March 7, 1862. Holding their new weapons
in their hands, the men were again packed on the deck of the steamship the Anglo-Saxon and
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transported further down the Tennessee River. 35 The relatively short journey to Pittsburg
Landing, Tennessee turned difficult for the regiment. The Tennessee River was in flood stage
due to heavy spring rains that left the river swollen and muddy. Severe cases of diarrhea and
stomach cramps devastated the regiment as the men relied on the river as their main source of
hydration.36 John K. Duke’s memoir described the river as, “more than bank full. On account of
the muddy condition of the river, the ‘boys’ called it ‘soup;’ and from its use for several days,
diarrhea followed to an alarming extent.”37
The river-induced illnesses decimated the regiment’s manpower. By April 1st, 255 men
were officially on sick roll.38 In total, the regiment was reduced by approximately twenty-five
percent as the sickness spread rapidly through the steamship. The proximity of the river proved
too alluring for the thirsty and bored men. It was too convenient to dip a cup of water as the ship
sailed down the Tennessee leading to the widespread nature of the illness. However, the men did
not lose their sense of humor and cleverly named the severe cases of diarrhea the “Tennessee
Quickstep.”39 In all, the horrific journey down the Tennessee River lasted twelve long days.40
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Disembarking from the steamship, the regiment stepped ashore for a brief stay in
Savannah, Tennessee.41 Savannah was not a stronghold of Confederate sympathy. As the FiftyThird Ohio learned during its time in the city, the majority of the population harbored strong
feelings of Unionism and rejected secession. Savannah became a refuge for Southern citizens
still loyal to the United States government following the state’s exit from the Union. Later,
Ulysses S. Grant located his headquarters in the mansion of a leading Savannah citizen and
strong supporter of the United States, W.H. Cherry.42 Anti-secession sentiments were so strong
in Savannah that a regiment in the Fifty-Third Ohio’s division recruited approximately one
hundred soldiers from the local population.43 If the positive reception the Fifty-Third Ohio
received in Savannah caused the soldiers to believe their campaign would be without resistance,
that thought was soon corrected during the buildup to the Battle of Shiloh.
Following its brief stay in Savannah, the regiment moved to the mouth of Yellow Creek
with the rest of Sherman’s Fifth Division. The creek was located a little over thirty miles north of
Savannah and provided access to an important Confederate railroad. Shortly after arriving at
Yellow Creek on March 14, 1862, the Fifth Division was tasked with destroying a Rebel railroad
network at Iuka.44 The Fifty-Third Ohio was ordered to participate in the unsuccessful mission
hindered by heavy rain, but the regiment was unable to field an effective fighting force. The
stomach ailments caused by drinking the flooded Tennessee River still plagued the Ohioans with

41

T.J. Lindsey, Ohio at Shiloh; Report of the Commission (Cincinnati: C. J. Krehbiel & Co., 1903), 23.

42

Steven E. Woodworth, Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865 (New York: Vintage
Civil War Library, 2005), 142.
43
Dawes, “The Battle of Shiloh,” in Campaigns in Kentucky and Tennessee Including The Battle of
Chickamauga, 1862-1864, ed. The Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, 109.
44

Ibid.

63

devastating effects.45 Sources of water around the Tennessee remained compromised and
detrimental to the soldiers’ health.
During the division’s expedition from Yellow Creek to Iuka, the commanding officer of
the gunboat Tyler brought Pittsburg Landing to General Sherman’s attention as potential spot for
a Union rendezvous prior to striking Corinth, Mississippi. The Tyler engaged Rebel forces at
Pittsburg Landing on March 1, 1862 and the location left a lasting impression on the crew.46
Sherman was equally impressed and passed the information to his superiors.47 Ultimately, Union
leadership chose Pittsburg Landing as the official Union camp in preparation for the invasion of
Mississippi. A system of streams and creeks surrounded the landing making it a naturally
defensible location, but choosing Pittsburg Landing placed the Union army on the same side of
the Tennessee River as Albert Sidney Johnston’s Rebel forces and left the Union soldiers no
avenue of retreat.48
Pittsburg Landing was already established as a popular river destination before the area
erupted with the guns of Shiloh. Approximately ten years before the battle, the landing housed a
general store that provided essential materials to travelers and local inhabitants. Later, a man
named Pitts Tucker built a log cabin above the river and peddled alcohol. Attracting frequent
stops from river passengers, the area grew and became known as Pittsburg Landing.49 The slope
of the river bank, and the presence of several open fields, made Pittsburg Landing an ideal
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location for disembarking a large number of soldiers. 50 With the infrastructure of a landing
already in place, the surrounding flat areas were an ideal location to house the campsites of a
large army. Once in camp at Pittsburg Landing, Union troops were positioned only about twenty
miles from their main objective of Corinth.51
The area around Pittsburg Landing was a still a frontier in the spring of 1862. Including a
crude church named the Shiloh Meetinghouse, only a few rough cabins and small farms broke up
the wooded area. The Shiloh Meetinghouse was a Methodist Church that took its name from a
Scripture reference meaning “a place of peace.”52 Eventually, the battle that occurred around the
church would take the crude chapel’s name.53 Shiloh veteran Leander Stillwell of the Sixty-First
Illinois Infantry remembered the area as “thickly wooded,” but a series of moderately sized open
fields broke up the forested landscape.54 The terrain around the landing, and especially the creeks
and river, would have a major impact on the movement of troops, the flow of the battle, and its
ultimate outcome.
The Fifty-Third Ohio arrived at Pittsburg Landing around March 15, 1862 after a short
steamboat journey from Savannah.55 The regiment did not immediately disembark from the
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Anglo-Saxon and the Ohioans were not settled into their Pittsburg Landing camp until March 20,
1862.56 The landing soon became a beehive of activity with the frequent sounds of steamboat
whistles echoing through the woods. The Civil War occurred during the peak of American
steamboat travel. Approximately 735 steam-powered vessels carried over 162,000 tons of cargo
on the western rivers alone by the outbreak of war.57 Like many technological and industrial
innovations, steam-powered river transportation was a great advantage for the Union cause.
Northern manufactures built the majority of the boats that travelled the Ohio, Mississippi,
Tennessee, and other western rivers.58 By the late-winter of 1862, the United States possessed
the capability to transport its troops into the heart of the Confederacy by river. The Fifty-Third
Ohio was among the regiments rendezvousing at Pittsburg Landing through the use of a great
Northern flotilla.

The Camp on Rea Field
Colonel Appler placed his men approximately a quarter mile from the Shiloh
Meetinghouse and three miles from the Tennessee River near a spring of water the regiment
hoped would alleviate their digestive suffering. However, it was quickly discovered that the
spring contained an unknown contaminant that only worsened the regiment’s collective health.59
After only a few days in camp, the regiment had two-thirds of its men on the sick list.60 By the
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morning of the Battle of Shiloh’s first day, the Fifty-Third Ohio’s consisted of 646 men and
officers reporting for duty and 206 remaining on the sick list.61 Once again, the Fifty-Third Ohio
encountered the dangers of contaminated water that plagued both sides of the conflict for the
duration of the war.
Similar to the conditions at Paducah, Pittsburg Landing was saturated with water in the
spring of 1862. The heavy spring rains pushed the Tennessee River beyond its limits and caused
the surrounding streams to spill over their banks.62 High water and damp ground were not the
only obstacles facing Appler’s men. The thick underbrush of the surrounding forests made even
the shortest journeys between regimental camps difficult.63 However, the Fifty-Third Ohio still
managed to successfully find a dry and open field for its campsite.
Colonel J.J. Appler ordered the Fifty-Third Ohio to pitch its tents in an exposed position
known as Rea (sometimes spelled ‘Rhea’ and pronounced ‘Ray’) Field. The regiment was one of
the farthest Union encampments from the Tennessee River.64 Appler’s men situated their camp
on the main road leading to Corinth, Mississippi from Pittsburg Landing.65 The encampment was
approximately 500 yards in advance of the remainder of its brigade and their brigade
commander, Colonel Jesse Hildebrand.66 From this position, the regiment was mostly isolated.
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Its fellow Third Brigade regiment, the Fifty-Seventh Ohio, camped approximately two-hundred
yards to the regiment’s right.67 The closest troops on the regiment’s left was a detachment of
Prentiss’ Division situated about one-half mile behind and to the left of the Fifty-Third Ohio.68
Once the Fifty-Third Ohio was in camp, the collective mood of the regiment brightened.
Throughout the Union camp, soldiers were enjoying the relative stability of camp life around the
Shiloh Meetinghouse following the damp stay at Paducah, cramped steamboats, and brief
residencies at river towns along the Tennessee.69 A member of the Twelfth Iowa Infantry
remembered the scene as a “gigantic picnic” before Confederates drastically altered the mood.70
Colonel Appler’s men settled in tents that provided a sense of permanency even though the army
was massing to strike Corinth. The Fifty-Third Ohio most likely covered Rea Field with Sibley
tents that were the predominant choice of shelter at Pittsburg Landing for its ability to
comfortably house sixteen men.71 As the weather dried, the scene around the Shiloh
Meetinghouse became a picturesque spring environment.
Rea Field was much larger in 1862 than today. Following the war, the forests around the
field grew and reduced the size of the former campsite. The Fifty-Third Ohio had an obstructed
view of Sherman’s headquarters near the Shiloh Meetinghouse on the eve of battle. Today, the
church is completely blocked by the forest and not visible from Rea Field during the summer
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months. By comparison, the ridge separating Rea Field from the church was sparsely wooded in
1862. The Fifty-Third Ohio’s obstructed visibility extended to the fields where the initial shots of
the Battle of Shiloh were fired.72 This lack of visibility later impacted the decisions made by the
regiment’s commander as the clash moved closer to the Rea Field on the morning of April 6,
1862.
The Fifty-Third Ohio’s placement on Rea Field violated the orders of General Sherman,
but not because of its isolated position.73 As previously mentioned, Colonel Appler situated his
men on Rea Field to allow for easy access to the nearby fresh-water spring. Sherman stated in
Orders No. 15 issued on March 19, 1862 that, “convenience of water may be considered, but
must not control the position of the camp.”74 In the same order, Sherman ordered the Fifty-Third
Ohio’s brigade to locate their regimental camps near the Shiloh Church and on the left side of the
Corinth Road.75 Colonel Appler appeared to follow Sherman’s order to camp facing west for
parade and battle formations, but neglected the order to minimize the distance between
regiments.76 The gap between the Fifty-Third Ohio’s camp and the closest regiment well
exceeded the 22-pace limit imposed by Sherman.77 However, no evidence exists to indicate that
Sherman attempted to correct the location of the regiment.
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Sherman, Grant, and the Fortification Debate
The camp at Pittsburg Landing continued to grow in the weeks following the Fifty-Third
Ohio’s arrival. Similar to his role at Paducah, General Sherman commanded the troop buildup
along the banks of the Tennessee River. Sherman’s command was not technically official, but
the result of General C.F. Smith remaining onboard a steamship after suffering a minor injury
that turned serious.78 Smith scraped his leg on a boat causing a serious infection to threaten his
life.79 The injury would soon be a factor into the return of Ulysses S. Grant to field command on
the eve of the Battle of Shiloh. Grant was eventually restored to command on March 13, 1862
and located his headquarters over five miles away in town of Savannah, Tennessee.80 Due in part
to his pre-war military experience and his status as a West Point graduate, Sherman remained in
charge of the daily operations at the landing.81
Under Sherman’s oversight, the camp at Pittsburg Landing grew to approximately 5,000
tents with multiple drilling grounds and strong supply lines from the river. Almost everything a
Civil War army needed was available on the banks of the Tennessee. However, one thing was
suspiciously absent that would soon haunt the soldiers in blue. No fortifications or defensive
works were constructed leaving the Union soldiers vulnerable to an attack.82 If Albert Sidney
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Johnston’s Confederates decided to take the offensive, The Union army would be forced to fight
without the advantage of an entrenched location.
The lack of fortifications became a source of controversary following the battle. General
Sherman deflected the blame to his superiors by stating that he never received orders to construct
defensive fortifications.83 Grant shielded himself from criticism by writing the Battle of Shiloh
occurred before defensive entrenchments were used in the West.84 Truthfully, the Union
command did not believe the Confederate forces would counter their advance until they were
within sight of the Corinth, Mississippi defenses.85 Grant and Sherman were convinced that the
Confederate army lacked the ability and desire to march to Pittsburg Landing and attack their
growing force. Regardless of the reason, the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry was in an
exposed position, untrained, and without the protection of defensive works on the eve of the
bloodiest battle any American had ever seen in the spring of 1862.86
Historians have interpreted the failure to entrench in two distinct schools of thought.
First, as part of the Union command’s inability to understand the true nature of Civil War combat
at that stage of the war, and secondly as the Union’s overconfidence that Johnston would never
leave his defenses at Corinth. Eventually, the historical question of entrenchments at Shiloh
centers on the leadership of General Ulysses S. Grant. How historians perceive Grant’s
performance at Shiloh often impacts how they interpret the lack of entrenchments. As long as
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Shiloh veterans could voice their opinions, the entrenchment debate remained at the heart of
questions related to the Union army’s “surprise” at Pittsburg Landing.
Among the earliest to interpret the lack of fortifications as a misunderstanding of Civil
War combat was Abraham Lincoln biographer, Carl Sandburg. His 1939 work portrayed the lack
of entrenchments at Shiloh as the moment the Union command realized the true nature of the
Civil War. Furthermore, Sandburg argued entrenchments were not an issue of concern for Union
command, but for the lowest ranking soldiers. Solidifying his argument, Sandburg wrote: “One
lesson sank home to the Union troops at Shiloh: From then on they dug trenches.”87
Bruce Catton shared Sandburg’s assessment in This Hallowed Ground: A History of the
Civil War. Catton argued that the Confederate advance should have been observed by the Union
due to the Rebels’ lack of discipline and noisy march toward Pittsburg Landing. However, the
Union army’s lack of defenses and preparation rescued the Confederate force from disaster.88
Once again, the lack of entrenchments was presented as simply a lesson yet to be learn by April
of 1862 and not the Union leadership’s failure to prepare for an attack.
As the second half of the Twentieth Century gave rise to more histories focused
exclusively on the Battle of Shiloh, the interpretation of entrenchments slightly shifted from the
interpretations of Sandburg and Catton to placing the blame directly on the shoulders of the
Union command. In 1977, James Lee McDonough argued that Union leadership collectively
dismissed the need to entrench due to the offensive nature of their expedition. Whereas Sandburg
and Catton argued the lack of entrenchments came from the greenish nature of the armies,
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McDonough argued that the Union command knew the dangers of not fortifying against a
possible attack and still chose to leave their soldiers exposed.89 Wiley Sword shared
McDonough’s argument by focusing on the criticism of Grant’s leadership following the battle.90
O. Edward Cunningham’s 1966 dissertation also blamed Grant for the Union’s defense
condition. Cunningham argued that Grant was solely responsible for the lack of fortifications
since he ignored General Halleck’s order to construct entrenchments.91 However, Timothy B.
Smith somewhat returned to the “yet to be learned” thesis while still arguing that the Union
command failed to properly prepare for an attack. Placing the blame on the Union command,
Smith stated, “Perhaps the most obvious sign that the Federal high command feared no battle at
Shiloh was that there were no entrenchments thrown up to guard the campsite.”92 Smith
solidified his argument with evidence that Halleck wanted Grant to entrench, fortifications were
considered, and Confederate scouts were shocked to learn the Union camp was unprotected.93 By
adding a Shiloh veteran’s recollection that the Union army had yet to learn the value of
entrenchments, Smith’s assessment was a combination of all the previous historiography of
Shiloh entrenchments.94
Steven E. Woodworth viewed the lack of fortifications in a different manner. In his book
Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865, he absolved Grant by portraying his
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force as an army intent only on forward motion.95 In addition, Woodworth claimed,
“entrenchment was not customary at that stage of the war,” in the introduction of a collection of
essays titled The Shiloh Campaign.96 Woodworth’s interpretations were a part of a
historiographical shift that sought to remove a direct link between Grant and the failure to
entrench that included Grant biographers H.W. Brands and Ronald C. White.97
Ron Chernow’s Grant biography brought condemnation back to the general by arguing
that Grant’s dedication to the offensive caused him to neglect his defense.98 Grant was again
portrayed as the central figure in the decision against entrenchment. Whereas McDonough,
Sword, Cunningham, Smith and Chernow argued that Grant was a major part of the Union
command’s failure to entrench, Woodworth, Brands, and White shifted the blame away from
Grant and deflected the failure to C.F. Smith, Sherman, and Union engineers.

Missed Warning Signs
Regardless of why the army camped at Pittsburg Landing without the protection of
entrenchments, it is clear the Union command drastically miscalculated the Rebel plans and
regiments like the Fifty-Third Ohio would soon pay the price on the battlefield. A string of losses
in the West pushed the Confederates toward desperation. Rather than wait for Union soldiers to
attack Corinth, Mississippi, the Confederate force decided to hit Grant before his men were

95

Woodworth, Nothing but Victory, 142-146.

96

Steven E. Woodworth, ed., The Shiloh Campaign (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2009),

5.
97
H.W. Brand, The Man Who Saved the Union: Ulysses S. Grant in War and Peace (New York: Anchor
Books, 2012), 173-174; Ronald C. White, American Ulysses: A Life of Ulysses S. Grant (New York: Random
House, 2016), 209.
98

Chernow, Grant, 196-198.

74

united with General Buell’s Army of Ohio.99 Another loss in the West would have been
disastrous for the Confederate war effort and crush Southern morale. While trying to decide on
the best strategy to turn the tide of the war in the West, Confederate General Albert Sidney
Johnston concentrated his forces at Corinth, Mississippi.100 Johnston eventually decided to take
the battle to Grant’s army at Pittsburg Landing. According to his son, Johnston’s plan was “to
crush Grant in battle before the arrival of Buell.”101
The Union camp at Pittsburg Landing remained unaware of the Confederate strategies
until the morning of April 6, 1862. Johnston planned to use the terrain to his advantage by
forcing battle in the land between Owl, Snake, and Lick Creeks trapping the Union soldiers
against the Tennessee River.102 This placed the Fifty-Third Ohio on a direct course with the
approaching Rebels. However, there were an abundance of missed signals that the Confederates
were on the move. Approximately a week before fighting around the Shiloh Meetinghouse
began, members of the Fifty-Third came into contact with Rebel soldiers. On March 30, 1862,
three men from the regiment were surprised by a Rebel calvary unit and taken prisoner only two
miles from Fifty-Third Ohio’s Rea Field camp.103
Shockingly, the Fifty-Third Ohio’s contact with the Rebel horsemen did not cause alarm
among the regiment or Union command. Neither the Fifty-Third Ohio’s official reports of the
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battle, nor the regimental memoir mentioned the incident. It seems strange that one of the first
encounters with the enemy would be treated as trivial. However, the reason could be due to the
Union belief that Rebel cavalry scouts were to be expected as Grant’s force closed in on
Johnston. The proximity of Corinth, Mississippi to the Shiloh Meetinghouse and Pittsburg
Landing would explain this possible view. The only published recording of the event appears in
Fifty-Third Ohio Adjunct Ephraim C. Dawes’ account of the regiment’s Shiloh experience for
the Historical Society of Massachusetts read in 1893 and published in 1908.
Despite the encounter with Rebels, the Fifty-Third Ohio’s attention focused on the
pleasant Pittsburg Landing weather as the calendar turned from March to April.104 Soldiers
coming from Northern climates that typically experienced the extended grip of winter
particularly enjoyed the warm spring weather of southern Tennessee. Throughout the Union
camp, soldiers tended to their laundry and enjoyed strolls through the dense woods.105 Military
drills occupied the majority of the soldiers’ time, but their schedules left room for swimming and
other leisure activities.106 In this setting, Grant’s soldiers continued to focus entirely on the
upcoming offensive movements and neglected any potential possibility of a Confederate
attack.107
The warming weather, mixed with the recent Union victories in the West, created a
feeling of inevitable victory throughout the Union camp.108 Many of Grant’s men believed the
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approaching attack on Corinth would not only sever important Rebel railroads, it would bring the
war’s immediate end.109 Even General Grant was overcome with this sense of optimism. Writing
to his wife from his Savannah, Tennessee headquarters one week before the fighting at Shiloh,
Grant stated, “A big fight may be looked for someplace before a great while which it appears to
me will be the last in the West.”110 Grant conveyed a similar thought on the state of Confederate
resistance following the fall of Fort Donelson writing that the secession movement in Tennessee
was “on its last legs.”111
It is difficult to quantify the impact of the Union command’s overconfidence on
regiments like the Fifty-Third Ohio at the Battle of Shiloh. Two armies were massing for a clash
that both were woefully unprepared to fight. The Union force was a dangerous mix of raw
recruits and overconfident veterans of the Fort Henry and Fort Donelson Campaigns.112 The
Confederate army was just as green. In the same regard, it is likely that the commanders of both
armies, including those who were later viewed in a positive manner, were equally unprepared to
lead soldiers into combat. The Fifty-Third Ohio’s command structure resembled many of their
fellow Union units with men who were highly favored among the civilian and political
population in command instead of officers with the proper military training.
As the day of battle approached, Friday, April 4, 1862 was one of the most active days
for the Fifty-Third Ohio. Adding to the potential warnings that a large Rebel force was in the
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area, the regiment could hear the sounds battle in the distance.113 Even though the reverberations
of the skirmish increased, it did not cause concern among the Union high command. Sometime
on the 4th or early on the 5th, another missed warning came directly from the lips of Rebel
soldiers captured during the day’s fight.114 The apprehended Confederates flatly stated that they
were not a part of small surveillance force, but the “advance of a great army.”115 The Rebels
clarified their warning boasting that an approaching Rebel force would destroy the Union camp
at Pittsburg Landing and drive the Yankees from Pittsburg Landing.116 Historian Larry J. Daniel
wrote that the Rebel prisoners “held at the Shiloh Church that evening, openly boasted of being a
part of a grand army that would drive the Federals into the river the next day.”117 Still, the
warnings of an impending attack were dismissed.
As the sun set on the evening of April 4, 1862, the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry
had encountered Rebel soldiers, heard the distant sounds of battle, and saw Rebel prisoners
guarded in the nearby church. The day’s events increased the already heightened anxiety of
Colonel J.J. Appler as the calendar changed to Saturday, April 5, 1862. In little over 24 hours,
the regiment would be among the first Union soldiers engaged in the largest battle fought on the
North American continent to that point. The soldiers of the Fifty-Third Ohio went to sleep in
their tents on the night of April 4th with an inexperienced and jittery colonel leading their
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regiment, a division commander trying to rehabilitate his image, and still suffering from
consuming contaminated water.118
Without entrenchments and the defensive works found later in the war, the Fifty-Third
Ohio Volunteer Infantry was dangerously exposed as the battle approached. Their lack of
training and preparation was not unique among the soldiers stationed at Pittsburg Landing, but
the Fifty-Third Ohio had never heard a shot fired in anger.119 On the eve of battle, William
Tecumseh Sherman’s line included his most inexperienced and untested regiments in the most
vulnerable position without fortifications and major gaps between regimental camps.120 Two
inexperienced armies were about to bump into one another near the banks of the Tennessee
River. Unfortunately for the soldiers from Camp Diamond, their position rested closer to the
approaching Rebels than almost every other Union regiment. The Fifty-Third Ohio settled into
their Sibley tents unaware that their Rea Field position sat on a crossroad between the
approaching Rebels and main body of Grant’s army.
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Chapter 4
The Fifty-Third Ohio at the Battle of Shiloh

Introduction
Warning signs that a large Rebel force was inching closer to the Union line continued to
appear throughout Saturday, April 5, 1862. Seemingly endless reports of enemy soldiers lurking
in the woods circulated throughout Pittsburg Landing. On the eve of battle, the Fifty-Third Ohio
Volunteer Infantry’s camp on Rea Field was overcome with the fear of a possible Confederate
attack.1 The regimental adjunct, Ephraim C. Dawes, remembered April 5th as, “a day of
rumors.”2 The Fifty-Third Ohio’s suspicions were not unfounded. By 10am, General William
Joseph Hardee’s Corp of Albert Sidney Johnston’s Army of Mississippi was within one mile of
the Shiloh Meetinghouse and closing in on Appler’s men.3
However, the Fifty-Third Ohio began its day oblivious to the reality of the threat,
participating in drills, and enjoying the bright spring sunshine of southern Tennessee.4 In the
coming fight, the problems associated with supply chain issues, inadequate leadership, and poor
training noticeably hindered the Fifty-Third Ohio’s performance. The events of April 6, 1862
placed the Ohioans in direct verbal conflict with its new division commander, William Tecumseh
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Sherman. The Battle of Shiloh, and the debates that followed, forever linked the Fifty-Third
Ohio and General Sherman.
The regiment’s reputation was forever altered by the events at Shiloh. In this regard,
questioning the effectiveness of the Fifty-Third Ohio in the combat of Shiloh is essential for
understanding how the battle’s legacy remained with the Ohioans. Were the reports of a large
approaching Rebel army accurately portrayed by the Fifty-Third, or was the Union command
correct in its decision to dismiss the warnings? Overall, the questions related to understanding
the regiment’s participation in the battle is grounded in two additional questions. First, how did
the regiment’s past impact its ability to defend the Union camp at Pittsburg Landing? Next, why
did General Sherman appear to hold the Fifty-Third Ohio in such low esteem before and after the
battle? Despite the Confederate attack that would soon surprise the Union camp, and the
ineffectiveness of its leadership, the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry presented accurate
information on the pending Rebel attack and remained in the fight for the entirety of the Battle of
Shiloh.

Shiloh: Day One (April 6, 1862)
In accordance with the testimony of Union pickets, Rebel forces were unmistakably on
the move and preparing to attack. Two days prior, Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston
reminded his men of the task before them. Johnston planned to smash Grant’s army before it
united with the approaching force of General Don Carlos Buell.5 Once combined, the armies of
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Grant and Buell planned to march on Corinth, Mississippi and destroy Johnston’s Confederates.
Instead, the Rebels hoped to surprise Grant at Pittsburg Landing, but weather and other factors
delayed their march. Confederate leadership feared the element of surprise was lost following
skirmishes with Union pickets. Fortunately for the men under Johnston’s command, Union
leadership failed to appreciate the danger posed by the growing presence of soldiers, “in
butternut clothes.”6 The desperate need for a Southern victory based on a surprise attack was not
lost on General Johnston who called the Confederate advance, “…the hopes of eight millions of
people…” and reminded his men to perform, “worthy of your race and lineage” in the coming
battle.7
However, the Union command did not mirror Johnston’s determination and seriousness.
The Fifty-Third Ohio spent considerable time drilling and practicing military maneuvers related
to the upcoming strike on Corinth, but the soldiers in blue remained unaware of the Rebels
positioned on the outskirts of their camp. General Grant knew many of his soldiers had yet to
experience combat and believed their time at Pittsburg Landing would be best spent drilling on
the camp’s parade grounds.8 On the morning of April 5th, Colonel Appler was following General
Grant’s orders leading his men through another military drill in the open ground near Rea Field.9
While Appler’s men learned essential military tactics, a group of mounted soldiers at the far end
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of Rea Field caught the Ohioans’ attention.10 Appler was convinced that the figures were enemy
soldiers and quickly dispatched a detachment of the Fifty-Third Ohio to pursue the
Confederates.11 The time was 4 p.m.12 A few shots were exchanged before mounted Rebels
disappeared into the surrounding forest.13
The presence of Rebel soldiers on Rea Field forced Colonel Appler into action. Grasping
the seriousness of the situation, he ordered his men into formation and prepared for a fight.14
This was not the Ohio colonel’s first sense of uneasiness at Pittsburg Landing. Appler had been
on edge since the morning of April 5th and remained in a similar state throughout the day.15
However, the nervous colonel properly handled the situation. Not only did Appler send a
detachment to pursue the mounted Rebels and formed a line of battle, he also dispatched his
quartermaster, J.W. Fulton, to alert General Sherman of the growing threat.16 Unfortunately for
the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio, Sherman was not receptive to Appler’s message triggering a
chain of events that would be at the center of the debate between the general and the regiment for
decades to come.
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Colonel Appler’s warning was promptly delivered to Sherman who was already aware
that Confederate cavalry had been visible to the Union lines the previous evening.17 However,
the general did not take Appler’s warning seriously and dismissed his report. Sherman was not
content to simply toss Appler’s warning aside, but chose to publicly humiliate the colonel. The
general sent back a blistering response meant to demean the nervous colonel. Quartermaster
Fulton returned with Sherman’s response while the Fifty-Third Ohio stood in battle formation.
Fulton relayed Sherman’s response to Appler reading the message aloud: “Colonel Appler,
General Sherman says: Take your damned regiment to Ohio. There is no enemy nearer than
Corinth.”18 Upon hearing these words, the regiment laughed at Appler’s expense, broke
formation, and pursued other activities.19
The Fifty-Third Ohio’s brush with the enemy was not a unique occurrence on April 5,
1862. Other regiments, including the Seventy-First Ohio, encountered Confederate forces in
numbers that indicated more than just a scouting party was in the vicinity.20 Earlier that day,
Sherman was also warned by the Fifty-Third Ohio’s brigade commander, Colonel Jesse
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Hildebrand, that a large Rebel force was spotted approaching the camp.21 The pickets of the
Seventy-Seventh Ohio reported a mass exodus of rabbits and squirrels from the woods followed
by Rebel cavalry and infantry in the distance.22 Again, General Sherman chose not to believe the
report. Instead, Sherman ordered the arrest of the soldier bearing Hildebrand’s dispatch accusing
him of: “bringing in a false report.”23 The Union command made no real preparations for an
attack despite the abundant warnings. The soldiers in the Fifty-Third Ohio believed that the
notices were not just overlooked, but that, “the necessary preparations for a conflict were totally
ignored.”24
It is unclear why Sherman chose to ignore the warnings of April 5, 1862. The general was
presented with several opportunities to prepare his men for the attack that smashed into the
unsuspecting Union camp the following morning. Rebel camp fires too numerous to count were
clearly observed by members of the Fifty-Seventh Ohio.25 It is worth noting that Sherman also
completely overlooked the events of April 5th in his memoir. In fact, he dismissed the warnings
of April 5th by writing, “Saturday passed in our camps without any unusual event…”26 It was not
only in retrospect that Sherman viewed the events of April 5th as unimportant, he spent the day
believing none of the warnings were worth the slightest concern. On the eve of battle, Sherman
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reported to General Grant, “I have no doubt that nothing will occur to-day more than some picket
firing… I do not apprehend anything like an attack on our position.”27
The men of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry did not share Sherman’s confidence.
Several men from the regiment spent the evening of April 5th into the morning of April 6th filled
with extreme anxiety over Saturday’s events. Among the restless was Captain Wells S. Jones.28
Captain Jones was one of the first to answer the Fifty-Third Ohio’s recruitment call and
performed admirably at Shiloh, but he spent the eve of battle filled with nervous energy. Jones
was not in his tent through the night as he fulfilled his role as brigade officer of the guard.29 That
role, combined with Jones’ lack of combat experience, undoubtedly factored into him
remembering being “nervous… and upon the alert and along the guard-line most of the night.”30
Jones was not alone in his uneasy state. Colonel Appler’s naturally nervous disposition
kept him on high alert throughout the night of April 5th and into the early hours of April 6th.31
The colonel was awake when the first shots of the Battle of Shiloh broke the predawn Sabbath
silence. Appler ran to Adjunct Ephraim C. Dawes’ tents upon hiring the distant sounds of battle
around 4am on the 6th.32 Dawes recalled the colonel escorting him out of his tent where the two
men clearly observed intermittent gun shots beyond the Fifty-Third Ohio’s picket line.33 Colonel
Appler was unable to sleep that entire night and informed Dawes that the sounds of constant
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gunfire were the cause.34 Suddenly, the Fifty-Third Ohio’s pickets raced into camp and reported
that a large Rebel force was in front of the regiment’s position. Appler’s pickets believed the
sounds of gunfire were too frequent to be anything other than a large-scale clash with the entirety
of the Confederate army.35 The pickets were convinced that a major Confederate force was
closing in on the Fifty-Third Ohio’s camp.
The noises that caused Appler and his pickets such concern were the loud guns of
Colonel Everett A. Peabody’s men of General Prentiss’s division. Without orders, Colonel
Peabody sent about 400 men from the Twenty-Fifth Missouri and Twelfth Michigan to
investigate a report of Rebel soldiers spotted by Major James E. Powell’s pro-Union Missouri
troops around midnight.36 The Union patrol advanced through the dark woods and entered Fraley
Field where they encountered detachments of Rebel cavalry and members of the Third
Mississippi belonging to General Hardee’s Corps.37 The Union then fell back toward their
Pittsburg Landing camp with steady fire slowing the advancing Confederate.38 This fighting in
Fraley Field in the early hours of April 6, 1862 would be remembered as the opening round of
the Battle of Shiloh.
The location of Fraley Field in relation to the Fifty-Third Ohio’s camp at Rea Field
allowed Colonel Appler to easily hear the battle. The fighting began approximately one hour
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before Appler woke Adjunct Dawes from his tent.39 Fraley Field and Rea Field were only
separated by a wooded area spanning roughly a mile.40 Unlike the scattered fighting of the
previous days that always seemed to end quickly, this battle intensified.41 Even more concerning
for Appler, it was clear that the fight was creeping closer to Rea Field.42 Overall, the fighting on
Fraley Field lasted over an hour.43 With each shot, Colonel J.J. Appler grew increasingly uneasy
and feared his regiment’s position was in grave danger. Further adding to Appler’s anxiety was
the predawn darkness that engulfed Pittsburg Landing. The sun had yet to rise over what was
soon to become the Shiloh Battlefield adding uncertainty to the situation.
Much has been written about J.J. Appler’s disposition during the opening round of the
Battle of Shiloh. Most historians have harshly assessed the colonel’s approach and emphasized
his uneasiness. Larry J. Daniel labeled Appler as “jittery” in his book, Shiloh: The Battle that
Changed the Civil War.44 Steven E. Woodworth branded Appler as “nervous” and Timothy B.
Smith stated that Appler “did not perform well” at Shiloh.45 While these assessments of Appler
are appropriate for his overall performance at Shiloh, the colonel had reconnoitered the enemy
position, alerted his superiors, and had his regiment in formation when the enemy moved on his
camp. Historian Steven E. Woodworth also argued: “Sherman might have scoffed at Appler’s
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concerns, but his brigade and regimental commanders were taking the situation seriously.”46 In
addition, Appler’s reconnaissance reports were soon verified despite General Sherman’s
reluctance to accept the Ohioan’s intelligence.
As Appler and Dawes stood in their Rea Field camp, the colonel could no longer contain
his uneasiness. The Fifty-Third Ohio was about to spring into action. First, Appler ordered
Dawes to form the regiment, but quickly called him back with a new order to alert Colonel
Hildebrand of the approaching clash.47 Appler exhibited the tensions associated with the
adrenaline of combat when he again called Dawes back and sent another soldier to the FiftyThird Ohio’s picket line with orders to return with an update.48 The men of the regiment were
still mostly in their tents. What calm that was left in the camp quickly disappeared when a Union
soldier from Fraley Field came into Appler’s camp nursing a bleeding wound on his side.49 The
wounded soldier from the Twenty-Fifth Missouri shouted, “the rebels are coming! get into
line!”50
The warning from the Missouri soldier was the last straw for Appler. Combined with the
increasing echoes of gunfire, the injured soldier’s notice placed the Fifty-Third Ohio’s colonel on
high alert. At that moment, Ephraim C. Dawes remembered that Appler ordered, “the long roll,
and formed the regiment on its color line.”51 The men of the Fifty-Third Ohio fell into line and
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prepared to meet the coming Rebel onslaught. However, the regiment was not fully aware of the
approaching army’s size. According to Milton Bosworth of Company K: “we did not know the
enemy was approaching in full force until they were within 300 or 400 yards.”52 The green Ohio
troops stood with rifles in hand under a Tennessee sky displaying the first streaks of sunlight.53
Again, Colonel J.J. Appler followed the proper procedure by finally sending the delayed
messages of approaching Rebels to Colonel Hildebrand and General Sherman.54 While
Hildebrand took the message seriously, General Sherman once more failed to appreciate the
seriousness of the situation.55 As he had done the previous day, Appler dispatched his
quartermaster to alert to Sherman to the news of a possible Rebel attack. The quartermaster
returned with message frustratingly similar to the previous day’s rebuke. Upon returning to
camp, Quartermaster Fulton read Sherman’s reply to the colonel. Sherman again dismissed
Appler with the humiliating reply: “You must be badly scared over there.”56
While recent Sherman biographers have portrayed the general’s participation in the Battle
of Shiloh as an overall success, they also have criticized his failure to take the reports of his
subordinates seriously. However, this misstep has usually been explained as a part of a collective
failure among Union command, or the result of the fog of war. James McDonough cited the
confusion of Sherman’s role as immediate commander of Pittsburg Landing, but still subordinate
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to Grant, as a possible reason for Sherman’s failure: “Sherman may have been dissuaded, to a
degree, from taking measures required to keep fully abreast of the Confederate Army’s
location.”57 Robert L. O’Connell also connected Sherman’s failure to recognize the danger of the
approaching Rebel threat on his connection to Grant. O’Connell argued that “Sherman appeared
to have picked up more than a little of Grant’s supreme confidence” as a justification for general
dismissing the warnings of his subordinates.58 Citing the confusion associated with the fog of
war, Stephen E. Woodworth wrote: “Like a general in any era, Sherman had had to sort through
conflicting data in the hours leading up to the battle of Shiloh… he succumbed to the temptation
of assuming his enemy would act in the way he wanted the enemy to act.”59
Around the same time as Sherman’s latest rebuke of Appler, Captain Wells S. Jones of
Company A left his position at the night guard to update brigade headquarters on the developing
situation. Unknown to Jones, the next few hours would forever alter the direction of his life. As
he passed Rea Field, Jones noticed that Appler already had the regiment in battle formation.
Soon, Jones witnessed the rest of the Fifty-Third Ohio’s brigade moving into line to meet the
approaching Rebels. The clash moving toward the Fifty-Third Ohio was now approximately onefourth a mile to the regiment’s front. Despite General Sherman’s reluctance to accept the realities
of an imminent attack was coming, the Fifty-Third Ohio, and the rest of its brigade, stood ready
to defend the general’s flank.60
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Following an order from his brigade commander, Appler then dispatched two companies
to re-enforce the brigade’s picket line.61 Shortly after these companies left the Fifty-Third Ohio’s
line, the remainder of the regiment caught its first glimpse of Rebels in full battle formation. An
officer of the Fifty-Third Ohio, straight out of bed and attempting to dress as he ran toward the
colonel, excitedly announced: “Colonel, the rebels are crossing the field!”62 South of camp, a
large Confederate force was crossing the edge of Rea Field near the tree line.63 Appler quickly
notified Colonel Hildebrand and ordered the regiment to assemble to the left of camp facing the
field’s southern end.64 According to the regiment’s official report, the Fifty-Third Ohio was then
perpendicular to the original line Appler formed after hearing the shots from Fraley Field.65
While the regiment formed its new line facing the now visible enemy, the two companies
dispatched to reinforce the picket line returned. Their report did little to steady the nerves of
Colonel Appler and the untested men of the Fifty-Third Ohio. A captain from one company
shouted, “The rebels out there are thicker than fleas on a dog’s back,” as he took his place in
line.66 In spite of Colonel Appler’s anxious state, he again executed the proper military maneuver
by shifting the regiment’s line to face the enemy. Soon, Colonel Hildebrand ordered the FiftyThird Ohio to move into the line it was already in the process of forming.67
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J.J. Appler properly address every danger thrown at the Fifty-Third Ohio in a constantly
evolving situation. From reconnaissance, to forming his men and recognizing the approaching
threat, the colonel performed admirably. However, that would soon change as the first shots were
fired at the regiment. Every correct maneuver ordered and executed by Appler before the fight
erupted on Rea Field would soon be overshadowed by his lack of steadiness under fire. The
moment of reckoning for Appler and his regiment finally arrived as the Confederate battle line
was now within musket range and visible with the fully risen sun reflecting off their gun barrels
on what otherwise would have been a perfect spring Sabbath in southwestern Tennessee.68
George E. Cutler of Company G wrote that the Confederates approached the Fifty-Third Ohio’s
line with “ten regiments strong, about 7,000 coming up 4 regiments or more deep.”69
Appler took position behind the center of his regiment’s line when he ordered the FiftyThird to move into its third location of the morning.70 The colonel ordered this maneuver
following a warning from the regimental Adjunct, Ephraim C. Dawes, who noticed the
Confederates on a direct course for the regiment’s right flank. Appler placed Dawes at the head
of the regiment with the responsibility of addressing its line when the first formation was
ordered.71 Dawes remained in that position and began to assert himself as the regiment’s leader
while Appler allowed the confusion of battle to overwhelm his judgement. Heeding Dawes’
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warning, Appler excitedly shouted, “This is no place for us…Battalion, about face; right
wheel!”72 The regiment once again changed positions.
The time of the regiment’s latest maneuver was approximately 6:45am.73 As the FiftyThird Ohio moved into its new position, the soldiers marched through their own camp as Rebel
skirmishers opened fire.74 For those still in the Fifty-Third Ohio’s camp, the morning routine
continued unbothered by the presence of the enemy or the action of the regiment. Cooks were
still preparing breakfast, soldiers on guard duty were reporting to their posts, and the sick
remained in their beds.75 Sensing the danger, Colonel Appler shouted orders to prepare the camp
for the coming fight and instructed the sick to move to the rear.76 Now, the Fifty-Third Ohio
stood behind its camp in the edge of Rea Field’s surrounding forest.77
The Fifty-Third Ohio was not completely alone in its new position. To the regiment’s
right, two cannons from Allen C. Waterhouse’s battery unlimbered and prepared to open fire.78
In addition, the commotion in Rea Field caught the attention of General Sherman who rode from
his headquarters near the church to investigate. Sherman was sitting on horseback peering
through his glass and riding in front of Waterhouse’s battery as more Confederates emerged from
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the woods.79 With the Rebels marching across the field, General Sherman sat on his horse
dangerously exposed to enemy fire.
Then, the tense buildup to combat transitioned to the horror of war as Adjunct Dawes
called out to Lieutenant Eustice H. Ball of Company E to remove Sherman from the danger.80 To
alert the general, Ball yelled, “General, look to your right,” fearing that Sherman had not seen the
Rebels moving through the field.81 The sight of the large Rebel force convinced Sherman that his
men were truly under attack. According to Sherman biographer Robert L. O’Connell, the general
was “in for the surprise of his life.”82 The general threw his hand into the air and exclaimed, “My
God, we are attacked!”83 As the chaos of the approaching battle consumed the Fifty-Third Ohio’s
camp, Sherman’s orderly fell dead beside him.84 Sherman’s hand was also pierced by a bullet
from a Confederate rifle.85 Seemingly unbothered by the injury, General Sherman ordered
Appler to hold his line and promised to send support.86 The general then rode away to assess the
full picture of the attack.
At this stage of the battle, Sherman and Appler started following very different paths.
Even though Appler had arguably outperformed Sherman on battle preparations and
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understanding the reality of the Rebel movements before the attack, the Fifty-Third Ohio’s
colonel melted under pressure while Sherman rose to the occasion. According to Ulysses S.
Grant’s memoirs, Grant did not worry about Sherman succeeding during Shiloh’s first day. Grant
remembered Sherman’s ability under fire to, “inspire a confidence in officers and men that
enabled them to render services… worthy of the best of veterans.”87 On the other hand, the Battle
of Shiloh would result in the discharge of Colonel J.J. Appler from the United States Army.88
Even though William Tecumseh Sherman was West Point educated and held several
military-related positions before the outbreak of war, his battle credentials were still mostly
unknown in the spring of 1862. Sherman was in the United States Army during the MexicanAmerican War, but he never set foot on any of the war’s battlefields. He spent a large portion of
his career in administrative and educational roles until the Civil War placed him in combat for
the first time at the Battle of Bull Run on July 21, 1861. He always remembered the gruesome
sights, smells, and sounds of that battle, but performed admirably during the clash. However,
nothing compared to the horror that was about to engulf the fields around the Shiloh
Meetinghouse. In spite of his lack of combat credentials, Sherman took his first steps toward
becoming a Union hero at Pittsburg Landing.89
Meanwhile, General Ulysses S. Grant was absent from Pittsburg Landing as the FiftyThird Ohio faced the first shots of the Battle of Shiloh. The general was awaiting the arrival of
General Buell’s 40,000 strong Army of Ohio at his Savannah, Tennessee headquarters. Grant’s
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breakfast had just been served when he heard the unmistakable sounds of battle coming from the
landing.90 Immediately, he departed for the front and directed scattered Union units toward the
battle.91 Another reason for Grant’s absence was due to stomach ailments and an injured ankle
that limited his mobility.92 Grant had also been among the unconvinced that the increased clashes
with Rebel soldiers indicated a pending large-scale attack, but the fact that he underestimated
Albert Sidney Johnston became clear as he arrived at Pittsburg Landing.
The Fifty-Third Ohio still stood in battle formation as soldiers from General Hardee’s
Corps approached. The Rebel line filled the width of Rea Field with both flanks disappearing
into the surrounding woods.93 Suddenly, the Confederates unleashed a volley of fire on the FiftyThird Ohio accompanied by a blast of artillery that stirred the dirt around the regiment and sent
tree limbs crashing behind Company A.94 Hardee’s men marched through the Fifty-Third Ohio’s
camp and approached Appler’s formation as the two cannons from Waterhouse’s battery each
unleashed a single shot.95 Even though the Fifty-Third Ohio was in the midst of the most
dangerous morning of its short history, the clock had yet to strike 7am.96
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The Confederate soldiers advanced within fifty yards of the Fifty-Third Ohio’s left
flank.97 Appler shouted above the noise for his men to fire in unison.98 The regiment collectively
fired on the enemy for the first time in the war. The volley stopped the approaching Rebels in
their tracks causing them to recoil in front of the Ohioans.99 The Confederates quickly regrouped,
resumed their attack, and again charged the Fifty-Third Ohio’s line.100 Once more, the Ohioans
fired with such force that the Confederates line temporarily dissolved.101 The untested regiment
was answering the call of military duty.
Sometime early in the fight, the regiment suffered its first combat death. Frank Smith of
Jackson, Ohio was killed when he was struck by two Confederate bullets.102 Captain Wells S.
Jones remembered Smith as a dedicated abolitionist who “eagerly embraced the opportunity to
bear arms for the cause.”103 Smith appeared too old for the rigors of military life, but readily
embraced the opportunity to serve.104 Smith’s body “lay very near the big spring” as the FiftyThird Ohio’s first fatality at the Battle of Shiloh.105 He would not be the last member of the
regiment struck down by a Rebel gun near the banks of the Tennessee River.
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Although ill-prepared for the true nature of Civil War combat, the Fifty-Third Ohio
initially met the Confederate onslaught with a successful barrage of murderous fire.106 General
Patrick Cleburne’s brigade of Hardee’s Corp suffered heavy losses in what historian John R.
Lundberg called a “bloody repulse.”107 The Fifty-Third Ohio’s well-directed fire decimated the
attacking Mississippi and Tennessee regiments.108 In spite of the Ohioan’s success, Colonel
Appler allowed anxiety to overwhelm his judgement. The Fifty-Third Ohio’s colonel was
positioned behind the regiment’s left wing and clearly witnessed the two volleys’ successful
impact on the Confederates. However, overcome by terror, Appler ordered his regiment to, “fall
back and save yourselves.”109 Despite the fact that the Fifty-Third Ohio was holding its ground,
the majority of the regiment fled Rea Field in disorder and confusion in an abrupt and
unnecessary retreat.110
Prior to Appler’s order to retreat, several officers from the Fifty-Third Ohio were
concerned that their commanding officer may prematurely order the regiment to fall back.
Captain Wells S. Jones’ Company A had already fought valiantly and successfully held the
regiment’s right flank through the morning.111 Realizing that Appler was wavering, Jones
exclaimed, “This is a good place to fight, and we will stay here.”112 Jones told the officers near
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him that he would not abandon his position despite an order from Appler to retreat. Adjunct
Dawes, Captain James Percy, and Lieutenant Robert Starkey sided with Jones and agreed to stay
in the fight.113 When the order to retreat was given, Jones’ Company A and Percy’s Company F
stubbornly held their ground even as the remainder of the regiment fled past the Forty-Ninth
Illinois in disorder.114
It is possible that Companies A and F did not hear Appler’s order to fall back. According
to Dawes’ recollection after the war, Company A and F, “…did not hear this order,” in reference
to Appler’s call to retreat.115 However, when considering Jones’ words prior to the regiment’s
retreat, the stand of Companies A and F could have been the result of the soldiers’ fear of
participating in humiliating retreat. Jones appeared dedicated to his duty and shouted, “We came
here to fight…” at Appler just before the colonel ordered the retreat.116 Regardless of why they
remained in position, the two companies were soon engaged in a fierce fight. Jones, Percy,
Dawes, Starkey, and their two companies joined the Seventeenth Illinois as the battle
intensified.117 The Ohioans held their position among a hail of gunfire until approximately
noon.118
Appler remained with his companies still engaged, but command was slipping from his
grasp. As the Confederate fire increased, Adjunct Dawes witnessed the Fifty-Seventh Ohio break
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near the position then held by the Fifty-Third Ohio’s Companies A and F.119 Dawes desperately
tried to persuade Appler to send his remaining men to the aid of their fellow Third Brigade
regiment. Unfortunately, the overwhelming fear of potential death replaced the last remnants of
Appler’s courage. The colonel laid on the ground behind his men refusing to issue the order.120
Appler instead ordered Dawes to have the regiment fall back and reform.121 Dawes told his
colonel, “…I will not do it,” resulting in Appler leaving the front, running in fear, and
abandoning his regiment.122 For Colonel J.J. Appler of Portsmouth, Ohio, his fight at Shiloh, and
his service in the army, were effectively over.
Even though, Appler was no longer leading the Fifty-Third Ohio, and the regiment
remained engaged in the Battle of Shiloh, the regiment’s reputation was forever altered by its
commanding officer. Many of the regiment’s critics cited the actions of Appler as proof that the
Fifty-Third Ohio failed to do its duty at Shiloh. After Shiloh, Appler was run out of the United
States Army, but his actions clouded the Fifty-Third Ohio’s legacy following the battle.
The exit of Appler from the front was not the end of the Fifty-Third Ohio’s fight on the
first day of the Battle of Shiloh. The battle continued for the two companies refusing to leave the
field. However, the regiment was left with a hole in its command structure. The regiment’s
Lieutenant-Colonel, Robert A. Fulton, was separated from the companies still engaged during
the chaotic retreat.123 Fulton separation does not indicate that he fled the scene in disgrace.
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Instead, he was remembered as a man of “resolute courage” and later rejoined the Fifty-Third
Ohio on the front line.124 Without a colonel or lieutenant-colonel, command of the regiment fell
to Company A’s captain, Wells S. Jones.125 Jones ordered the regiment, “to stay right here as
long as there is any one else on the line.”126
Soon after the change in command, Dawes informed Captain Percy that Jones was now
leading the regiment. Whether caught in the fervor of battle or overcome with adrenaline, Percy
raised his arm in a show of solidarity with Jones, swung his sword over his head, and shouted,
“Tell Captain Jones I am with him. Let us charge!”127 Dawes calmed the captain and reminded
him of the regiment’s scattered state and its inability to effectively attack the enemy at that
moment. Percy was later known as a soldier who embraced danger and bravely fulfilled his
duty.128 His first experience in combat on the morning of April 6, 1862 was no exception and
earned Percy a reputation as a brave and courageous soldier.129
Company A and F of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry fought mostly without
ceasing since their regiment first made contact with the enemy. As the fighting on Shiloh’s first
day increased, the regiment’s supply of ammunition was spent. Company A’s dwindling supply
was remedied when a soldier from the Seventeenth Illinois filled their cartridge boxes. The
Illinois soldier who came to the aid of the Ohioans was an acquaintance of Dawes named A.C.
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Voris. Voris, a veteran of previous battles including Fort Donelson, shouted above the explosion
of rifle fire, “it’s just like shooting squirrels, only these squirrels have guns, that’s all!”130
Somewhat reassured, and now with ample ammunition, the Fifty-Third Ohio continued firing
their Enfield rifles at the rising Confederate tide.131
Unfortunately for the Fifty-Third Ohio, the fighting seemed to increase by the second.
The heavy Confederate fire took a severe toll on Companies A and F. The Rebel soldiers had
overrun the cannons belonging to Waterhouse’s artillery and threatened the Ohioans’ position.132
Only forty of the two companies’ seventy men were still standing as able soldiers. Nineteen of
the men were killed or wounded and approximately ten men left the line to escort severely
injured men toward medical attention. Captain Jones saw no other option than to link with the
Fifty-Seventh Ohio fighting to the left of the church.133
The battle followed Jones’ men as they defeated a Confederate advance with the
assistance of the Fifty-Seventh Ohio. In addition, the Seventy-Seventh Ohio arrived creating a
line entirely consisting of the Third Brigade of the Fifth Division. The brigade’s line stretched
toward the Tennessee River on the left with its right still hugging the Shiloh Meetinghouse. As
the Rebels advanced on this line, the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio were again firing into their old
campground in a fight that quickly descended into a chaos hindered by another lack of
ammunition. The lack of standardized weapons plagued the Union line. Since each regiment
required different ammunition for the various calibers, supplying ammunition was an extremely
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difficult task. This would not be not the last time the Fifty-Third Ohio was faced with supply
issues and confusion during the Battle of Shiloh.134
After the Fifty-Seventh and Seventy-Seventh Ohio regiments were overran by withering
Confederate fire in a fight that a witness claimed, “…ain’t got any rear,” the Fifty-Third Ohio
fell in with the Forty-Eighth Ohio.135 Together, the remnants of the Forty-Eighth, Fifty-Seventh,
and Fifty-Third Ohio regiments made a stand on the Purdy Road.136 The Fifty-Third Ohio and
the Forty-Eighth Ohio jointly repulsed another Rebel attack.137 Sometime during the afternoon,
Dawes and a small group from the Fifty-Third Ohio were separated from the rest of Companies
A and F. After a brief and successful fight against a band of Louisiana troops, the Dawes’
remnant located Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton and approximately 250 members of the Fifty-Third
who followed Appler’s retreat.138
Fulton immediately assumed leadership of all the soldiers belonging to the Fifty-Third
Ohio. The regiment was then ordered to support Union artillery. Even though several other
regiments were present when the order was given, only Fulton’s regiment to answer the call. The
time was approximately 3:30pm. Rebels answered the Union cannons with an effective barrage
before the Fifty-Third Ohio drew their fire away from the Union guns. At this point, the regiment
settled into the spot where it would spend the night. Flanked by the Eighty-First Ohio on its left
and the Forty-Fifth Illinois on its right, the Fifty-Third Ohio concluded its first day of combat.139
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During the night, wild rumors about the day’s fighting drifting down the line. In addition
to the true story of Confederate Albert Sidney Johnston’s death, rumors swirled that the Union
captured General Beauregard and Union General Buell was arriving.140 However, not all the
rumors encouraged the Fifty-Third Ohio. A man told Adjunct Dawes that he witnessed the
surrender of the entire Union army at the Tennessee River.141 However, this misinformation was
easily corrected when news reached the Fifty-Third Ohio that the rest of Companies A and F
would soon link up with the division following a successful repulse of the day’s final attack in
connection with the Forty-Eighth Ohio.142
Under the leadership of Wells S. Jones, Companies A and F were a part of the last line of
defense on April 6, 1862. Still fighting with the Forty-Eighth Ohio, Jones’ men were present
when the Rebels attempted to slam into the Union line and drive them into the river. However,
Union cannister, combined with infantry fire from a strong position, brought the day’s fighting to
an end. Grant’s Union force was bloodied, but not broken.143 The Ohioans stubbornly held every
possible inch of ground.144 But, the battle was not over and the gruesome task would return the
next morning.
As evening gave way to night on April 6, 1862, the battlefield of Shiloh was a horrific
scene of carnage and death. Chaplains from both sides spent the night searching the battlefield
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for soldiers in need of spiritual comfort and preparation for the afterlife.145 Since the
Confederates now occupied the majority of the campsites that housed Union soldiers before the
fighting began, Union surgeons were without the proper tools and medicine to treat the
astounding number of wounded soldiers in blue.146 However, the grisly work of amputation
continued.147 The battlefield echoed with the unforgettable sounds of mutilated men begging for
mercy, relief, and death. As one Union veteran remembered: “There was never a night so long,
so hideous, or so utterly uncomfortable.”148
It had been a terrible day for the Union army, but the Confederates had not achieved total
victory. Historian James Lee McDonough described the stated of Union army as, “…pushed
back, driven from position after position… always outnumbered, taking heavy losses, almost but
never quite broken.”149 Following the death of General Albert Sidney Johnston, Confederate
command solely fell to General P.G.T. Beauregard. Victory appeared to be within the
Confederates’ grasp when Beauregard called off the attack around 6pm on the evening of April
6th.150 After eleven hours of fighting and realizing the Union held a strong artillery position near
the Tennessee River, Beauregard decided to regroup, rest, and finish off Grant’s army the
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following morning.151 Unknown to the Confederate commander, the Union position was
strengthening with the arrival of General Buell’s Army of Ohio.152
Union command tried to reorganize their men throughout the night. In addition to the
high number of dead and wounded Union soldiers, many of the raw troops fled the front lines. A
mass of men huddled on the banks of the Tennessee River searching for a safe spot to
successfully escape the clash intact. Some of these men refused to rejoin the fight as night fell on
the battlefield. Instead, they swamped the riverbank and spread the disease of fear believing
rumors that Grant’s demise was imminent.153 Undoubtedly, a few of the soldiers from the FiftyThird who followed Appler’s order to retreat were among these refugees.
Despite the high casualties and being pinned against the Tennessee, General Grant had no
plan to disengage. Retreating across the river to safety via the Union’s great steamboat armada
was not a consideration. Furthermore, Grant was not going to fight a defensive battle from
behind his hastily assembled, but strong, defensive position. The general was going on the
offensive the next morning and planned drive the Confederates from the Union tents they now
occupied. Grant, in one of the war’s most oft quoted exchanges, relayed his plans to Sherman
under the cover of a sturdy tree when he responded to Sherman’s, “Well Grant, we’ve had the
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devil’s own day, haven’t we?” with the silently confident remark, “Yes, lick ‘em tomorrow,
though.”154
The Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry, now fully united after being separated during
the day’s fighting, still occupied a position between the Eighty-First Ohio and the Forty-Fifth
Illinois.155 The two factions of Wells S. Jones and Robert Fulton laid down together on the
battlefield after a terrifying first day of combat.156 Adjunct Ephraim C. Dawes remembered the
fighting on the first day of Shiloh as, “the fiercest… on this continent.”157 Samuel R. Betts of
Company G wrote that the regiment remained engaged in first day’s fight for eleven hours.158
Colonel J.J. Appler’s location remained unknown.159 Sole leadership of the Fifty-Third Ohio
remained with Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Fulton. The men with Fulton and Jones survived
their first fight and were prepared to face whatever new clash came with the morning.
The Fifty-Third Ohio were among the numerous Union soldiers without shelter after the
fighting on April 6th. They slept on their guns as the groans of the dying filled the woods. Just
when it appeared that the night of horrors could not get worse, the clouds opened and a heavy
thunderstorm pelted both armies.160 The men of the Fifty-Third Ohio had no option but to endure
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the rain. Their Rea Field camp, and all their regimental possession, were in Confederate hands.161
Adding to the sleeplessness of the night, Union gunboats on the river fired at the Rebel lines in
intervals. Meant to soften the Rebel lines and keep Beauregard’s men from sleeping, the
gunboats’ thunderous booms shook the ground and deprived both sides from the chance of a
restful night.162 Years later, Lucius Barber of the Fifteen Illinois shared his memory of that night:
“The night was dark and stormy. The rain came down in perfect torrents and we had neither food
nor shelter. Through the long dismal night, our rest was broken by the deep reverberating tones
of the guns from the gunboat which kept up an incessant roar all night.”163
Along the Confederate lines, the soldiers still among the living attempted to sleep in the
bullet-ridden Yankee tents. It had been a tough day for the Rebel force, but a successful one.
Exhausted and realizing that they had not quite broke Grant’s army, Confederate soldiers were
mostly satisfied with the day’s results.164 However, many Rebel soldiers believed they could
have achieved more. Many Southern soldiers thought they disengaged the enemy without
achieving complete victory and one more push could have secured a war-altering victory in the
West. In some Southern circles, particularly those whose understanding of battle was molded by
Albert Sidney Johnston’s son, General Beauregard would bear the responsibility for costing the
Rebels a chance at total victory.165
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Shiloh: Day Two (April 7, 1862)
Although victorious in the first day’s fighting, the situation was not completely positive
for the weary Rebel soldiers as the morning of April 7, 1862 approached. The nature of the first
day’s fighting left Confederate units spread out on the battlefield. The Battle of Shiloh may have
consisted of two large armies slugging it out on the banks of the Tennessee, but it frequently
dissolved into violent skirmishes among small groups of combatants. This fact, combined with
the Confederates desire to make use of the abandoned Union camps, left Rebel soldiers in a
woefully scattered condition.166
Even though General Beauregard planned to finish Grant’s army off in the morning, the
Rebels were in no real condition to successfully repulse an attack. Arguably, the Rebels were just
as unprepared for an attack on the second day as the Union on the first day. The Confederate
soldiers slept where they could and often made camp where their regiment fired its last shots of
day. Some of the Southern men refused to rest for the opportunity to raid the Union camps.
Rebel soldiers sloshed through the mud and dodged the boom of Yankee gunboats to steal food
and weapons from the abandoned Union camps.167
General Buell’s Army of Ohio arrived on the banks of the Tennessee as the last
Confederate charge fizzled on the evening of April 6th. General Grant arranged for steamboats to
ferry Buell’s men to Pittsburg Landing and into the battle as quickly as possible.168 Even though
Buell’s men exchanged just a few shots with the enemy, their presence undoubtedly boosted
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Union morale. The Army of Ohio continued to arrive on the battlefield throughout the rainy
night. In addition to Buell, Lew Wallace arrived with a force of approximately 5,000 men to
bolster the Union line.169 Arriving too late to impact the fighting on April 6th, Wallace’s army
was fully in position by midnight and eager to join the next day’s fight.170 The new arrivals made
Grant so certain that he would prevail the following day that he remembered believing: “that the
next day would bring victory to our arms if we could only take the initiative.”171
When morning came, Grant set his attack in motion. His soldiers made up the right of the
Union line while General Buell’s soldiers occupied the left flank.172 The Fifty-Third Ohio was
not under the direct command of General Sherman during the second day’s fighting due to the
scattered nature of Union troops. Along with the Eighty-First Ohio, they were a part of hastily
assembled collection under the command of a Kentucky-born democrat, General John A.
McClernand.173 The Eighty-First Ohio entered the battle as a part of the Second Brigade in
General W.H.L. Wallace’s Second Division.174 Like the rest of the Union army on the morning
of April 7, 1862, a lot had changed for the Eighty-First Ohio in the last twenty-four hours. Their
division commander was mortally wounded and dying, they were introduced to the Fifty-Third
Ohio, and placed under the command of McClernand.175
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The Fifty-Third Ohio advanced under General Grant’s order toward the Union camps
now occupied by Beauregard’s Confederates.176 In conjunction with the Eighty-First Ohio, the
two regiments moved over a mile from their original position without any signs of Rebel
resistance.177 Lieutenant R. A. Starkey and Lieutenant J.W. Fulton led an advance party of
skirmishers in front of the advancing Fifty-Third Ohio.178 Eventually, the Ohioans stumbled on a
collection of Rebels determined to defend their position. As a member of the Eighty-First Ohio
remembered, the Confederates opened a couple of cannons on the Ohioans sending, “shell and
shot from two batteries… flying through our ranks.”179 The two Ohio regiments eventually
chased the Rebels from their position with a bayonet charge.180
As the fighting continued on the second day, the Fifty-Third Ohio became a part of a
heavy clash on the Union left.181 The Confederate onslaught forced the Ohioans from their
position until the arrival of reinforcements gave the Union the advantage.182 Then, General
McClernand ordered the Fifty-Third Ohio to fill a different role. After engaging in combat for
the past forty-eight hours, the regiment was reassigned as sharpshooters. In this role, the FiftyThird Ohio successfully assisted in one of the final Union assaults at the Battle of Shiloh made
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by Buell’s soldiers.183 The last Union attack finally and thoroughly broke the Rebel line and sent
Beauregard’s army withdrawing back toward Corinth.184 The muddy ground and saturated roads
made the Confederate withdrawal difficult, and a Union pursuit almost impossible, but the Union
soldiers had successfully repulsed the attack on Pittsburg Landing. However, victory came at a
high price.185
On the Confederate side, the battle had taken a completely unexpected turn. The Rebels
were on the verge of driving the Union soldiers into the Tennessee less than twenty-four hours
earlier. Now, they were retreating from the field, heading back to Corinth, and leaving the
battlefield in Union possession. Due to the Union’s overwhelming numerical advantage and
Grant’s daring counterattack, withdrawal was arguably the only option left for General
Beauregard. The Rebel attack on Pittsburg Landing was a gamble that nearly succeeded, but
General Grant prevailed on a Western battlefield once again.
The Battle of Shiloh was a horrific experience for the men on both sides. Similar to the
Fifty-Third Ohio, the clash was the first war experience for the majority of Confederate and
Union soldiers. From the opening shots to the closing charge, the Fifty-Third Ohio remained
engaged in the fight. The regiment’s only rest came during the rain-soaked night following the
battle’s first day. Adjunct Ephraim C. Dawes only recorded two words in his pocket diary on
April 7th: “still fighting.”186 The Fifty-Third Ohio ended April 7th near the Shiloh Meetinghouse.

183

OR: 10, Part 1, 266.

184

Chamberlain, History of the 81st Regiment Ohio Infantry Volunteers during the War of the Rebellion, 19.

185

Grant, The Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant, ed., Marszalek, Nolen, and Gallo, 241-242.

186

Ephraim C. Dawes Pocket Journal, April 7, 1862, series 4, box 3, folder 78, Ephraim C. Dawes Papers,
Newberry Library, Chicago, Illinois.

113

After the confusion of combat, the regiment was finally reunited with the regiments of the Fifth
Division’s Third Brigade.187

The Day After Shiloh: April 8, 1862
By the morning of April 8, 1862, it was clear that the Rebels had abandoned the field.188
Still, the battered victors dispatched a small advance party to determine Confederate intentions.
General Sherman’s division contacted the retreating Rebels near a place known as Fallen
Timbers. Covering the Confederate retreat, Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest attempted to lure the
pursing Union troops into an ambush. Dismounted Rebel cavalry fired on Sherman’s men.
Behind Forrest’s initial line, approximately three hundred Confederate horsemen waited to
spring their trap.189 Once again, the Fifty-Third Ohio, and the rest of its brigade, was in the
midst of the fighting.
The fight on Monday April 7, 1862 illustrated the effectiveness of the Fifty-Third Ohio
under fire. Upon contacting Forrest’s men approximately five miles from Shiloh on the road
leading to Corinth, General Sherman deployed Colonel Hildebrand’s brigade to advance on the
enemy. First, the Seventy-Seventh Ohio engaged the Confederates with the Fifty-Third Ohio in
support. The Seventy-Seventh Ohio formed into a battleline and prepared their rifles to fire.
Before the Seventy-Seventh Ohio could direct its fire toward the enemy, Forrest sprang his trap.
The Rebel cavalry violently charged the regiment forcing the Seventy-Seventh to break and
retreat.190
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Following the breaking of the Seventy-Seventh’s line, the Fifty-Third Ohio was ordered
to quickly fall into a battle formation. The regiment, now engaged in combat for the third
consecutive day, fixed bayonets and prepared for the fight. The Fifty-Third Ohio then executed a
daring and brave movement by charging toward the mounted Confederates. Forrest’s men were
no match for the Ohioans and began to ride away. Not only did the Fifty-Third Ohio force the
Rebel cavalry to break, a large number of soldiers from the Seventy-Seventh Ohio were rescued
by their fellow Third Brigade regiment.191 In addition, several of Forrest’s men cut down by the
Fifty-Third Ohio lay dead among the trees.192 The Fifty-Third Ohio pressed the attack until the
fallen trees, and the arrival of night, hindered the regiment’s ability to execute military
maneuvers.193
The promptness of the Fifty-Third Ohio’s actions during the fight at Fallen Timbers on
April 8, 1862 illustrated how rapidly the regiment matured during the Shiloh campaign. The
Ohioans entered the Battle of Shiloh totally green and were forced to learn Civil War combat in
the midst of a battle General Sherman remembered as, “one of the most fiercely contested of the
war.”194 By April 8th, the Fifty-Third Ohio was a veteran regiment that not only engaged the
Rebels without hesitation, the Ohioans most likely saved General Sherman from capture when
the enemy unleashed its trap.195 Whether the regiment’s growth was due to finally “seeing the

191

Ibid., 89-90.

192

OR: 10, Part 1, 266.

193

Duke, History of the Fifty-Third Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry during the War of the Rebellion, 89-

194

Sherman, Memoirs, 231.

195

Duke, History of the Fifty-Third Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry during the War of the Rebellion, 90.

90.

115

elephant,” or if they just benefitted from the removal of Colonel Appler from command, the
Fifty-Third Ohio exited the Shiloh campaign prepared meet the call of duty for the duration of
the war.
General Ulysses S. Grant ultimately decided against a full pursuit of the Confederate
retreat. The frequent and heavy rains of the previous few days left the roads in a muddy
condition that were worsened by the retreating Rebel wagons. Grant’s army, although ultimately
victorious, was just as battered and exhausted as the enemy. There was also a question of
seniority that prohibited Grant from ordering Buell’s men to pursue Beauregard. Grant believed
that the brutal fighting at Shiloh left the Union army without the strength and manpower to
successfully follow up on its defense of Pittsburg Landing.196 Instead, the Union soldiers
returned to the battlefield to bury the dead laying exposed to the warm spring sun.197
During the fighting at Shiloh on April 6th and 7th, nine members of the Fifty-Third Ohio
were killed in action. Forty-four soldiers received injuries, but zero were reported missing. A few
minor injuries occurred on the fighting at Fallen Timbers that afflicted seven of the Ohioans.198
As the regiment returned to the battlefield at Shiloh following the fight at Fallen Timbers, its
connection to the battle was far from over. Speculation, rumors, and false accounts of the clash
would soon overpower the initial praise placed on General Grant and his men for driving the
enemy from Pittsburg Landing. The Union command would soon be forced to answer questions
about the preparedness of their men and whether the army was surprised by Johnston’s attack.
However, the finger pointing would not solely be directed at high-ranking officials. The Fifty-
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Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry’s performance, and its honor, would soon be the center of
attention.
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Chapter 5
The Fifty-Third Ohio’s “White Feather” at Shiloh
Introduction: The Context of Shiloh’s Complicated History
As the smoke cleared from the battlefield at Shiloh, both home fronts basked in the
temporary jubilation of perceived victory. However, the elation experienced by citizens of the
United States and Confederate States did not accurately reflect the battle’s true outcome.
Confederate leadership electrified the South with a premature telegraph to Richmond announcing
a sweeping victory on the evening of April 6, 1862.1 The excitement throughout the Confederate
States of America was soon replaced by the realities of defeat. Leaving the Union in possession
of Pittsburg Landing was eventually viewed as a Rebel loss by almost everyone except General
P.G.T. Beauregard, who clung to the previous message of triumph.2
Beauregard’s assessment of the battle was among the first of many attempts to calculate
Shiloh’s true outcome. The blurring of fact, fiction, and fantasy further complicated attempts to
construct an accurate history. In an April 16th message to the Army of Mississippi, the
Confederate general continued to spin his army’s action at Shiloh as a crippling blow to the
Union war effort stating: “You have bravely fought the invaders of your soil for two days in his
own position…Your success has been signal…You have done your duty. Your commanding
general thanks you.”3 For decades, Beauregard continued to present the battle in the best possible
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light for the Rebel cause.4 Many other Confederate leaders viewed the Battle of Shiloh as a
missed opportunity that should have been a war-altering victory.5
The Battle of Shiloh also created a confusion between reality and fabrication in the
North. The Union victory once again elevated Ulysses S. Grant’s status as a war hero until the
high casualty numbers soured the Northern mood. Popular opinion quickly turned against the
successful general for the first time in the war.6 In addition, questions arose about the status of
Union defenses at Pittsburg Landing and whether the Union army had been surprised on April 6,
1862. Even the old accusation of drunkenness returned to haunt a disheartened Grant.7
According to historian James McPherson: “Grant was now a bigger goat than Albert Sidney
Johnston had been in the South after his retreat from Tennessee.”8 Ultimately, General Henry
Halleck arrived at Pittsburg Landing and pushed Grant into a meaningless subordinate role.9
Due to the debates and finger pointing, Grant remembered the Battle of Shiloh as:
“perhaps less understood, or, to state the case more accurately, more persistently misunderstood,
than any other engagement between National and Confederate troops during the entire
rebellion.”10 William Tecumseh Sherman, the recipient of similar criticism, agreed with Grant’s
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assessment of Shiloh’s legacy. In his memoir, Sherman wrote: “Probably no single battle of the
war gave rise to such wild and damaging reports.”11 The clash on the banks of the Tennessee
River still caused causalities long after the Rebel army withdrew. However, the victims were no
longer the results of horrific battlefield injuries, but the damaged reputations of commanders.
Questions surrounding the tardiness to the battlefield of General Lew Wallace, and whether
Grant could have won without the arrival of General Don Carlos Buell’s army, provided
newspapers with sensational material for an eager public.12
Commanding generals and household names were not the only recipients of accusations,
slanders, and falsehoods. There was enough blame for every soldier associated with the Union
military victory, or perceived loss, at Shiloh. Arguably, few soldiers understood Grant and
Sherman’s assessments of the battle’s legacy more than the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio
Volunteer Infantry. Not only was the regiment still reeling from the shock of its first encounter
with the enemy, but additional wounds from the Battle of Shiloh festered for decades through
spoken words, newspaper articles, and memoirs. As the Fifty-Third Ohio’s de-facto regimental
historian wrote in 1900, “a certain amount of odium was sought to be cast upon the 53rd Ohio
Regiment” in the Shiloh narrative.13
To understand the lasting impact of the Battle of Shiloh on the Fifty-Third Ohio, the
sources of the criticism, and reasons why the regiment was ostracized, must be considered. First,
how the Union command viewed the actions of the Fifty-Third Ohio on the morning of April 6,
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1862 should be examined. This question focuses heavily on General Sherman’s interpretation of
the Fifty-Third Ohio at Shiloh with emphasis on his face-to-face rebuke of the regiment in the
battle’s immediate aftermath. In addition, General Grant’s opinion of regiments who initially fled
the frontlines adds further context to the overall interpretation of the Fifty-Third Ohio. Next, how
was the Union commanders’ opinion of the regiment influenced solely by the actions of Colonel
Appler?
The second set of questions that are necessary for a full understanding of the Fifty-Third
Ohio at Shiloh are connected to the regiment’s portrayal in the press. First, how was the regiment
presented in the local Ohio press? Furthermore, the harsh treatment of the regiment in the
Chicago newspapers, and how that was connected to the need of the Illinois press to protect the
honor of its state’s soldiers, is examined. Finally, the question of how the regiment responded to
criticism places the post-Shiloh debate into larger questions of honor, duty, and manhood of the
Civil War Era. Despite staying in the fight for the duration of the battle, the Fifty-Third Ohio
remained the focus of unjust innuendo and allegations of cowardice related to Colonel J.J.
Appler’s rash and unnecessary order to withdraw that cast a long shadow over the regiment’s
legacy.

Union Commanders’ Criticisms of the Fifty-Third O.V.I.
At the Battle of Shiloh, the state of Ohio received a bad name based on the perceived
unsteadiness of its soldiers under fire. Ohio troops, including the Fifty-Third Ohio, were viewed
by some of their comrades in a negative light for failing to hold their ground against the initial
Rebel attack. John A. Cockerill of the Seventieth Ohio remembered a Union lieutenant saying in
the midst of battle: “Ohio is making a bad show of itself here today. I have stragglers from a
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dozen Ohio regiments going past here for half an hour. Ohio expects better work from her sons
than this.”14 The Fifty-Third Ohio was not unique among its fellow Ohio regiments for the
criticism it received. However, the ferocity of the attacks against the regiment was particularly
hurtful. The broad statements about Ohio soldiers wounded the collective pride of the state, but it
was the direct accusations of cowardice against the Fifty-Third Ohio that truly tarnished the
regiment’s legacy.
Several factors placed the Fifty-Third Ohio in the direct path of criticism and
condemnation during the fallout from Shiloh. Arguably, no bigger factor assisted in smearing the
regiment’s name more than generals looking to redirect their own critics. General Sherman was
particularly hurt by the slanderous reports of against him and General Grant in the Union
newspapers. Sherman felt the attacks were unjust and renewed his longstanding feud with the
press.15 Officers caught in the censure’s crosshairs readily passed the buck to the men serving
under them as the accusations mounted. General Sherman became the focus of many criticisms
related to Shiloh, but he was equally angry about the attacks on Grant who the press painted as
negligent and mostly responsible for the failures of Shiloh.16
Sherman had already faced his share of troubles with the press and was just emerging
from the accusations against his mental health first published by the Cincinnati Commercial
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when the Battle of Shiloh occurred.17 According to Sherman biographer and historian John F.
Marszalek, Sherman “battled the press in a conflict that in intensity rivaled the fighting between
Union and Confederate soldiers.”18 Sherman likely searched for cover out of fear of repeating the
negative press of the previous year. Partly related to the growing desire to identify scapegoats for
the Battle of Shiloh, the Fifty-Third Ohio found itself in the midst of the controversy. No source
was harsher in its criticism of the Fifty-Third Ohio than its division commander, William
Tecumseh Sherman.
Historian Brooks D. Simpson argues that Sherman tried to defend the Union surprise at
Shiloh by overstating the preparedness of his troops.19 According to Simpson, Sherman was
“eager to discredit negative newspaper reports detailing a Union army overrun in a moment of
absolute surprise, went too far when it came to defending themselves from the charges that they
had not anticipated the Confederate attack.”20 Sherman knew that his failure to take the reports of
approaching Rebels seriously would likely taint his legacy.21 In addition, the general sent
multiple rebukes to the Fifty-Third Ohio and its colonel for alerting him of a large Confederate
force approaching Pittsburg Landing.22 For Sherman, it was important to deflect the claims to an
easier target. Unfortunately, the Fifty-Third Ohio perfectly suited that role.
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On April 11, 1862, Sherman made his displeasure with the regiment known. He called
the Fifty-Third Ohio to attention and berated its performance in the opening rounds of the battle.
Regimental adjunct, Ephraim C. Dawes, recorded in his diary for the 11th that the Fifty-Third
Ohio was: “publicly disgraced to day.”23 As the regiment stood at attention before its division
commander, Sherman unloaded a scolding public rebuke of the Fifty-Third Ohio’s performance
on April 6th.24 The general accused the regiment of cowardice in the face of the enemy and
verbally attacked the Ohioans’ honor. General Sherman must have raised his voice in anger,
possibly screaming, allowing the exchange to be recorded by a nearby member of another
regiment.25 A.F. Davis of the Fifteenth Indiana Infantry listened as Sherman scolded the FiftyThird Ohio.26
In a letter to his brother, Davis recorded the blistering attack: “On Wednesday Gen.
Sherman found the 53rd Ohio in a hollow square in a few yards from my tent and addressed them
for near one hour. And of all the rebukes that I ever hear men get he gave them. Calling them
cowards, bastards and every low name he could think of.”27 Sherman continued his reprimand by
stating the Fifty-Third Ohio was a “disgrace to the nation” and threatened to kill members of the
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regiment with Union cannons if they ever broke again.28 Specifically, Sherman threatened to
“open on them with grape and canister” if a repeat of Shiloh occurred.29
In addition to Sherman’s negative portrayal, General Don Carlos Buell later blamed the
Fifty-Third Ohio for the Union initial failure at Shiloh in an article for Century magazine.
However, Buell not only criticized the Fifty-Third Ohio, but blamed the entire Third Brigade of
Sherman’s Fifth Division for failing to hold the Union line.30 First, Buell wrote that Sherman’s
left, the position occupied by the Fifty-Third Ohio, “immediately broke into a rout.”31 Later, he
stated: “Hildebrand’s brigade now disappeared in complete disorder from the front, leaving three
pieces of artillery in the hands of the enemy.”32 The Fifty-Third Ohio became a universal
scapegoat for Union generals connected to the Battle of Shiloh.
It should be noted that General Buell was not present when the first shots of the Battle of
Shiloh were fired.33 The general was waiting to bring his full army together with Grant’s soldiers
to initiate the strike on Corinth, Mississippi.34 Buell likely based his portrayal of the Fifty-Third
Ohio, and the Third Brigade of the Fifth Division, off reports filed by the participants of the
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clash. Undoubtedly, Sherman’s opinion of the battle’s opening minutes influenced Buell’s
account and contributed to his unflattering picture of the Fifty-Third Ohio.
Buell’s assessment of the battle reached a wide audience. In the 1880s, the formerly titled
Scribner’s magazine was in the process of being rebranded as Century. The magazine’s new
editors were hoping to find a series of novel articles that would capture the nation’s attention.
With the Civil War receding into history and memory, and the conflict’s veterans aging, the idea
was born to persuade soldiers from both sides to record their wartime experiences for the
publication.35 Shortly after the first “battle paper” was printed, the circulation of Century rose
from approximately 127,000 to 225,000 with an estimated readership of around two million.36
The articles were printed in the 1880s in a four volume set and reprinted in 1956 ensuring that
the early portrayals of soldiers, like the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio, continued to heavily
influence the historiography of the Civil War.37

The Impact of the Union Command’s Censure of Appler on the Fifty-Third O.V.I.
The public censure of the Fifty-Third Ohio was not the only time the regiment was the
focus of General Sherman’s anger. As time passed, however, his displeasure with the regiment
shifted more toward the actions of Colonel J.J. Appler, but he never fully pardoned the FiftyThird Ohio as a whole. In an 1862 letter, Sherman placed Appler into the group of colonels who
withered in the face of the Rebel attack at Shiloh. The general called these men “cowards,” and
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the soldiers who followed them were defined as “those who deserted their colors.”38 In addition,
General Sherman wrote harshly of the Fifty-Third Ohio in his official report and echoed some of
his earlier charges against the regiment.
Sherman’s recollection of the battle was recorded one day before the Fifty-Third Ohio’s
adjunct, Ephraim C. Dawes, recorded the regiment being “publicly disgraced,” and roughly the
same time as the rebuke of the regiment recorded by A.F. Davis.39 In his report, Sherman wrote
that “Appler’s regiment broke in disorder” and that “two regiments of Hildebrand’s brigade –
Appler’s and Mungen’s – had already disappeared to the rear” by 10 am on April 6th.40 Sherman
later added the report, and his assessment of the Fifty-Third Ohio at Shiloh, to his published
memoir which allowed his version to reach a wide audience.41 Not only did the regiment’s
division commander blame the Fifty-Third Ohio in the immediate aftermath of Shiloh for the
initial failure of his command, Sherman remained firm in this conviction for the remainder of his
life.
A change in the Fifty-Third Ohio’s command did not appear to ease Sherman’s
frustration toward the Ohioans. Colonel J.J. Appler was removed from command following the
Battle of Shiloh.42 Eventually, Wells S. Jones of Company A replaced Appler and led the

Brooks D. Simpson and Jean V. Berlin, eds., Sherman’s Civil War: Selected Correspondence of William
T. Sherman, 1861-1865 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 243-245.
38

39

Ephraim C. Dawes Pocket Journal, April 11, 1862; A.F. Davis to F.D. Davis, April 21, 1862; OR: 10,
Part 1 248.
40

OR 10: Part 1: 249.

41

Sherman, Memoirs, 218-227.

42

The Roster Commission, Official Roster of the Soldiers of the State of Ohio in the War of the Rebellion,
1861-1865: Volume IV, 37th-53rd Regiments – Infantry (Akron: The Werner PTG. and MFG. Co., 1887), 675;
Ephraim Dawes to Ed McFurger, April 29, 1862, series 1, box 1, folder 43, Ephraim C. Dawes Paper, Newberry
Library, Chicago, Illinois; Steven E. Woodworth, Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865 (New
York: Vintage Books, 2005), 197.

127

regiment as it became known as a reliable and brave unit.43 The general’s later correspondences
that praised the efforts of the regiment were still accompanied by his original criticism of Appler.
In a letter praising the Fifty-Third Ohio from June of 1864, Sherman still referenced the regiment
as: “that very Regt. which first broke, the 53rd Ohio, Col. Appler.”44 In Sherman’s eyes, the
perceived stain of Shiloh remained with the Fifty-Third Ohio in spite of the regiment’s later
success.
Sherman’s disgust with Appler was primarily based on the colonel ordering the regiment
to “fall back and save yourselves.”45 The general was present with the Fifty-Third Ohio when he
realized his line was under attack. Sherman promised to send support to bolster the position
before riding away to assess the overall situation. As Sherman departed from the Ohioans, the
general ordered the regiment to meet the Confederate assault where it stood: “Appler, hold your
position; I will support you.”46 Shortly after Sherman’s departure, Appler lost his nerve and
ordered an unnecessary retreat from the Fifty-Third Ohio’s Rea Field position.
The story of the Fifty-Third Ohio at Shiloh remained almost exclusively negative for the
approximately one-hundred years following the battle. By comparison to the great battles in the
East, the Western Theater did not receive enough attention to spark a major historiographical
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shift for Appler or his men. Unfortunately for the Fifty-Third Ohio, Sherman’s assessment of the
regiment’s performance at Shiloh became foundational research for the general’s biographers.
The reoccurring critique of the Fifty-Third Ohio at Shiloh usually cites Sherman’s censure of
Appler and the men who followed his order to retreat.
As mentioned in chapter one, the historiography of the Fifty-Third Ohio at Shiloh has
been largely negative among Sherman biographers. The negative portrayals often focused on
Appler, but the colonel was usually presented as a part of the regiment and not as the outside
factor of poor leadership beyond the regiment’s control. James Lee McDonough wrote that
Sherman’s failure to hold his line on the morning of April 6, 1862 was likely tied to the retreat of
the Fifty-Third Ohio from Rea Field.47 Robert L. O’Connell described Appler as “nervous” and
praised the heroic Sherman as a leader who “righted himself and took on the wave” after failing
to believe reports of Rebels near Pittsburg Landing.48
Steven E. Woodworth, with a slightly more balanced assessment, still wrote that the
Fifty-Third Ohio “crumbled” on the morning of April 6th.49 Woodworth also argued in his book
Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865, that the “apparent constitutional
coward Jesse Appler” was somewhat responsible for alerting the Union camp of the Rebel threat
on April 6, 1862.50 Also balanced but still harsh in his calculation of the Fifty-Third Ohio’s first
moments in combat, Lloyd Lewis agreed with Sherman’s assessment of the regiment and
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Appler’s performance.51 Due in part to the lack of histories written about the Battle of Shiloh, the
established reputation of the regiment remains entrenched in the American mind.52
Through all of this criticism, General Grant was mostly silent. The general, who was also
the target of growing public animosity following Shiloh, was disappointed and angered at the
performance of some of the men under his command. However, no surviving record exists to
indicate that Grant specifically called out the Fifty-Third Ohio. Grant approached the situation
with more universal critiques, but he did feel animosity toward the officers who abandoned their
positions in the early moments of the Battle of Shiloh. In addition, he felt substantially more
contempt for colonels like Appler for running than he did the men who followed their example.
Writing in his memoirs, Grant stated: “Colonels led their regiments from the field on first
hearing the whistle of the enemy’s bullets. In these cases the colonels were constitutional
cowards, unfit for any military position.”53

The Fifty-Third Ohio and the Northern Press
Thanks to the public demand for information from Shiloh, the criticisms of the regiment
reached a large readership. The citizens from the Fifty-Third Ohio’s hometowns could not avoid
the negative reports. Even though the entire nation was hungry for news about Shiloh, the
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Western states were particularly interested.54 As Steven E. Woodworth summarized the region’s
desire for news from the front: “News of what was then the bloodiest battle ever fought by
Americans hit the Midwest hard.”55 Family and friends impatiently awaited news about their
local regiments and read every piece of information available.
While it may have been a comforting for the men to know their relatives followed the
regiment’s every move, it also ensured that the accusations against the unit would not go
unnoticed. The public criticism of the Fifty-Third Ohio at Shiloh went through two phases. First,
the regiment was collectively shamed for breaking on the morning of April 6, 1862. Then, the
retreat from Rea Field was rebranded as a failure of command with Colonel J.J. Appler as the
main target. In this regard, the press largely followed the interpretative shift of the Union high
command. However, the Fifty-Third Ohio remained linked to the underwhelming performance of
its colonel.
Among other critiques, a damaging claim circulated that the Ohioans broke without firing
their guns at various points of the battle. This charge grew in popularity as the Fifty-Third Ohio
emerged as one of the battle’s most criticized Union regiments. Among others, Lucius Barber of
the Fifteenth Illinois Volunteer Infantry shared this interpretation. Writing in his 1894 memoir,
Barber wrote that the Fifty-Third Ohio was in support of his regiment in mid-morning hours of
April 6, 1862.56 Barber claimed: “We had hardly gotten our line formed before the enemy
opened on us with grape and canister… The 53d Ohio, appalled at the sight, broke and ran
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without firing a gun.”57 This stigma remained with the regiment as historians such as Timothy B.
Smith, Wiley Sword, Steven E. Woodworth, and others relied on Barber’s account as a source
for their interpretations of the Battle of Shiloh.
The charge of retreating without firing a shot originally surfaced in the immediate
aftermath of the Battle of Shiloh. And for the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio, the accusation
arguably came from the worst possible source. The Daily Ohio Statesman printed the accusation
in an article published approximately one week after the battle.58 People throughout the
regiment’s home state read the indictment: “the Fifty-Third Ohio was ordered to the rear in
disgrace, for refusing to fight.”59 Unfortunately for the regiment, the criticisms continued to
mount.
The Daily Ohio Statesmen was not the only newspaper to print the accusation in April of
1862. Other papers printed their own version of the story, or reprinted the original. The April 17,
1862 edition of the Illinois Daily State Journal included an article claiming the regiment fled
“without firing a gun”.60 In addition, the paper specifically called out the Fifty-Third Ohio as one
of the many regiments who failed to muster any response to the Rebel attack stating: “Some of
the regiments, it is even said, ran without firing a gun. Col. Appler’s Fifty-third Ohio is loudly
complained of on this score, and others are mentioned.”61 Unlike Barber’s memoir, it is clear that
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the Illinois Daily State Journal portrayed the Fifty-Third Ohio as failing to discharge its weapons
during the initial Rebel attack.
The accusations against the Fifty-Third Ohio were direct attacks on the era’s concepts of
honor and manhood. As stated in chapter two, honor and manhood were often major factors in
the decision to enlist for many Civil War soldiers. How a soldier performed in the face of enemy
fire could forever alter how his friends, family, and comrades viewed his character.62 For the
men of the Fifty-Third Ohio, the accusation of fleeing the field at Shiloh without firing a shot
was devastating when viewed through the lens of the Civil War Era.
Illinois newspapers continued to be the harshest early critics of the regiment. The papers
in Chicago were particularly rough in their accusations.63 Before details of the battle’s first day
turned the Chicago Tribune’s anger toward Colonel Appler instead of the regiment in general,
the paper labeled the Fifty-Third Ohio as a regiment that was “accused of running to the rear.”64
The April 15, 1862 edition of the Chicago Tribune was particularly harsh on the Fifty-Third
Ohio. In attempt to justify why its local battery belonging to Captain Allen C. Waterhouse was
overrun by the enemy, the Chicago paper accused the Ohio regiment of failing to protect the
Illinois cannons.65 Losing its guns to the enemy was a stain on the reputation of the battery which
likely led the Illinois press to use the Ohioans to explain the loss. The paper wrote that Fifty-
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Third Ohio was on the left of Waterhouse’s battery and “upon the first volley received by the
enemy, cut and run cut and run like so many sheep.”66
Regardless of where the slanderous articles originated, the pride and honor of the
regiment was severely damaged. An April 12th article from the Cincinnati Times tried to make
sense of the accusations against its former local heroes. Cincinnati, located in Hamilton County,
supplied men for the regiment’s Company K under the direct command of Captain Preston R.
Galloway.67 The article, later printed by The Philadelphia Inquirer, was written as answer to
another article that claimed: “the Fifty-third Regiment of Ohio Volunteers, at the late battle of
Pittsburg, had acted disgracefully, by evincing a degree of cowardice not to be tolerated.”68
Furthermore, the charge of retreating “without firing a gun” was directed at the Fifty-Third Ohio
from a source claiming to be familiar with the events.69 The Cincinnati Times tried to defend its
local soldiers by debunking the slanders against the regiment. Not only did the charges of
cowardice wound the pride of the men directly involved in the Fifty-Third Ohio’s fight on April
6, 1862, they also drug the name of southern Ohio through the mud of defamation.
The Cleveland Daily Leader also attempted to find clarity for the regiment’s actions.
Even though the paper was concerned about how the regiment was perceived, the article was
more concerned about the state pride of Ohio. Calling the charges against the regiment: “the
rumored disgrace of the 53d Ohio Regiment at the Pittsburg battle,” the paper hoped that some
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piece of information would shed light on why Appler’s men failed in the face of the enemy.70
According to the article, the potential cowardice of an Ohio regiment was “deeply mortifying to
our State pride.”71 Even though the regiment came from the opposite end of the state as the
Cleveland Daily Leader’s readership, the failure of any Ohio regiment was a disgrace to the
entire state. The article ended on an optimistic, but wishful, tone: “we cannot comprehend how
there should have been such a demonstration by the whole Regiment, unless upon the
supposition that it was the result of some accidental cause not contemplated, producing, perhaps,
a momentary panic, not uncommon in battle.”72
Similarly, the community of Gallipolis, Ohio sought answers to questions pertaining to
the regiment’s honor. Even though the community was located in Gallia County, the local
newspapers felt a sense of duty to come to the defense of a regiment created in its neighboring
county, Jackson.73 The Gallipolis Journal acknowledged the charges against the regiment: “The
53d Ohio regiment is accused of showing the white feather at the late battle of Pittsburg.”74
Fearing that the rumors might taint the name of southern Ohio, local newspapers searched for
answers.
The claims of cowardice deeply offended the era’s sense of honor, bravery, and
masculinity. The Victorian influence on American culture demanded that a man perform bravely
in the face of danger.75 Colonel Appler definitely violated the era’s codes of manly conduct and
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the charges trickled down to the rest of the regiment. According to historian Lorien Foote:
“courage was intimately connected with honor, an ideal of manhood…and with selfcontrol…Obviously a man overcome by his fear had lost control of his emotions and was, to use
the contemporary phrase, ‘unmanned.’”76 Arguably, no greater danger, and no better chance for
proving one’s worth, ever existed than a Civil War battlefield. Historian Peter S. Carmichael
argued that soldiers of the Civil War Era were willing to face certain death and take part in
suicidal missions to avoid being shamed with the labels of disgrace and dishonor.77
Union soldier and college professor Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain said of maintaining
battlefield integrity: “an officer is so absorbed by the sense of responsibility for his men, for his
cause, or for the fight that the thought of personal peril has no place whatsoever in governing his
actions. The instinct to seek safety is overcome by the instinct of honor.”78 In the months that
followed Shiloh, it was clear that Colonel Appler had violated the era’s code of honor, but an
opportunity remained for the rest of the regiment to escape the controversary unscathed.
Specifically, Appler had let the fear of personal harm overcome his duty to his men and his
country. If the men could clearly explain that Appler ordered the retreat, and prove that not every
member of the regiment followed, the collective honor of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer
Infantry could remain intact. In this regard, the importance of setting the record straight was
paramount for the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio.
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The Fifty-Third Ohio’s role as one of the first regiments to make contact with the enemy
on the morning of Shiloh’s first day allowed it to be used as a scapegoat. Even a member from
the Fifty-Third Ohio’s own brigade, R.B. Griggs of the Seventy-Seventh Ohio, used the regiment
to cover his own unit’s failures. In the pages of the National Tribune, Griggs was quoted: “The
53d gave way long before the 77th. If the 53d could have held its position the 77th would not have
had to fall back. The 53d was in advance and to the left of the 77th about 300 yards, and when the
53d gave way the Rebels came in on our left flank, and we were compelled to fall back and be
taken prisoners.”79

The Press Shifts the Blame to Appler
In the weeks after Shiloh, news outlets started to blame the regiment’s leadership rather
than collectively disparaging the unit for the perceived failures at Shiloh. Originally running in
the Cincinnati Times, the Daily Ohio Statesmen printed an April 30th article that placed the guilt
squarely on the shoulders of Colonel J.J. Appler: “Col. Appler, of the Fifty-third Ohio, is charged
with displaying great cowardice at Pittsburg Landing.”80 The article lifted some of the stain on
the regiment’s name claiming of Appler: “through his trepidation the regiment was broken, and
the men fought as best they could under other commanders.”81 This interpretation was a part of
the redirection of blame from the regiment to its leader.
The Appler-centered interpretation of the regiment’s failure was shared by the members
of the Fifty-Third Ohio. Following the battle of Shiloh, Colonel J.J. Appler remained separated
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from his unit. The colonel did not rejoin the regiment until late on Monday night, April the 7th.82
When Appler entered the regiment’s camp, his men greeted him with anger and derided their
colonel for cowardice. David Neal of Company I confirmed to the Ironton Register that “Col. J.J.
Appler run from the field at the commencement of the fight, and failed to show his face until the
battle was over.”83 Arguably, the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio appeared to know that their Shiloh
story had been severely tainted by Appler. According to Neal, when the colonel finally returned
to camp, the men of the regiment shouted “Shoot him! Shoot him!”84 Appler tried to resign, but
he was informed that he would instead be “cashiered, dismissed from the service, and sent home
in disgrace.”85
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Fulton’s official report echoed the account of David Neal and
the shift toward blaming Appler for the failures of the Fifty-Third Ohio. Fulton’s report stated
that Appler “abandoned” the Fifty-Third Ohio. Later, and John K. Duke’s regimental memoir
agreed with Fulton and labeled the Fifty-Third Ohio’s leaders, presumably with Appler in mind,
as “amateurs in matters of warfare.”86 The regiment realized the interpretation of their service
was tied to the actions of their commander. Unfortunately for the Fifty-Third Ohio, Appler’s
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reputation was destroyed.87 General Sherman filed for Appler to be court-martialed two weeks
after Shiloh.88
The shifting of blame to Appler did not totally free the rest of the Fifty-Third Ohio from
the continued mudslinger. Newspaper articles continued to print the previous allegations and
connected the regiment with its colonel’s actions. As late as 1900, the stain of Shiloh still
haunted the Fifty-Third Ohio. In Duke’s regimental memoir, the author still sought to clear the
regiment’s name. Duke stated that the Fifty-Third Ohio was unjustly derided for its conduct at
Shiloh. Furthermore, Duke referenced the accusations against the regiment as one of the factors
for printing the memoir.89
By the turn of the century, the Fifty-Third Ohio had experienced ever-evolving portrayals
related to the Battle of Shiloh. Although mostly negative, the regiment occasionally found a
sympathetic newspaper or author willing to give the unit a balanced depiction. Ohio’s
commission on its troops’ conduct at Shiloh provided a balanced portrayal of the regiment and
accused Colonel Appler for being the source of the Fifty-Third Ohio’s criticism. In spite of this
approach, the commission still dedicated a major portion of its report on regiment to the failures
at Shiloh and the accusations that followed.90
The commission came into existence as a part of the preparations for the establishment of
the Shiloh National Military Park. Its purpose was to “locate positions of Ohio troops and erect
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monuments therefore on the battlefield of Shiloh.”91 Setting its sights firmly on Appler, the
commission wrote: “The 53d has been much criticized about their conduct in the first day’s
battle of Shiloh. They were unfortunate in having an arrant coward for a colonel, who at the first
sight of the enemy deserted his men.”92 The debate over the regiment’s performance at Shiloh
remained central to the story of the Fifty-Third Ohio long after the conclusion of the war.

The Response of the Fifty-Third Ohio and Its Defenders
The claims against the regiment continued to deeply wound the men. Adjunct Dawes
acknowledge that the charges were a frequent topic of conversation among the Fifty-Third
Ohio’s soldiers even in battle’s immediate aftermath. In an April 21, 1862 letter, a concerned
acquaintance wrote Dawes asking his friend to address the negative newspaper reports and
clarify the Fifty-Third Ohio’s actions during the Battle of Shiloh. Merely questioning the
integrity and honor of the regiment hurt Dawes. It was one thing to have strangers write
disparaging reports in the newspapers, but the letter from a friend placed Dawes on the
defensive.93
In the letter, Dawes not only defended his actions and the actions of his regiment, but he
gently scolded his acquaintance for questioning the Ohioans’ honor: “I know the papers have
been pitching into us – That we are everywhere cursed as cowards; but it did hurt me for you to

91

Ibid., 2; Daniel J. Ryan, The Civil War Literature of Ohio: A Bibliography with Explanatory and
Historical Notes (Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers Company, 1911), 538; William Herbert Page, ed., The General
Code of Ohio: Revised Compact Edition, Including all Laws of a General Nature in Force January 1, 1921 with
Notes Showing the Legislative History of Each Section, Also Cross-References to Kindred Sections (Cincinnati: The
W.H. Anderson Company, 1921), 5,850.
92

Lindsey, Ohio at Shiloh, 24.

93

Ephraim C. Dawes to Marshall (Last Name Illegible), April 21, 1862.

140

ask the simpler & very natural question, ‘Were you in the fight either of the two days?”94 Dawes
admitted his sensitivity to the question was a result of the constant barrage of attacks coming
from the press, other Union regiments, and General Sherman.95 In the letter, Dawes took the first
step toward his self-appointed role as the regiment’s historian and defender by writing “you can’t
appreciate our position exactly without what it would take me a week to tell you by word of
mouth… Yes, I was in the fight.”96
Ephraim C. Dawes later became one of the Fifty-Third Ohio’s most prolific defenders
during the postbellum period, but he began his efforts to vindicate the regiment in the immediate
aftermath of the battle. The remainder of Dawes’ life was dedicated to addressing the rumors and
innuendos directed at the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry. First, he wrote a two-part essay
meant to set the regiment’s record straight that was published by the Historical Society of
Massachusetts in 1893 and 1895. Then, he wrote a full-length account of the regiment for the
Ohio Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States that was
published in an 1896 collection of essays. In addition, Dawes chronicled the regiment’s war
service with papers for the G.A.R. War Papers collection and a history of the Army of the
Tennessee. Dawes voluntarily became the self-appointed official historian of the regiment
following the death of fellow-veteran, R.H. Brewster.97 Until his April 23, 1895 death from heart
failure triggered by severe influenza, Dawes was unquestionably the greatest chronicler of the
Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry and its most productive defender.98
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After Dawes’ death, the task of officially correcting lingering doubts about the FiftyThird Ohio at Shiloh fell to John K. Duke. Even though Duke was not a member of the regiment
at its inception, nor was he present at the Battle of Shiloh, he relied heavily on the writings of
veterans like Dawes. Unfortunately, most of Duke’s sources have been lost to history and no
longer exist in their original form. However, a history of the Fifty-Third Ohio was published by
Duke in 1900 that promoted the Fifty-Third Ohio’s collective version of Shiloh.99 Undoubtedly
related to Shiloh’s status as the main topic of regimental reunions near the turn of the century,
approximately one-third of the Duke’s book was devoted to the battle.100 It is evident that the
regiment still felt the sting of the original criticism associated with its performance in the battle’s
opening moments. As the regiment’s de-facto historian, Duke sought to separate the actions of
the regiment at Shiloh from Appler and the initial historiography of the battle.
Duke faced another obstacle that hindered any attempt by the Fifty-Third Ohio to alter
the public perception of their role at Shiloh. When the initial historiography of the battle
emerged, the fighting at the Hornet’s Nest was the primary focus. David W. Reed’s The Battle of

The “accuracy” of Duke’s account of the Fifty-Third Ohio at Shiloh reflected the overall writings of
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Shiloh and the Organizations Engaged was one of the first major works on Shiloh. Reed was a
veteran who selected as Shiloh’s official historian during the effort to establish the battlefield as
a National Military Park.101 Furthermore, he had fought at the Hornet’s Nest which arguably
influenced the level of importance it received. Due in large part to the lack of scholarly works on
Shiloh during the first half of the 1900s, Reed’s version ensured that the Hornet’s Nest remained
the battle’s focal point. According to historian Timothy B. Smith: “Today, in large part because
of Reed’s historical efforts, historians view the Hornet’s Nest as the focal point in the Battle of
Shiloh. It is Shiloh’s Pickett’s Charge; it is Shiloh’s Bloody Lane.”102
Officially published two years after Duke’s regimental memoir, Reed’s work mirrors
Sherman’s account of the battle. Although not as stern as the general’s portrayal, Reed still wrote
that the Fifty-Third Ohio “fell back disorganized, passing to the rear around the flank of the
Forty-ninth Illinois.”103 However, Reed did mention Adjunct Dawes and the two companies that
remained in the fight, but he countered that fact by stating that “eight companies going to the
landing at once” after Appler’s order to retreat.104 Overall, the Fifty-Third Ohio’s struggle at Rea
Field was a small part of Reed’s work in terms of the general battle. The regiment’s historical
reputation remained at the mercy of Sherman’s memoir and the general’s biographers. The
memoirs of well-known leaders like Grant and Sherman were printed by publishers with a
nationwide reach while Duke’s memoir on the Fifty-Third Ohio was published by a small
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company in Portsmouth, Ohio. For this reason, and many others, Civil War history has been
heavily influenced by the recollections of household names like Sherman.
Dawes and Duke were not the only members of the regiment to publicly defend the unit.
A few reluctant defenders emerged immediately following the battle. Samuel R. Betts of the
regiment’s Company G came to the Fifty-Third Ohio’s defense with a letter printed in the
Ironton Register dated April 10, 1862.105 Although not originally intended for publication, Betts
provided the Ironton Register with vital information in the paper’s attempt to clear the name of
its local soldiers. Betts wrote that the regiment was in the fight for “eleven hours on Sunday and
twelve hours on Monday.”106 Betts claimed that the men of the regiment “fought like veterans”
and that Appler’s actions kept the Fifty-Third Ohio from standing “among the first regiments in
the mighty force.”107
The publication of the Betts’ letter helped the regiment reach its home counties with the
Fifty-Third Ohio’s version of events. According to the May 8, 1862 edition of the Ironton
Register, Betts’ letter was “of the highest interest to all our readers in this section of Ohio.”108
The papers further claimed that Betts believed the Union cause at Shiloh was in a desperate
condition until the arrival of General Buell’s troops. Possibly frustrated by reports that Sherman
was furious with the regiment, a report that was undeniably confirmed by the general’s public
rebuke, the Ironton Register wrote that Betts’ account confirmed “that drunkenness and
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carelessness were the prevailing sins of our Generals on the first day of the battle.”109 The paper
confessed that the letter was private and not intended for publication, but “it is all the better on
that account, as it states some things that otherwise might have been concealed.”110
The Ironton Register also published a letter from George E. Cutler in the May 8, 1862
edition. Cutler was a First Lieutenant in Company G of the Fifty-Third Ohio at the time of the
battle.111 In the published letter, Cutler stated that he “blamed Sherman seriously” for the
perceived failures of the regiment.112 Cutler’s words were intended for family and friends to
address the charge of “running” directed at the Fifty-Third Ohio, but found its way into the
paper.113 The letter claimed that Sherman “allowed the enemy to have a line of pickets within our
line of pickets for two or three days observing all our weak points” and that the general “did not
know anything of them.”114 The letter reflected the opinion of other Fifty-Third Ohio soldiers
like Dawes, Betts, and Duke that the regiment was primarily the victim of poor leadership.
In addition, the Fifty-Third Ohio was not without prominent defenders. General
Sherman’s brother stood before the United State Senate on May 9, 1862 to defend Ohio soldiers.
Senator John Sherman remarked: “I especially desire to show the part taken by the volunteers
from Ohio in that bloody and most important contest. Like other citizens of Ohio, I felt keenly
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the indiscriminate imputation cast by the earlier accounts of the battle, especially in the Chicago
papers, upon the Ohio volunteers.”115 Senator Sherman defended the Fifty-Third Ohio as “raw,”
poorly led, and as victims of the army supply chain.116
Even though the senator’s speech could easily be viewed as a defense against the charge
of his brother being surprised by the Rebel attack, he still exonerated the regiment while
defaming Colonel Appler. By the time of Senator Sherman’s speech, the shifting of the blame to
Appler was already underway. Sherman said of the colonel: “I do not wish to extenuate the
conduct of Colonel Appler…His conduct should not tarnish the fair fame of brave men who, no
doubt, would have this attack bravely but for his order to retreat.”117

Forever Linked: The Fifty-Third Ohio, General Sherman, and the Battle of Shiloh
General William Tecumseh Sherman mostly remained steadfast in his rebuke of the
regiment as a whole. The topic of Shiloh, and Sherman’s treatment of the regiment, dominated
the Fifty-Third Ohio’s reunions. Covering an 1886 regiment reunion, a reporter for the Jackson
Standard wrote: “As Shiloh must ever be a prominent feature in the history of the Fifty-Third,
the story of the retreat of the Regiment, and the cowardice of the commanding officer was a sad
blow to the many friends of the Regiment in Jackson.”118 However, the newspaper argued that
the local community was more outraged by Sherman’s rebuke of the regiment than the rumors of
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cowardice, stating: “there was universal indignation at Gen. Sherman’s brutal treatment of the
Regiment.”119 Despite the positive mutual feelings between the regiment and Sherman during the
later stages of the war, the controversary surrounding Shiloh remained.
The debate over the regiment’s performance on the morning of April 6, 1862 revolved
around General Sherman’s assessment of the Fifty-Third Ohio and whether the Union had been
surprised. Considering these questions, the Fifty-Third Ohio was unjustly criticized for failing in
the face of the enemy at the Battle of Shiloh. The battle and regiment remained connected. When
just two veterans arrived for the last reunion in 1927, Shiloh was the only battle mentioned by
name in the newspaper’s regimental biography.120 Furthermore, many members of the regiment
and their families believed that the true source of the stain on the Fifty-Third Ohio’s name was
the result of General Sherman deflecting the censure that should have rightfully been directed at
him. According to Duke: “Someone was to blame and if these gentlemen could find a scape-goat
they might escape just condemnation for poor generalship, and thus it was that the 53rd and the
77th Ohio were censured.”121
Sherman’s chastisement of the regiment may have caused a feeling of isolation among
the men in the Fifty-Third Ohio. Following the Battle of Shiloh, William Tecumseh Sherman
began his transformation from a division commander to a living military legend. According to
Sherman biographer Robert L. O’Connell, Sherman was greeted with roaring applause
“everywhere he went” and that the army was becoming “Uncle Billy’s boys.”122 Furthermore,

119

Ibid.

120
Anonymous, “Gallant Old 53rd O.V.I. Holds Last Reunion in Jackson; Only Two Members Present,”
Portsmouth Daily Times, September 16, 1927, 17.
121

Duke, History of the Fifty-Third Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry during the War of the Rebellion, 25.

122

O’Connell, Fierce Patriot, 230.

147

Sherman praised the individual and collective efforts of men in his division. The day after the
battle, the general praised the efforts of men in Seventieth Ohio Volunteer Infantry telling the
regiment’s colonel that he was “worth your weight in gold to me.”123 Undoubtedly, the men of
the Fifty-Third Ohio most likely felt like outcasts when they compared the rebuke they received
to the general’s praise of other regiments.
The bond between Sherman and his men was based on a mutual admiration and respect
that began on the battlefield at Shiloh. Later in the war, soldiers showed their affection and
dedication to their general by approvingly greeting Sherman with cheers of “Uncle Billy”
whenever he came into their view.124 According to Steven E. Woodworth, Sherman’s soldiers
never “particularly cared where they were bound, as long as Uncle Billy was directing them.”125
The men of the Fifty-Third Ohio later came to share this relationship with the general, but they
found themselves outside the bonds of affection spreading through Sherman’s division in the
days after Shiloh.126
Unlike the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio, General Sherman had a powerful weapon in his
arsenal that came assisted in his defense following the criticism of Shiloh. Sherman’s family
wielded immense power in Ohio politics. Among others, the general’s surrogate father, Thomas
Ewing, publicly came to Sherman’s defense. Ewing published a public article defending
Sherman from allegations made against the general by the Lieutenant Governor of Ohio,
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Benjamin Stanton.127 Even though the Lieutenant Governor clarified his criticism against Ohio
generals was based on the fact that Union forces were surprised on April 6, 1862, the charges did
not specifically mention General Sherman.128 Specifically, the Lieutenant Governor stated: “The
disasters of Sunday, April 6th, were the result of surprise, which is justly chargeable on the
commanding officers.”129
After Ewing’s public response, Lieutenant Governor Stanton answered by presenting
evidence that Sherman’s men had been surprised. Citing the officially reports of men under the
general’s command, Stanton argued that the troops were at breakfast, in bed, or going about
other camp activities when they heard the sounds of heavy gunfire. Even though some of
Sherman’s men, including the Fifty-Third Ohio, were in formation when the official attack
began, the entire Union camp presented itself as if the whole army was completely unaware of
the impending Rebel attack.130 According to historian Kenneth J. Heineman, “the Ewings reacted
harshly to these attacks.”131
In spite of the general’s remaining frustration over Shiloh, Sherman eventually came to
view the overall performance of the regiment in a positive light. In 1864, Sherman wrote: “I also
take great pleasure in adding that nearly all the new troops that at Shiloh drew from an official
censure have more than redeemed their good name, among them…the 53rd Ohio…it has shared
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every campaign and expedition of mine since…and fight as well as the best Regiment in this or
any army.”132 The regiment remained connected to the general for the duration of the war
fighting at Vicksburg, Chattanooga, and Atlanta among others.133
The Fifty-Third Ohio also came to view Sherman in positive light. When the general
passed away in 1891, Wells S. Jones of Company A, and later commander of the regiment, held
a memorial service for Sherman. Alerting his former comrades to the service, Jones submitted a
small announcement to the local newspaper: “On Saturday next at 2 o’clock in the afternoon,
Barnes Post, preceded by the Waverly Cornet Band, will proceed to the court house, where, with
the citizens of the county, suitable honors will be paid to Gen. Wm. T. Sherman, the dead hero,
whose body on that day will be deposited in its final resting place.”134 Despite the ongoing
debate over the Battle of Shiloh’s first day, the Fifty-Third Ohio still honored the man they
followed into battle during the Civil War.
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Chapter 6
History, Historians, and the Fifty-Third Ohio at the Battle of Shiloh

By the conclusion of the Civil War, the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry
were veterans of the Western Theater’s most significant battles. The unit that emerged from the
war no longer resembled the collection of men that left Jackson, Ohio in the early months of
1862. The regiment engaged Confederate forces at Corinth, Vicksburg, Chattanooga, Atlanta,
Columbia, and numerous other clashes.1 However, one battle loomed the largest and haunted the
regiment’s legacy long after the death of its final veteran. No event remained as firmly connected
to the Fifty-Third Ohio as the Battle of Shiloh. Despite its successful involvement in later
engagements, the regiment’s first combat experience remained a defining moment.
The Battle of Shiloh, and the perceived failure of the regiment, cast a long shadow over
the legacy, reputation, and honor of the Fifty-Third Ohio.2 The Fifty-Third Ohio continued its
efforts to free itself from the accusation of cowardice and its unfortunate role as the battle’s
scapegoat for General Sherman. When the men gathered for regimental reunions, the
conversation inevitably turned to the battle and its impact on the honor of the Fifty-Third Ohio.
The men of the regiment likely agreed with Alvin P. Hovey of the Twenty-Fourth Indiana’s
assessment of Shiloh: “Thousands of brave, true soldiers and patriots have been branded with the
names of ‘craven’ and ‘coward’ who were only the victims of the surprise, blunders, and
mistakes of that Sunday morning.”3
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The accusations, innuendoes, and slanders following the Battle of Shiloh forced the men
of the regiment on the defensive. Not every man took up the pen or stood behind podiums to give
their version of the battle, but the newspaper coverage of the regimental reunions indicate that
Shiloh forever remained on the minds of veterans of the Fifty-Third Ohio. Sherman’s rebuke of
the regiment, and his accusation of cowardice, motivated the Fifty-Third Ohio to explain why it
was the focus of extreme criticism.4 The regiment continued to fight the Battle of Shiloh in Ohio
newspapers, the National Tribune, Century magazine, the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of
the United States, and other venues.
To understand why Shiloh occupied such an exalted place in the regiment’s collective
consciousness, it is important to ask how the Fifty-Third Ohio became entangled in the Shiloh
controversy. General Sherman was quick to publicly berate the regiment, but what were the
conditions that caused the regiment to become viewed as failures? Furthermore, Sherman used
the Fifty-Third Ohio as a scapegoat for his own shortcomings as Shiloh. Why was the regiment a
perfect candidate for Sherman’s attempt to deflect blame? Overall, the Fifty-Third Ohio was the
victim of circumstances beyond their control. Poor leadership, inadequate training, a lack of
fortifications, the inability of Union command to understand the seriousness of the approaching
Rebel threat, and General Sherman’s need to deflect blame, placed the regiment on the path to
criticism.
The men of the Fifty-Third Ohio were average individuals who were peacefully going
about their lives when political and social forces intervened. Suddenly, they were caught in what
was undoubtedly the most consequential debate since the nation’s founding. Lincoln’s election in
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1860, decades of growing sectional hostility, and decisions made hundreds of miles away from
Ohio in the Confederate secession conventions thrust the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio into the
bloodiest war in American history. Outside of casting a vote in the presidential election and
discussing slavery with neighbors, the major forces that led the men to the banks of the
Tennessee River in the spring of 1862 were beyond the control of the average citizen. The
soldiers in the ranks of the Fifty-Third Ohio were small pieces in the larger chess game of the
Civil War.

Unprepared and Poorly Supplied
Like many regiments on both sides of the conflict, the Fifty-Third Ohio entered the field
with almost no preparations for the combat of the Civil War era. The Battle of Shiloh was
defined by two inexperienced armies chaotically fighting around the Shiloh Meetinghouse during
two days in early April 1862. The battle’s role as one of the earliest major land engagements in
the West meant that it was fought by an unparalleled high number of inexperienced soldiers.5
According to historians Joseph Allen Frank and George A. Reaves: “There were more green
troops in this battle than any battle of the Civil War. Three of Grant’s divisions were raw,
virtually all of Buell’s army had never seen major action before.”6 The inexperienced Union
army fought an equally green Confederate force under the command of Albert Sidney Johnston
in a battle that shocked both sides and forever altered the expectations for future combat.7

5
Joseph Allan Frank and George A. Reeves, Seeing the Elephant: Raw Recruits at the Battle of Shiloh
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 11.
6

7

Ibid.

Ibid; Alan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, For the Common Defense: A Military
History of the United States from 1607-2012 (New York: Free Press, 2012), 167.

153

While it is certain that many of the regiments present at the Battle of Shiloh were as
green as the Fifty-Third Ohio, it is equally sure that no unit was more inexperienced. The
regiment arrived at the Union camp on the banks of the Tennessee River without any concept of
military action or combat. As stated in chapter two, the Ohioans never participated in a single
battalion drill before departing its camp for the field and entered Confederate territory as a
collection of men more than a military unit.8 Furthermore, the Fifty-Third Ohio only had its
weapons for a few weeks before the regiment fired in unison against an enemy force for the first
time.9 In this regard, the Fifty-Third Ohio reflected the overall supply issues facing the United
States forces in the early war. According to historian Earl J. Hess, the Western Theater “is where
the problems of shipping materials and moving large armies were most formidable… the most
severe test of military supply occurred in the West.”10
The United States government struggled to supply the largest war effort in its history.
Regiments like the Fifty-Third Ohio experienced the dangers of poor supply lines. As Roger
Lowenstein’s book Ways and Means: Lincoln and His Cabinet and the Financing of the Civil
War stated: “The Union’s financial needs dwarfed any prior expense or governmental
undertaking.”11 Illustrating how ill-prepared the federal government was for the outbreak of Civil
War, and the financial burden of defeating the rebellion, President Lincoln asked congress to
approve $400 million for the war effort. The president requested the money to ensure the war
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was “a short and decisive one” and asked for “at least four hundred thousand men” to
supplement the armed forces.12
The decisions on how to best recruit an army, equip troops, and to finance a war
happened well above the highest-ranking soldiers in the Fifty-Third Ohio. Washington held the
power over the flow of supplies to the front line. Even the state government in Columbus largely
depended on the federal government to equip Ohio troops. Like most Union soldiers in the war’s
earliest days, the men of the Fifty-Third Ohio were the victims of a supply chain and an
economic debate that happened hundreds of miles from their theater of war.13

The Lack of Fortifications at Shiloh
Arguably, the biggest factor that set the Fifty-Third Ohio on the path to perceived failure
was the unwillingness of the regiment’s superiors to understand the danger of the approaching
Rebel attack. As stated in chapters three and four, Union command was presented with ample
warnings which they chose to ignore. General Sherman specifically refused to order his men to
prepare for a possible attack. The general was confident that the bulk of Albert Sidney
Johnston’s Confederate force was still entrenched at Corinth, Mississippi and any visible Rebel
soldiers were simply scouting the Union encampment.14
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Two of the warnings came directly from the Fifty-Third Ohio. Sherman not only refused
to believe the reports, but he publicly rebuked Colonel Appler for sending the warnings. The
general could have taken the reports seriously and prepped the Pittsburg Landing camp for the
pending attack, but instead he reprimanded Appler for being “badly scared” and told the Ohioan
to “take your damned regiment to Ohio.”15 However, Sherman refused to take the reports
seriously and reported on the eve of battle that he did not expect any large-scale attack on the
Union position.16 He later remembered April 5, 1862 as a day without any significant
developments.17 According to historian James Lee McDonough: “How Sherman could have so
completely missed or ignored the signs that should have alerted him to the imminent danger
remains a puzzle.”18
While it is impossible to accurately measure how the Fifty-Third Ohio would have
performed if General Sherman had taken the warnings seriously, it would have undoubtedly
benefitted the regiment if the whole Union camp had been more vigilant. In this regard, the
debate over the lack of fortifications at Pittsburg Landing is directly connected to the
performance of the Fifty-Third Ohio. The regiment met the Rebel onslaught in the open field
around its camp on the morning of April 6th. While it is possible that the Ohioans threw down
logs and other items capable of creating a hastily constructed defense, a full defensive perimeter
would arguably have been more effective.19
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However, the Union army did not entrench at Pittsburg Landing. Historian Steven
Woodworth contended that the lack of entrenchments was consistent with how the war was
conducted in 1862. Woodworth stated that entrenchments were “not customary at that stage of
war.”20 Some soldiers present at Shiloh shared Woodworth’s assessment. General James Turtle
claimed that a soldier would have been “laughed out of camp” if he suggested building
fortifications at that stage of the war.21 General Grant stated: “Up to that time the pick and spade
had been but little resorted to at the West.”22
The Fifty-Third Ohio did not share this view. The official historian of the regiment, John
K. Duke, argued that the Ohioans would have fared better if they had been protected by strong
fortifications.23 Duke’s overall assessment of the condition of the Union army of Shiloh was a
blistering attack on his superiors: “It is well to note that we had no fornications of any kind for
our use; our entire force being in an unorganized condition, resembling more a mob than what it
should have been, a well organized and equipped army.”24 Furthermore, the Fifty-Third Ohio’s
adjunct, Ephraim C. Dawes, cited the lack of Union entrenchments as one of the deciding factors
that motivated Confederate leadership to launch the April 6, 1862 attack.25 Milton Bosworth of
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the Fifty-Third Ohio Company I complained that the Union camp had not “fortified, planted
batteries, or felled timber, or done anything else to prevent surprise or ward off an assault.”26
It should be noted that a large proportion of Union soldiers believed their camp should
have been fortified. Even though almost every account that promotes this belief was written in
retrospect, it is clear that a significant number of Union soldiers believed their Shiloh experience
would have been drastically different if they met the Rebel assault from behind the protection of
fortifications. In addition, the argument that entrenchments were not a part of the war by the
spring of 1862 is perplexing when contrasted with how Grant and Sherman viewed the intentions
of Albert Sidney Johnston. The Union command at Shiloh was thoroughly convinced that the
Confederate army was not going to strike Pittsburg Landing. Instead, it was generally accepted
that Johnston’s Rebels would await Grant’s attack on Corinth, Mississippi and fight from behind
their own entrenchments.27 The fact that entrenchments were expected at Corinth, and that
entrenchments were used at Corinth and Vicksburg, conflicts with the belief that they were not
yet considered in the Western Theater. Either way, the decision against building fortifications
was beyond the Fifty-Third Ohio’s control and impacted how the regiment’s Shiloh experience
unfolded.
The Civil War mostly began as outdated combat between two armies in an open field.
Historians traditionally cite the continuation of Napoleonic warfare combined with rifled musket
as the cause of the war’s high casualty numbers.28 According to James McPherson, this
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combination emphasized going on the offensive and “West Point teaching stressed the tactical
offensive.”29 Arguably, the emphasis on offensive campaigns may have factored into the reasons
why Union command refused to entrench at Pittsburg Landing. The Union army, and Ulysses S.
Grant, were committed to an offensive campaign that may have decreased commanders’
willingness to construct fortifications.30
The Fifty-Third Ohio at Shiloh may have been the victim of its era. By the spring of
1862, Civil War tactics primarily focused on the movement of troops instead of the fighting from
behind defensive entrenchments.31 It is possible that few commanders understood how to direct
soldiers from a fixed position since the accepted tactics of the time were centered on concepts of
parade marching and maneuverability. In addition, it is possible that commanding officers on
both sides at Shiloh were still trying to master the techniques of multiple lines and open field
tactics at the time of Shiloh and simply overlooked the necessity of defensive works. This would
explain Grant’s insistence on drills rather than the construction of fortifications at the Pittsburg
Landing camp.
However, fighting behind entrenched positions increased as the war the continued. As
McPherson wrote, the Civil War shifted to “the tactical predominance of the defense.”32
Famously, Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia charged into a fixed fortified position on
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the afternoon of July 3, 1863. In what became known as Pickett’s Charge, the Army of Northern
Virginia lost around 42% of its manpower during the attack.33 After two days of offensive
maneuvers, Lee’s army limped away from Gettysburg with a noticeable depletion in
manpower.34 According to historian Earl Hess, northern losses at Gettysburg are harder to
ascertain due to the Union regiments involved in answering the attack “had seen action” during
the previous two days.35 The Confederate soldiers attacked into the teeth of a strong defensive
position that included fortifications of stone walls and fences already in place when the battle
began, hastily assembled breastworks, and earthworks created by the Federal troops.36 Union
losses were still high, but playing defense allowed the Union to absorb the blow of Pickett’s
Charge and ultimately repulse the attack.
In addition, Ambrose Burnside’s Army of the Potomac faced a similar situation when it
attacked a Rebel force behind a stone wall at the Battle of Fredericksburg. The Union soldiers
made several unsuccessful attempts to dislodge the Confederate soldiers from its fortified
position. As a result, 1,284 Union soldiers were killed with an additional 9,600 wounded and
1,769 were reported missing of captured.37 Southern losses were drastically lower with
approximately 608 Confederates killed and 4,116 wounded.38 Due in large part to the strength of
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the Confederates’ fortifications, the Battle of Fredericksburg was one of the most lopsided and
complete victories scored by either side during the war.39
The Union army met a similar fate later in the war at Cold Harbor where the
Confederates occupied a strong defensive line that included entrenchments.40 Overall, the Rebels
had at least twelve hours to fortify its line and to prepare for the coming Union assault.41 One
assault on the Confederate breastworks resulted in Union casualties that more than doubled the
number of Rebels killed, missing, and captured.42 While there is no doubt that exceptions to the
success of entrenchments during the Civil War exists, it is mistakeably clear that substantial
fortifications of some kind could have drastically altered the Fifty-Third Ohio’s ability to hold its
ground on the morning of April 6, 1862.
It is impossible to calculate how the Union army at Gettysburg, and the Confederate force
at Fredericksburg and Cold Harbor, would have performed without entrenchments. However, the
overwhelming victories from behind fixed fortifications indicate that entrenchments were
beneficial to a defending force during the Civil War. Unfortunately for the men of the FiftyThird Ohio, neither Grant nor Sherman ordered the large-scale construction of defensive works.

38

Ibid.

39
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 572-575; Gary W. Gallagher, “The Yanks Have Had a Terrible
Whipping: Confederates Evaluate the Battle of Fredericksburg,” in The Fredericksburg Campaign: Decision on the
Rappahannock, ed. Gary W. Gallagher (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 93; Bruce
Catton, Never Call Retreat (Garden City: Doubleday, 1965), 24-26; Mackowski and White, Simply Murder, 100.

Keith S. Bohannon, “Breastworks Are Good Things to Have on Battlefields: Confederate Engineering
Operations and Field Fortifications in the Overland Campaign,” in Cold Harbor to the Crater: The End of the
Overland Campaign, ed. Gary W. Gallagher and Caroline E. Janney (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 2015), 123.
40

41

42

Ibid.

Earl J. Hess, Trench Warfare Under Grant and Lee: Field Fortifications in the Overland Campaign
(Chapel Hill: The University of Press of North Carolina, 2007), 149.

161

Again, this decision was made above the rank of the soldiers in the Fifty-Third Ohio. General
Sherman did not order construction due to his position as Grant’s subordinate.43 Grant did not
order the building of fortifications because he was focused on training and offensive
maneuvers.44 Even though these decisions were out of the hands of the Fifty-Third Ohio, the
regiment paid the price for the decision when the Rebel force slammed into its Rea Field Camp
on the morning of April 6, 1862.
Overall, the Army of the Tennessee lost approximately 7,000 men on Shiloh’s first day.45
These loses are comparable to the killed, missing, and wounded numbers of the charging Rebels
at Gettysburg, Grant’s assault at Cold Harbor, and the attacking Union soldiers at
Fredericksburg. The Fifty-Third Ohio lost approximately forty-four men that were either killed,
wounded, or missing.46 It is impossible to accurately calculate how the losses, and the
effectiveness of the regiment’s defense of Sherman’s left flank, would have been altered by
construction of entrenchments, but the history of combat during the Civil War illustrates a strong
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argument that defensively fortified positions were capable of withstanding assaults from large
numbers of soldiers.

Surprised at Shiloh
The accusation that the Union army was surprised at Shiloh is connected to the
fortification debate. Many soldiers throughout the various ranks believed the army was
completely caught off guard on the morning of April 6, 1862. Duke’s regimental history
definitely labeled the attack as a surprise: “It is impossible to deny that the battle of Shiloh was a
great surprise.”47 Duke’s writings were based on the recollections of a variety of soldiers from
the ranks of the Fifty-Third Ohio. The writings and diaries of John K. Duke, John R. Percy, R.H.
Brewster, and others were consulted by Duke.
Duke’s final analysis, and presumably the majority opinion of the Fifty-Third Ohio’s
veterans, of the condition of the Union camp at Pittsburg Landing was a contemptuous censure
intended to remove the stain of Shiloh from the Fifty-Third Ohio:
Taking into consideration the physical condition of the regiment, and indeed the
army at the date of this battle… also that the army was simply en-massed with no
regard to military rules or the usages of war; that men and the majority of officers
were amateurs in matters of warfare, that the few experienced officers of former
wars, or those who were West Point graduates, were remote from the front…it
would be a gross injustice to the men who fought this battle so say that they were
responsible for the deplorable disasters of the first day’s fight.48
Among those that believed the attack surprised the Union forces was the “Ohio at Shiloh
Commission.” In its report published in 1903, the commission stated that “the officers in
command of the Union army did not anticipate that a battle would be fought there until they saw
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the heavy columns of the enemy bearing down on them.”49 Furthermore, the report somewhat
absolved the Fifty-Third Ohio from the accusation of cowardice by stating: “There are mitigating
circumstances connected with the disordered condition of this regiment on that Sunday
morning.”50
Indiana soldier Alvin P. Hovey shared the assessment of Duke and the Ohio Commission.
Writing for The National Tribune, Hovey argued that the Union army was completely taken by
surprise at Shiloh. Hovey used Dennis Hart Mahan’s book on military fortifications to strengthen
his argument. According to Mahan, a surprise attack is simply “an unexpected attack, for which
the assailed are not prepared.”51 Hovey connected his argument to Mahan’s definition and stated
“under this definition, was not General Sherman and his forces more than surprised on Sunday
morning, April 6th, 1862?”52 Furthermore, the article boldly asserted: “thousands of men…would
swear before the world and their God that there could be no mistake as to that surprise.”53
Lucius Barber of the Fifteenth Illinois shared Hovey’s opinion that the Union army was
undeniably surprised. Writing in his 1894 memoir, Barber stated: “The enemy was in camp
before it had time to arouse and form a line. Some were shot in their sleep, never knowing what
hurt them. Terrible and complete was the surprise.”54 Barber also claimed that the Pittsburg
Landing camp showed no sign that the Union soldiers were concerned about a possible attack on
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the night before the battle. Instead, Barber painted a picture of camp filled with games, music,
and entertainment inconsistent with proper military vigilance.55
The recollection of Leander Stillwell of the Sixty-First Illinois Infantry reflected the
accounts of Hovey and Barber. Stillwell remembered the Union camp as routine and without
preparations for a pending battle. At the moment of the Rebel assault, Stillwell wrote that the
men “were scattered around the company streets and in front of the company parade grounds,
engaged in polishing and brightening their muskets, and brushing up and cleaning their shoes,
jackets, trousers, and clothing generally. It was a most beautiful morning.”56 The Confederate
attack changed Stillwell’s morning from being “like as Sunday in the country at home” to a day
that was constantly on his mind.57
Within the Fifty-Third Ohio’s brigade, Robert H. Flemming of the Seventy-Seventh
Ohio’s recollection of the Rebel attack corroborated the accounts of Hovey, Barber, and
Stillwell. Flemming stated in a paper that the army had been taken by surprise on the morning of
April 6, 1862.58 Furthermore, he remembered the morning of the attack as a “spring day of
superb beauty” filled with “the usual camp duties.”59 Solidifying his argument that the Union
camp was taken by complete surprise, Flemming wrote: “There were no indications of the
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impending bloody conflict, excepting the distant sound of an occasional musket shot… as that
had been going on at intervals for a day or two, we thought nothing of it.”60
Members of the Fifty-Third Ohio that weighed in on the issue agreed that the Union army
had been taken by surprise. Milton Bosworth stated that the regiment “did not know that the
enemy was approaching in full force until they were within 300 yards.”61 Adjunct Dawes
recorded Sherman’s response to the attack as “my God, we are attacked!” after writing about the
general’s two rebukes of Appler’s intelligence as an indication that Union command was caught
off guard.62 In addition, coverage of a regimental reunion in The Jackson Standard newspaper
stated: “The question came up whether Sherman was surprised at Shiloh. That question was
settled on the battlefield. He was surprised, completely, ingloriously.”63 Presumably, the article’s
anonymous author reached this conclusion after discussing the battle with the veterans of the
Fifty-Third Ohio.
Almost all of the scholarly work on the Battle of Shiloh presents the Confederate attack
as a surprise to the Union army. Larry J. Daniel wrote that “there is no question that the Federal
army was surprised at Shiloh, and for that Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman cannot
escape substantial blame.”64 Wiley Sword presented Grant and Sherman as unsuspecting on the
eve of the attack.65 Sherman biographer John F. Marszalek also shared this assessment.
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According to Marszalek, the proof that the Union army was surprised at Shiloh rests in the fact
that “Union high command, not expecting an attack, simply ignored all information to the
contrary.”66 Sherman biographer Robert L. O’Connell also stated that the Rebel attack was a
“surprise” to the general.67
James L. McDonough combined his argument that the Union army had been surprised
with a condemnation of the camp’s lack of fortifications. McDonough stated that “the failure of
Grant lay… in allowing his army to remain in badly aligned encampments for repelling an
attack, with no entrenchments, on the same side of the river as the enemy camp.”68 In addition,
he argued that Grant’s decision to stay at his headquarters nine miles away from Pittsburg
Landing further indicated that the Union army was not expecting an attack.69 Even though
McDonough stated that Sherman would have been able to hold his position on the morning of
April 6, 1862 if the Fifty-Third Ohio had not broken, his overall scholarship presents an
argument that the true failures at Shiloh rests on the decisions made by Union commanders
above the regimental level.70
Furthermore, James McPherson, in agreement with the historiographical interpretations
of Daniel, Sword, Marszalek, O’Connell, and McDonough, condemned Grant as “not prepared
for the thousands of screaming rebels who burst out of the woods near Shiloh church.”71 Steven

66
John F. Marszalek, Sherman: A Soldier’s Passion for Order (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
Press, 1993), 175.

Robert L. O’Connell, Fierce Patriot: The Tangled Lives of William Tecumseh Sherman (New York:
Random House, 2014), 96.
67

68

James Lee McDonough, Shiloh: In Hell before Night (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1977),

69

Ibid., 58.

70

McDonough, William Tecumseh Sherman, 11; McDonough, Shiloh, 57-58.

71

McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 408.

57.

167

E. Woodworth claimed General Sherman did not “grasp the serious of the situation that the
Army of the Tennessee faced” until the full Rebel attack was visibly in motion on the Fifty-Third
Ohio’s Rea Field camp.72 Joseph Allen Frank and George A. Reaves summarized the experience
of Union soldiers at Shiloh as “an army of green volunteers wedged in the confluence of several
streams and unprepared for attack was taken by surprise by A.S. Johnston’s Confederates.”73
Grant biographers Ronald C. White, H.W. Brands, and Ron Chernow also agreed that the Union
high command was surprised at Shiloh.74
The historiography of the surprise attack at Shiloh perhaps absolves the Fifty-Third Ohio
for any failures during Shiloh’s first day. If the Union position had been fortified, and the Army
of the Tennessee on full alert, it is likely that the Fifty-Third Ohio would not have abandoned its
initial position on Rea Field. However, the decisions on what level of heightened security to
place the Pittsburg Landing camp was in the hands of General Grant and General Sherman. The
regiment, as were all Union units at Shiloh, was not fully in control of its destiny.
Historian Timothy B. Smith disagreed with the accepted interpretation of the Confederate
surprise attack in his book, Shiloh: Conquer of Perish. Smith argued: “the idea that Federals
were totally negligent of security is a myth.”75 However, Smith also argued that Sherman
suffered a “strategic surprise” as a part of his more complex interpretation.76 Almost alone in his
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interpretation of the Union preparedness for the Rebel attack, Smith points to the rampant
sickness among the ranks as equally important to the Union’s ability to respond to the attack as
the failure to entrench.77 Even though Smith stands alone in this historiographical debate, he
presents another uncontrollable factor that hindered the Fifty-Third Ohio’s capability at Shiloh.
The Ohio regiment was not spared from the illnesses that spread through the Union camp.

The Impact of Illness and Poor Leadership on the Fifty-Third Ohio
As stated in chapter three, the Fifty-Third Ohio did not arrive at the Pittsburg Landing
camp at full strength. The Tennessee River’s flooded state led to the regiment being decimated
by stomach ailments. After spending several days drinking contaminated water, and without the
proper medical knowledge of waterborne illnesses, the Fifty-Third Ohio limped ashore.78
Approximately 216 members of the regiment were officially on the sick list when the battle
began.79 Similar to the other events that hinder the regiment’s ability to perform at full capacity,
the widespread illness was beyond the regiment’s control.
The Fifty-Third Ohio entered the Battle of Shiloh without a true military leader. Colonel
Appler was a respected community leader whose social status elevated him to command.80 The
colonel was an older man without any military experience outside of the Ohio militia and a brief
stint with the Twenty-Second Ohio before taking command of the Fifty-Third Ohio in September
of 1862.81 Like many regimental commanders in the Union army, it was speculated that Appler
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was appointed to command through the spoils system. The Fifty-Third Ohio’s regimental
memoir twice tied Appler’s appointment to Ohio governor, William Dennison Jr.82 According to
a Cincinnati Times article that circulated in Ohio newspapers after Appler’s disastrous
performance at Shiloh, the colonel was accused of being “another of Gov. Dennison’s pets.”83
Among others, the article was printed in the democrat-leaning newspaper, the Daily Ohio
Statesman. The paper, along with the article’s original publisher, were openly hostile to
Governor Dennison. The Daily Statesman was founded as to promote the Democrat Party, but
had transformed into a controversial Copperhead publication by the outbreak of the Civil War.84
This placed the paper in direct opposition with the Whig turned Republican governor. By the
time the Battle of Shiloh occurred in April of 1862, Governor Dennison had been replaced by
David Tod as the chief executive of Ohio. Tod was a pro-war Democrat and the 1861
gubernatorial candidate of the Unionist Party consisting of Republicans and Unionist
Democrats.85
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However, J.J. Appler spent his public service and political career as a member of the
Democrat Party.86 It is unclear whether these papers were originally unaware of Appler’s
affiliation or if the Copperhead influenced persuaded the publications to deride any connection to
the war against the Confederate States of America. Clearly, Appler was not in opposition to the
Union war effort despite his shortcomings on the battlefield. It is likely that the colonel’s
affiliation to Dennison was mentioned to draw a distinction between the Unionist coalition in
Ohio and the paper’s Copperhead persuasion. Although never strong enough to defeat the prowar sentiments of the majority of Ohioans, enough of the state’s citizenry held pro-Confederate
sympathies that the Rebel government believed Ohio could be plucked away from the Union
effort with the right politician and proper effort.87 In this climate, the rhetorical and political war
between the two Ohio factions continued throughout the war.88
Appler was not alone in his role as a civilian commander. The Fifty-Third Ohio went into
combat on the morning of April 6, 1862 without any militarily trained officers. Even the men
who were remembered for their bravery and courage at the Battle of Shiloh were without
previous military credentials. Adjunct Ephraim C. Dawes joined the Fifty-Third Ohio as a recent
graduate of Marietta College.89 James R. Percy, who rallied the regiment with Dawes and Wells
S. Jones after Appler’s order to retreat, was a graduate of the Polytechnic School in the state of
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New York and a teacher in Piketon, Ohio when the war began.90 Wells S. Jones had an
educational background that included teaching and graduating from Starling Medical College in
Columbus Ohio.91 When he joined the Fifty-Third Ohio, Jones was a doctor in Waverly, Ohio
and without prior military service.92 Even the regiment’s lieutenant-colonel, Robert A. Fulton,
was strictly a civilian before joining the Fifty-Third Ohio.93
Unqualified military leadership was not unique to the Fifty-Third Ohio. The problem of
political generals plagued the Union army. While it is true that some politically appointed leaders
were competent commanders, it is likely that most were especially inept in the war’s earliest
years. The system of appointing unqualified leaders, like Colonel Appler, usually occurred either
to reward loyal politicians at the state and national level, or to balance the number of democrat
and republicans in a regiment, division, or army.94 Colonel Appler’s status as a democrat in a
regiment from a politically diverse region may have factor into his appointment as colonel of the
Fifty-Third Ohio.95 The accepted practice of appointing unqualified commanders to lead men
into battle placed the Fifty-Third Ohio in a difficult position during the initial Confederate
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assault on Shiloh’s first day. As Adjunct Dawes wrote during the days that followed the battle:
“Had we had a good Col. Instead of being disgraced, we would have been honored.”96

Sherman’s Scapegoat
William Tecumseh Sherman’s anger toward the Fifty-Third Ohio was based on Colonel
Appler’s decision to withdraw from the Rea Field area on the morning of April 6, 1862. The
nervous colonel ordered the retreat, and abandoned his men, after Sherman ordered him to hold
his position and promised to support the colonel. In addition, the general was with the FiftyThird Ohio when he realized his position was under attack.97 Sherman’s presence at the moment
of the attack, and the general’s later rebuke of the regiment, forever linked William Tecumseh
Sherman, the Fifty-Third Ohio, and the Battle of Shiloh together.
The Fifty-Third Ohio first met Sherman soon after the general returned to duty following
the accusation of insanity. The scornful attacks on his character and mental health deeply hurt the
general.98 First, the Cincinnati Commercial blasted him for being “insane” and berated him for
reportedly considering removing his army from Kentucky and retreating into Indiana while in
command in Bluegrass State.99 The article circulated among the Northern press appearing in
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major markets such as Chicago.100 Talks of Sherman’s “lunacy” even circulated among
members of Lincoln’s cabinet.101 When the general entered his commanding role in Kentucky,
the strong political divisions in the state increased his naturally anxious personality.102 The
Sherman that emerged from the episode was arguably more aware than ever about his public
perception.
The Fifty-Third Ohio did not collectively meet General Sherman until it arrived at
Paducah on February 23, 1862. It is unclear if any member of the regiment had any previous
encounters with the general, but at least some members must have known Sherman’s name due
to his politically powerful Ohio family.103 It is also uncertain if the regiment was aware of the
charges made against their new division commander. The widely circulated nature of the
“insanity” article indicates that members of the Fifty-Third Ohio probably read the accusations
depending on the availability of newspapers at Camp Diamond. However, there is no record that
the Fifty-Third Ohio viewed Sherman as “insane.”
When the Fifty-Third Ohio brought its reports of Confederates lurking in the woods and
fields around Pittsburg Landing, the ordeal was still fresh on Sherman’s mind. The general likely
had the accusation of insanity on his mind when he rebuked Appler’s warnings. Sherman’s use
of colorful phrases to downplay the threat may have been compensation for his previous
overestimates of enemy strength in Kentucky. It was the overestimates that eventually led to the
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accusations against the general’s mental stability. Historian James Lee McDonough presented
this argument in his biography of the general: “He overcompensated, trying to avoid the kind of
criticism he had encountered earlier in Kentucky.”104
The Fifty-Third Ohio was again caught in a situation not of its own making. It was not
the regiment who claimed the general was insane, nor did the Ohioans print the articles that
circulated the accusation. All the Fifty-Third Ohio and Colonel Appler did was properly assess
the Rebel’s intentions on April 5th and 6th.105 If Sherman did ignore the warnings due to the
similarities the buildup to Shiloh shared with the general’s Kentucky experience, the Fifty-Third
Ohio paid the price. It is impossible to calculate how the opening round of the battle would have
been different if Sherman had taken the regiment’s reports seriously, but it could have given the
Fifty-Third Ohio and the entire camp more time to prepare for the assault. Instead, the general
did not recognize the Confederate movements as an attack until Rea Field was swarming with
Rebel soldiers.106
Despite the regiment’s shortcomings, the Fifty-Third killed a large number of Rebel
soldiers. Seventy members of the Sixth Mississippi regiment were killed during the Battle of
Shiloh.107 Presumably, a large portion of those deaths were a direct result of the Fifty-Third
Ohio’s initial volleys. 300 of the 425 Mississippians who participated in the attack against the
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Fifty-Third Ohio were later listed as killed, wounded, or missing.108 Today, one of the discovered
Confederate mass burial sites is located at the edge of Rea Field. It is additionally likely that a
large portion of the soldiers buried there were the victims of the Fifty-Third Ohio’s vicious fire
on the morning of April 6th.
At least two attacks on the Fifty-Third Ohio’s position were thoroughly beaten.109 As
Adjunct Dawes remembered; “The first fire of our men was very effective. The Confederate line
fell back, rallied, came forward, received another volley, and again fell back” before Appler
ordered the retreat.110 Historian O. Edward Cunningham wrote that the “Fifty-Third Ohio was
not routed…for the company commanders on the right were of sterner stuff” than Appler.111
However, the insistence on early Civil War histories to rely on the words of the conflict’s “great”
men and leaders left the regiment’s reputation damaged. The facts of the Battle of Shiloh, and the
words of the men from the Fifty-Third Ohio, were overwhelmed in the public square by the
writings and opinions of monumental figures like Sherman.
The official report of Confederate General Patrick Cleburne referenced the effectiveness
of the Fifty-Third Ohio. The Sixth Mississippi, along with the Twenty-Third Tennessee, attacked
the Fifty-Third Ohio on April 6, 1862 under the Cleburne’s leadership.112 According to
Cleburne’s report: “The Sixth Mississippi and the Twenty-third Tennessee charged through the
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encampments of the enemy…Under terrible fire much confusion followed, and a quick and
bloody repulse was the consequence.”113 Cleburne also wrote that the Sixth Mississippi “yielded
and retreat in disorder” and the Twenty-Third Tennessee was “with difficulty rallied” after it had
fled one-hundred yards from the front.114 The Fifty-Third Ohio inflicted heavy damage on the
charging Rebels before Appler ordered the regiment to retreat.115

The Redemption of the Fifty-Third Ohio
The Fifty-Third Ohio had no record of bravery to fall back on when the accusations
against its honor mounted. Since Shiloh was the regiment’s first fight, the Fifty-Third Ohio was
without positive achievements to counter the attacks. The regiment may have been unjustly
labeled as cowards and failures at the Battle of Shiloh, but the remainder of their war record was
remembered as honorable and courageous. Despite Sherman’s continued use of the regiment as a
scapegoat for Shiloh, the general grew to respect, and depend on, the regiment.
Colonel Appler was discharged from command in the wake of his disastrous
performance.116 Captain Wells S. Jones replaced Appler as the commander of the regiment after
the majority of the Fifty-Third Ohio’s officers recommended him for the job.117 Immediately
following Shiloh, the regiment debated whether Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Fulton should move
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into Appler’s role, or if Jones should be the new regimental commander.118 Ultimately, Jones
assumed command and the regiment set out to wipe away the public perception of Shiloh.
Jones’ bravery and leadership took the regiment to new heights of battlefield success.
During the Atlanta Campaign, Jones courageously saved the regimental flag after the color
bearer was shot and the banner was in danger of falling into enemy hands.119 Jones risked his
life, saved the flag, and lifted the spirits of the Fifty-Third Ohio.120 Jones eventually gained the
rank of general and was seriously wounded during the attack on Fort McAllister on December
13, 1864.121 He survived and was mustered out with the rest of the regiment on August 11,
1865.122 Jones returned to Waverly, Ohio after the war, resumed his medical practice, and
assisted in establishing a Republican Party presence in Pike County, Ohio.123
Ephraim C. Dawes continued to show the bravery exhibited on the battlefield at Shiloh
for the duration of his service. Dawes was horrifically wounded in May of 1864 in Dallas,
Georgia.124 A Rebel bullet struck him in the jaw and caused severe damage to his face.125 His
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jaw was completely shattered requiring an experimental surgery.126 The wound forced his
discharge from the military in 1864, but his heroic exploits on the battlefield led to his promotion
to brevetted lieutenant colonel.127 Dawes continued to show courage after war by refusing to
allow the injury to hinder his efforts to tell the regiment’s story with emphasis on the Battle of
Shiloh until his death in 1895.128
Another of the regiment’s Shiloh heroes was Captain James R. Percy. At Shiloh, Percy
bravely stood with Jones and Dawes instead of Appler.129 He entered the Fifty-Third Ohio as a
private before his promotion to captain of Company F on January 1, 1862.130 Captain Percy
quickly gained a reputation as a leader and exhibited bravery throughout his service. He died on
August 18, 1864 after being shot on the frontline of a battle outside Atlanta, Georgia.131
According to Ephraim C. Dawes who fought beside Percy at Shiloh and beyond: “No braver man
died for the Union than Capt. James R. Percy.”132
In addition to the individual displays of bravery, the Fifty-Third Ohio more than
answered the call of duty following the battle of Shiloh. The War of the Rebellion: Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies indicate a regiment that won the trust and
admiration of its fellow units. The reports show that Union commanders never hesitated to rely
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on the regiment. Undoubtedly, the regiment won this respect partly due to the leadership that
replaced Appler.
Even though the regiment played a minor role in Vicksburg Campaign of 1863, it never
failed in the face of the enemy.133 After the fall of Vicksburg, the Fifty-Third Ohio successfully
crossed a river under intermittent enemy fire.134 In addition, the Ohioans engaged Confederate
forces around Jackson, Mississippi including skirmishes around the Rebel defensive works.135
Fifty-Third Ohio commanding officers wrote of his men: “With feelings of great pleasure, I
announce the fact that every officer and soldier in my command have performed their arduous
duties cheerfully. Their patience and courage well deserve the admiration of their commanding
officers and the gratitude of their country.”136
The regiment was heavily engaged during the Atlanta Campaign of 1864. General J.A.J.
Lightburn wrote of the Fifty-Third Ohio and the leadership of Colonel Wells Jones during a fiery
exchange with the Rebels. In the report, Lightburn wrote that the Ohioans were dispatched to
defeat a heavily armed group of Rebel skirmishers occupying a ridge in front of the Union
army.137 The Fifty-Third Ohio, along with the Forty-Seventh and the Forty-Fourth Ohio, were
driven back by the skirmishers.138 However, this did not cause Lightburn to view the Fifty-Third
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Ohio in a negative manner. Instead, he wrote glowingly of the regiment: “The regiments sent out
to occupy the ridge in the open field came back broken, but rallied in the main line and fought
well.”139 The Fifty-Third Ohio’s superior offered the complete assessment of service denied the
Ohioans at Shiloh by General Sherman. Overall, Lightburn included the Fifty-Third Ohio in his
assessment that “the officers and the men behaved well.”140
Wells S. Jones’ report of September 12, 1864 chronicled the entirety of the Fifty-Third
Ohio’s service during the Atlanta Campaign. The regiment remained almost constantly engaged
on the front line or in support of major maneuvers. John K. Duke remembered the regiment’s
service in a telling, but biased assertion: “It is not vainglorious to assert that no regiment in the
Army of the Mississippi did more to assist in the capture of Atlanta than did the 53rd O.V.V.I.”141
Jones’s official report balanced the service of the Fifty-Third Ohio with their fellow regiments,
but he stilled praised the efforts of his unit. According to Jones, the Fifty-Third Ohio, with the
assistance of the Thirty-Seventh Ohio, “drove the enemy out from among the fallen timber and
behind the trees to their rifle pits” in a May 13, 1864 fight on the approach to Atlanta.142
Furthermore, Jones included the Fifty-Third Ohio in his overall assessment of his brigade efforts
in the fight for Atlanta: “Too much credit cannot be given to the brave officers and men who
compose this brigade.”143
The Fifty-Third Ohio continued to build its reputation as a reliable regiment during
Sherman’s 1864 “March to the Sea.” In December, the regiment played a role in the storming of

139

Ibid.

140

Ibid.

141

Duke, History of the Fifty-Third Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry during the War of the Rebellion,

142

OR: 38, Part 3, 225

143

Ibid., 230.

158.

181

Fort McAllister. Union soldiers took control of the fort within ten minutes of the start of the
attack.144 The Fifty-Third Ohio was again praised as a part of the larger Union force when its
commanding officers wrote: “The conduct of the regiments engaged deserves the highest praise
– not a falter, but steadily on under a withering fire, until three starry banners waved from the
parapets.”145 In this battle, the beloved colonel of the Fifty-Third Ohio, Wells S. Jones, was
severely injured by a Rebel bullet transferring command of the Second Brigade of the Second
Division to Colonel Jas. S. Martin.146 The Fifty-Third Ohio then participated in the destruction of
Confederate railroads and infrastructure in Georgia to damage the Rebel war effort.147
Arguably, no praise went as far to erase the stain of Shiloh than the approval heaped on
the Fifty-Third Ohio by General Sherman in June of 1864. Even though the debate over Shiloh
continued, Sherman spoke highly of the regiment he once publicly berated. His June 13, 1864
correspondence with Professor Henry Coppee contained the following:
I also take great pleasure in adding that nearly all the troops that at Shiloh drew
from me official censure have more than redeemed their good name; among them
that very regiment that first broke, the Fifty-third Ohio, Colonel Appler. Under
another leader, Colonel Jones, it has shared every campaign and expedition of
mine since; is with me now and can march and bivouac and fight as well as the
best regiment in this or any army. Its reputation now is equal to that of any from
the State of Ohio.148
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Sherman’s inclusion of his negative assessment of the regiment at Shiloh further indicates
the festering nature of his displeasure from April 6, 1862. However, the statement shows the
impact of the change in leadership, and the regiment’s full war record, on Sherman’s overall
perception of the Fifty-Third Ohio. While it is impossible to calculate the full influence of
Sherman’s post-Shiloh rebuke on the Fifty-Third Ohio, it is clear that the regiment had
transformed its reputation by the start of the Atlanta Campaign. In this regard, the Fifty-Third
Ohio had regained the honor lost from the censures of Shiloh and proved their collective
worthiness of manhood of the Civil War Era.
The record of the Fifty-Third Ohio is one of a regiment that met every challenge of the
war. The events connected to Appler’s retreat were an aberration when the remainder of the
regiment’s service is considered. Even though the perceived failures of the Battle of Shiloh’s
earliest moments were related to factors beyond the regiment’s control, they were also connected
to the leadership of J.J. Appler. Once the Fifty-Third Ohio was freed from his command, the
regiment performed admirably. The regiment stood up to the Rebel onslaught after Appler
abandoned them on April 6, 1862. In the command vacuum created by his departure, true leaders
came to the forefront. Once Appler was out of the picture, the true character and capability of the
Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry rose to the surface.

Grand Review and Mustered Out
On May 24, 1865, the Fifty-Third Ohio arrived in Washington, D.C. for the Grand
Review. The regiment spent the previous night six miles from the city and marched into
Washington, joined the Review, and marched by the stand of dignitaries around 11a.m. Like
most of the soldiers from the Western Theater, the Fifty-Third Ohio walked through the
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celebration “bronzed, ragged, shoeless, and dirty; but the healthiest and bravest lot of dare-devils
that ever paraded in review before the American public.”149 The armies of the West may not
have looked as fancy as the Army of the Potomac, but their credentials were undeniable.150
The Fifty-Third Ohio was a green regiment that first faced enemy fire on April 6, 1862
near the banks of the Tennessee River. They emerged from the war as hardened and effective
group of veterans. The Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry were present at sixty-nine
engagements. By the time the Ohioans mustered out in August 1865, they had travelled
approximately 6,400 miles. The journey from Camp Diamond to Little Rock, Arkansas was more
than a geographical journey through the reunited states, it was also an expedition of character.151
The men of the regiment learned if they were worthy of the era’s title of man, or if their honor
would be irreversibly tarnished by battlefields.
Shiloh became a national battlefield when President Grover Cleveland signed legislation
for its creation on December 27, 1894.152 Today, a monument to the Fifty-Third Ohio stands in
the middle of Rea Field. A marker designating the regiment’s campsite is located just a few steps
away.153 The monument to the Fifty-Third Ohio was a part of the larger effort to remember the
service of all Ohioans at the Battle of Shiloh. The state of Ohio dedicated the first monuments on
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the new national battlefield on June 6, 1902.154 Thirty-four markers were transferred to the
national government from Ohio before an assembled crowd of approximately two-thousand
spectators.155
During the dedication ceremony, Judge David F. Pugh addressed the crowd and honored
the sacrifice and bravery of Ohioans at Shiloh. Pugh had been selected the chairman of the
committee overseeing the Ohio Shiloh monuments partly due to his status as one of the youngest
Ohioans to serve in the clash forty years prior. The mood of the day was about reconciliation
between the once warring geographic factions of the United States and remembrance for the
Ohio soldiers whose bodies were buried at the battlefield. The debates that followed the battle,
including the dispute between General Sherman and the Fifty-Third Ohio, were not a part of the
festivities. Even a delegate from Mississippi whose soldiers crashed into the Fifty-Third Ohio’s
line on the morning of April 6, 1862 attended the ceremony to greet his state’s former enemy as
friends.156 According to Timothy B. Smith, “patriotism, reconciliation, and honor were very
much in the minds of the park builders.”157
Pugh spoke highly of the Ohio soldiers at Shiloh: “We are here today to dedicate the
monuments erected by the state of Ohio to commemorate the achievements of Ohio dead…
Whether they should wear a harp and crown was not the question that was uppermost in their
minds. Their supreme desire was to do their duty to country, and the rest they left to God.”158 In
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addition, the chairman collectively sainted the Ohioans who died as Shiloh by telling the crowd
that “they were more than heroes. They were heroes plus the qualities which constitute
patriots.”159 Even though Pugh never directly referenced the Fifty-Third Ohio in his dedication
speech, his sentiments could have provided the regiment’s veterans with some solace to know
that their fallen comrades were venerated as heroes of the battle that plagued their regimental
reputation.
The monument to the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry does not address the
controversy that followed the battle. It simply states the regiment was commanded by Colonel
Appler and Lieutenant-Colonel Robert A. Fulton. The designations that the regiment was a part
of Sherman’s Fifth Division, Hildebrand’s Third Brigade, and the Army of the Tennessee are
also listed. Furthermore, the numbers of dead, wounded, and missing are listed with the
inscription: “This regiment formed here at 8 a.m., April 6, 1862, but soon fell back across the
ravine in the rear.”160
The words on the Fifty-Third Ohio’s Shiloh monument are left open to the interpretation
of the reader to decide whether the regiment fell back in disgrace or fell back to continue the
fight. The regiment may have been tangled in the controversaries that followed Shiloh, but its
tarnished reputation was due to outside factors. In addition, the remainder of the regiment’s
wartime service showed that any momentary negligence of duty at Shiloh was the result of bad
leadership and an anomaly in comparison to the rest of the war. When considering a more
complete version of the Fifty-Third Ohio’s history at Shiloh, it is clear that the Ohioans fought as
well as possible given the circumstances of the regiment’s creation and were unjustly labeled as
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cowards by early Civil War historians who relied exclusively on the writings of the war’s biggest
names.
For too long, histories like the Fifty-Third Ohio at the Battle of Shiloh were told
exclusively through the interpretation of traditional military history. The regiment was generally
presented as only a piece of the larger Shiloh narrative without any consideration to its
background. This interpretation undoubtedly assisted in solidifying the regiment’s negative
portrayal in battle’s early historiography. However, with the advent of new military history
techniques, the Fifty-Third Ohio’s Shiloh story can be interpreted within the larger contexts of
social, political, religious, and cultural histories of the Civil War Era.161
The Fifty-Third Ohio was not a failed regiment that fled in the face of the enemy on the
morning of April 6, 1862, but a regiment betrayed by a lack of leadership, poor supplies,
inadequate training, and hindered by the negative factors facing all regiments in the Union and
Confederate armies. Furthermore, the Fifty-Third Ohio was a regiment dedicated to defending its
honor from the accusations that followed the battle with the same dedication that prompted
Dawes, Jones, Percy, and Fulton to stay in the fight long after Colonel Appler fled the scene. The
story of the Fifty-Third Ohio at Shiloh is a history of Civil War Era honor, courage, and
masculinity as well as of reputation and memory.
Furthermore, the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry’s Shiloh story did not begin on the
morning of April 6, 1862 and did not end with the last shots of the battle. Every event that
brought the regiment to the banks of the Tennessee River is vital to understanding how the Fifty-
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Third Ohio responded to its first sight of hostile Rebels charging its line. Similarly, every printed
debate and paper read before veterans’ committees that fought over control of the Shiloh
narrative in the battle’s immediate aftermath as well as in the postbellum era are essential to
understanding the full picture of the Fifty-Third Ohio at the Battle of Shiloh.
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Conclusion
Arguably, John K. Duke’s History of the Fifty-Third Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry
during the War of the Rebellion was the culmination of the regiment’s effort to combat the
assault on its honor caused by the lingering accusation of cowardice at Shiloh. Before presenting
his full defense of the Fifty-Third Ohio, Duke’s second chapter set the stage for the arguments
that followed. Chapters three through seven could be viewed as a closing argument in the
regiment’s defense. Duke called upon the words of Sherman, Ephraim C. Dawes, Confederate
Basil Duke, and others as evidence that the Fifty-Third Ohio performed admirably in the face of
the enemy at Shiloh.1 In addition, Duke insisted that the regiment was left improperly prepared
and ill-equipped for fight that surprised Grant’s army on April 6, 1863. Duke was not presenting
his evidence in a formal judicial setting, but fighting for his regiment’s honor in the court of
public opinion.
The Fifty-Third Ohio was unjustly labeled as cowards in the immediate aftermath of the
battle by General William Tecumseh Sherman. The accusation haunted the regiment long after
the last of its members passed away. Even though the majority of the blame for failing to hold its
initial position was transferred to Colonel Appler, the stain of Shiloh remained. In the Civil War
Era, accusations like Sherman’s were devastating to the period’s concepts of honor, manhood,
and duty. For these reasons, the regiment fought as hard with the pen and the speaker’s podium
to erase the stain of Shiloh as it had on that battlefield during the spring of 1862. The newspapers
of southern Ohio, as well as the papers written for the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the
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United States and the Grand Army of the Republic War Papers, provided the men of the FiftyThird Ohio with the opportunity to tell their Shiloh experience.
Overall, the story of the Fifty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry at Shiloh is a story of Civil
War honor, manhood, and duty. But it is also a story of reputation, memory, and historiography.
The lack of major historical works focused on Shiloh during the first half of the Twentieth
Century ensured that the regiment’s place in the battle’s historiography was cemented in the
negative portrayal of major figures like William Tecumseh Sherman and Don Carlos Buell. The
Fifty-Third Ohio was at the mercy of the interpretations of the war’s most visible and popular
generals.
After reviewing the overall story of Shiloh, the evidence portrays the Fifty-Third Ohio as
a collection of able soldiers who performed admirably in the face of daunting circumstance. The
regiment came to Pittsburg Landing without proper training and under the command of the
unqualified J.J. Appler. Still, Appler repeatedly warned his superiors, including General
Sherman, of the impending danger before the first the shots of the battle of Shiloh were fired.
The Fifty-Third Ohio met the Rebel onslaught, changed its command in the midst of battle, and
overcame its deficiencies only to be publicly berated by General Sherman and used as a
scapegoat for Union high command. After examining the evidence, the Fifty-Third Ohio
Volunteer Infantry was wrongfully criticized for its perceived failure at Shiloh, and became the
subject of unjustly critical historiography that failed to take into account poor leadership,
inadequate training, supply-chain issues, and General Sherman’s scapegoating of the regiment.
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